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ABSTRACT

There is considerable evidence in the audit literature that even though auditors
usually identify the relevant information needed to propose and select the correct cause of
an unexpected fluctuation, they frequently do not propose the correct cause, and even
when they do propose the correct cause, they often fail to select it. I suggest that working
memory limitations might be a factor contributing to this analytical review paradox.
Consequently, this study investigates whether two new decision aids, designed from
Cognitive Load Theory, reduce auditors’ cognitive load during analytical review, freeing
cognitive resources for problem solving, and ultimately leading to improved auditor
analytical review effectiveness. My first decision aid, an activity relationship diagram
(ARD), gives the auditor a graphical depiction of common accounting relationships. My
second decision aid, a pattern-consideration aid (PCA), automatically recalls and
textually displays the auditor-identified relevant information cues. In an experimental
setting, I find that auditors who rely on either decision aid significantly improve their
analytical review effectiveness compared to auditors who conduct analytical review
unaided. However, contrary to my predictions, auditors who rely on both decision aids
do not outperform auditors who rely on only one decision aid. Although I find empirical
evidence that cognitive load is negatively related to analytical review effectiveness, I do
not find evidence that my decision aids reduce cognitive load.
vii

1.0 INTRODUCTION

When performing financial statement audits, external auditors around the world
employ analytical review because it is consistent with their desire to conduct the audit
from a holistic, risk-based approach (Trompeter and Wright 2010) and because
conducting analytical review is presumptively mandatory under audit standards (AICPA
2010a; IAASB 2010a).1 Analytical review is used during audit planning “…to assist in
planning the nature, timing, and extent of auditing procedures that will be used to obtain
audit evidence for specific account balances or classes of transactions” (AICPA 2010a,
paragraph 6), during fieldwork to evaluate and support financial statement assertions, and
during overall review to evaluate the reasonableness of the financial statements (AICPA
2010a, paragraph 9 and paragraph 23, respectively). Thus, auditors use analytical review
as an attention-directing device to identify and assess risk and to obtain audit evidence.
This study examines auditors’ analytical review effectiveness during audit planning and
in audit fieldwork to evaluate financial statement assertions.
Analytical review is the “…diagnostic process of identifying, investigating, and
resolving unexpected fluctuations.” (Koonce 1993, p. 57). An unexpected fluctuation
arises when there is a significant difference between a client’s reported balance and the

1

The PCAOB adopted AU 329’s promulgation as part of the body of interim auditing standards.
Conducting analytical review during the audit planning stage and final review stage is presumptively
mandatory.

1

auditor’s expectation for that balance.2 The auditor formulates the expectation based on
many factors. For example, the expectation should be based on the auditor’s
understanding of the client and the industry in which the client operates (AICPA 2010a).
To identify unexpected fluctuations, the auditor applies analytical procedures which
“…involve comparisons of recorded amounts, or ratios developed from recorded
amounts, to expectations developed by the auditor.” (AICPA 2010a, paragraph 5).
Although the terms analytical review and analytical procedures are often used
interchangeably in the audit literature, analytical procedures refer only to the specific
tests an auditor performs while conducting analytical review, such as the calculation of a
ratio (Koonce 1993). Thus, analytical procedures are used during the analytical review
process. Although audit standards use the term analytical procedures, the spirit behind
the standards’ use clearly indicates auditors should conduct analytical review to achieve
the audit objectives.3
After an unexpected fluctuation has been identified the auditor engages in three
stages to investigate and resolve the unexpected fluctuation. First, the auditor generates
hypotheses that can potentially explain why the fluctuation occurred. The process of
obtaining hypotheses fuels an information search, though the hypotheses obtained often
set the boundaries of the search (Asare and Wright 2001). Next, the auditor evaluates the
2

The auditor’s expectation is not necessarily expressed solely as a point-estimate, as auditors frequently
establish thresholds, or upper and lower boundaries of tolerable expectation deviation. When a clientreported balance exceeds the threshold an unexpected fluctuation exists.
3

For example, ISA 520 defines analytical procedures as “…evaluations of financial information through
analysis of plausible relationships among both financial and non-financial data. Analytical procedures also
encompass such investigation as is necessary of identified fluctuations or relationships that are inconsistent
with other relevant information or that differ from expected values by a significant amount.” (IAASB
2010a, paragraph 4). The ASB is in the process of revising AU 329 such that the current redraft defines
analytical procedures in exactly the same terms as ISA 520. If adopted, the ASB’s proposal will be
effective for audits ending on or after December 15, 2012.

2

merits of each proposed hypothesis against the relevant information. After evaluating
each hypothesis, the auditor may decide none correctly explain the cause of the
unexpected fluctuation; if so, he or she returns to the hypothesis generation stage.
Alternatively, the auditor may select a hypothesis as the cause of the unexpected
fluctuation, ending the analytical review process.4 The analytical review literature
classifies these three stages as hypothesis generation, hypothesis evaluation, and
hypothesis selection, respectively. These three stages are the focus of this study; Figure 1
presents an illustration of all the stages associated with conducting analytical review and
denotes the stages investigated within this study.

FIGURE 1. Illustration of All Stages Associated With Analytical Review.

4

In practice, an unexpected fluctuation can be comprised of one or many causes. Thus, to fully explain an
unexpected fluctuation the auditor needs to obtain a hypothesis that identifies all causes. Within this study,
the unexpected fluctuation I employ arises from only one cause. While consistent with prior analytical
review research, the use of only one correct cause is an abstraction from practice in situations where an
unexpected fluctuation is comprised of multiple causes. This abstraction is employed for interpretation
tractability. A detailed discussion of this abstraction is presented in the method section.

3

I investigate these three stages because there is considerable evidence in the
literature that it is difficult for auditors to propose, evaluate, and select the correct cause
of an unexpected fluctuation, giving rise to an analytical review paradox: Even though
auditors usually identify the relevant information needed to propose and select the correct
cause of an unexpected fluctuation, they frequently do not propose the correct cause, and
even when they do propose the correct cause, they often fail to select it (Bedard and
Biggs 1991; Anderson and Koonce 1995; Bedard, Biggs, and Maroney 1998; Asare and
Wright 2001; Asare and Wright 2003; Green and Trotman 2003; Green 2004).5 A
theoretical explanation for this problem is that the cognitive requirements of the task
exceed the auditor’s available cognitive resources. Specifically, I suggest that although
auditors can identify the pieces of information required to propose the correct cause of
the unexpected fluctuation, the cognitive load placed upon the auditor’s working memory
can exceed its capacity.6 As a result, I suggest working memory limitations frequently
cause the auditor to conduct ineffective analytical review.
This study investigates the analytical review effectiveness of inexperienced
auditors during hypothesis generation, hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis selection.
Although standards allow inexperienced auditors to perform analytical review, the
existing literature focuses almost exclusively on experienced auditors even though it
seems likely that inexperienced auditors should have greater difficulty performing
analytical review. Thus, it seems reasonable to expect that inexperienced auditors may

5

The research cited here examined the analytical review effectiveness of experienced auditors that were
asked to perform an analytical review task in an experimental setting.
6

Cognitive load is defined as the burden placed upon working memory when conducting a task (Sweller
1988). Working memory is the amount of memory used by an individual to retain and process current
information (Baddeley 1992).

4

perform analytical review less effectively than experienced auditors. Given that staff
auditors now conduct analytical review 48 percent of the time (Trompeter and Wright
2010), there is a need for research that examines the analytical review effectiveness of
inexperienced auditors to complement and extend prior research that has examined the
analytical review effectiveness of experienced auditors.7
I apply Cognitive Load Theory (Sweller 1988) to examine whether inexperienced
auditors’ judgment and decision making performance can be improved by reducing the
cognitive load placed upon them during analytical review. Using Cognitive Load Theory
as the foundation for the creation of two new decision aids, I examine whether the use of
these aids can help to reduce auditors’ cognitive load during the analytical review,
leading to improved analytical review effectiveness. The first decision aid that I designed
and developed is an activity relationship diagram (ARD), gives the auditor a graphical
depiction of common accounting relationships. This aid should help an auditor recall
common accounting relationships during the analytical review task, reducing the
auditor’s cognitive load by eliminating the need to expend cognitive resources recalling
and maintaining common accounting relationships in working memory. By graphically
presenting common accounting relationships to auditors, the aid should heighten the
salience of these relationships, which should help the auditor to generate, evaluate, and
select the correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation. The second decision aid that I
designed and developed is a pattern-consideration aid (PCA), automatically recalls and
textually displays the auditor-identified relevant information cues. The PCA should help

7

Since this study is concerned with investigating the analytical review effectiveness of inexperienced
auditors (i.e., staff auditors) tasked with performing analytical review, hereafter the term "auditor" in this
study refers to inexperienced auditors and not those with relatively high levels of audit experience such as
senior and manager level auditors.

5

an auditor to accurately recall and simultaneously consider the relevant information cues
during the analytical review task, reducing the auditor’s cognitive load by eliminating the
need to expend cognitive resources recalling and maintaining the relevant cues in
working memory. By textually presenting the auditor-identified relevant cues, the PCA
should heighten the salience of the cues, helping the auditor to consider the cues while
conducting hypothesis generation, ultimately helping the auditor to generate the correct
hypothesis. The PCA should also improve hypothesis evaluation and hypothesis
selection by permitting the auditor to identify and select the hypothesis that is best
supported by the auditor-identified relevant cues.
This study is important because an auditor’s failure to correctly generate,
evaluate, and select the actual cause of an unexpected fluctuation can negatively impact
both audit effectiveness and audit efficiency. For example, failing to correctly attribute
an unexpected increase in gross margin to accounting error can lead to misstated financial
statements. Audit failure can result if the auditor fails to identify misstatements that
individually, or in the aggregate, materially misrepresent a company’s financial position.
At a minimum, conducting analytical review ineffectively has audit efficiency
consequences. Specifically, if an auditor fails to select the correct cause of an unexpected
fluctuation during analytical review, subsequent fieldwork by way of audit procedures
may be unproductively channeled to relatively low risk audit areas, resulting in
needlessly high audit costs. Although the cause of the unexpected fluctuation may
ultimately be uncovered during fieldwork, such detection would be accompanied by high
audit costs, which could have been avoided if the initial analytical review had been
effective. Thus, an auditor may be required to perform analytical review a second time to

6

explain the same unexpected fluctuation. Consequently, there are negative consequences
associated with ineffective analytical review. Within this study, I use the term analytical
review effectiveness to refer to auditor performance in three stages: hypothesis
generation, hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis selection.
Two recent trends suggest that accounting firms remain at risk for conducting
ineffective analytical review: First, analytical review constitutes an increasingly large
part of the audit engagement budget. According to Trompeter and Wright (2010),
analytical review constitutes approximately 25 percent of an audit engagement’s
budgeted hours (as of mid-2005) compared to 21 percent of the engagement hours during
the period 1998 to 2003. This trend is consistent with the findings of Ameen and
Strawser (1994), who present evidence that approximately 15 percent of an audit
engagement’s budget was allocated to analytical review during the early 1990’s. Thus,
recent accounting scandals and legislation notwithstanding, analytical review continues to
play an increasingly larger role in financial statement audits. Second, audit firms are
progressively employing staff auditors to conduct analytical review; staff auditors now
conduct analytical review 48 percent of the time (Trompeter and Wright 2010) compared
to ten percent of the time as reported by Hirst and Koonce’s (1996).8 Thus, analytical
review is increasingly being performed by auditors with less audit experience than in the
past.
Accounting firms have expended significant resources developing audit aids to
improve auditor judgment and decision making (O’Donnell and Perkins 2011). “Industry
8

Trompeter and Wright (2010) note that although less experienced staff (i.e., staff auditors) now frequently
conduct analytical review, experienced auditors (i.e. audit seniors and above) generally design the
analytical review tests. Thus, inexperienced auditors are often the ones who propose, evaluate, and select
the cause of the unexpected fluctuation, which are the three stages of analytical review this study examines.
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packs” are an example of an audit aid used by each of the Big 4 public accounting firms
to improve auditor judgment and decision making. An industry pack automatically
tailors each client’s audit plan to directly address industry-specific risks. Industry packs
also prompt the auditor to consider management’s integrity when formulating the audit
plan (Dowling and Leech 2007). However, accounting research finds that decision aids
are “rarely used” during analytical review (Trompeter and Wright 2010, p. 690).9 It is
therefore not surprising that relatively few accounting studies have investigated decision
aids within the context of analytical review (O’Donnell and Perkins 2011). A potential
explanation for the absence of decision aids during analytical review may be that
experienced decision makers tend to ignore or under-rely on decision aids because they
do not want to surrender their own judgment to the aid (Rose 2002). Since analytical
review was largely conducted by experienced auditors in the past, decision aids may have
been considered unwanted or unnecessary. Given that audit firms are increasingly using
inexperienced auditors to conduct analytical review, and since it is reasonable to expect
that inexperienced auditors are just as prone to the analytical review paradox as
experienced auditors, this study is important because it tests the effectiveness of two
decision aids that can be used to help inexperienced auditors perform analytical review.
The use of decision aids within this context should be especially helpful because research
finds inexperienced users to be more likely to place reliance upon decision aids compared
to experienced users (Rose 2002).

9

Additional indirect evidence is provided by Dowling and Leech (2007), who examine the audit support
systems and decision aids of the Big Four and find that while the audit systems of some firms have
rudimentary analytical review aids such as ratio calculators, none of the Big Four firms used decision aids
to perform the analytical review steps examined in this study. As the audit practices of the Big Four are
highly standardized, the Dowling and Leech (2007) study provides evidence that the decision aids utilized
in this study are not already widely used in practice.

8

Prior audit decision aid research demonstrates that while decision aids can
improve task performance (Blocher et al. 1983; McDaniel and Kinney 1995; Mueller and
Anderson 2002), decision aids can also introduce new biases (Pincus 1989; Glover et al.
1997; Kowalczyk and Wolfe 1998). Thus, when introducing a decision aid into a new
context it is important to investigate what impact it has upon existing judgment and
decision making processes. For these reasons, the findings of prior decision aid research
cannot automatically be extended to the setting in this study, i.e., analytical review being
conducted by inexperienced auditors.
In a between-subjects experiment, I manipulate one factor, decision aids, at four
levels. The four levels of the decision aid factor are: (1) a no-aid intervention, (2) an
activity relationship diagram intervention, (3) a pattern-consideration aid intervention,
and (4) a combined-aid intervention, where participants are provided with both an
activity relationship diagram and a pattern-consideration aid.10 Participants are masters of
accountancy (MAcc) students and accounting seniors who serve as proxies for
inexperienced auditors. Applying Cognitive Load Theory, I predict auditors’ analytical
review effectiveness can be improved by reducing the cognitive load placed upon them.
Thus, I examine what impact the two decision aids utilized in this study have on the
cognitive load experienced by auditors during analytical review and I examine the impact
that reducing cognitive load has on analytical review effectiveness. I suggest that
cognitive load mediates the relationship between decision aid use and analytical review
effectiveness and I conduct mediation analysis to test this assertion.

10

I do not suggest that my two decision aids are the normative standard. Instead, I examine whether the two
decision aids utilized within this study are a step towards improving auditors judgment and decision
making during analytical review. Therefore, unlike proof-of-concept research, this study does not attempt
to demonstrate the feasibility of a new method or principle.

9

This study responds to Bonner’s (1999) call for research to mitigate known
judgment and decision making deficiencies. Bonner categorizes judgment and decision
making deficiencies in terms of task, person, and environmental factors. Thus, I address
her call by introducing two new decision aids that are designed from theory to help
attenuate known auditor (i.e., person) judgment and decision making deficiencies.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In the Background
and Literature Review section, I present a literature review. In the Hypotheses
Development section, I discuss this study’s decision aids in depth and develop and
propose my hypotheses. In the Method section, I discuss the experimental design, the
task, and the participants employed. In the Results section, I discuss the statistical tests
associated with testing each hypothesis and present the results of hypothesis testing.
Finally, the Summary and Conclusion section discusses the implications of my findings,
highlights the study’s contributions, recognizes the study’s limitations, and presents
future research opportunities.

10

2.0 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Analytical Review Context
AU 329, Analytical Procedures, describes the three ways analytical review may
be used during the audit: to help plan the audit, as a substantive test in support of specific
financial statement assertions, and as a form of reasonableness testing during the final
review stage of the engagement (AICPA 2010a).11 Although there are numerous
analytical review techniques available (i.e. use of accounting ratios, trend analysis, etc)
the universal rationale for using any technique is to provide assurance that financial
statement assertions are not materially misstated.
2.1.1 The Role of Analytical Review in Audit Planning.
The traditional role of analytical review within the United States has been to help
formulate the audit plan (Hirst and Koonce 1996). Per AU 329, “The purpose of applying
analytical procedures in planning the audit is to assist in planning the nature, timing, and
extent of auditing procedures that will be used to obtain audit evidence for specific
account balances or classes of transactions.” (AICPA 2010a, paragraph 6). In other
words, the auditor should conduct planning stage analytical review to identify areas of the
financial statements with the highest potential for misstatement by identifying those

11

This promulgation was adopted by the PCAOB as part of the body of interim auditing standards.
However, the PCAOB has recently made some changes to the interim standard. For example, PCAOB
Audit Standard 14, Evaluating Audit Results, now establishes the requirements regarding the performance
of analytical procedures as part of the overall review stage of the audit.
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accounts that vary significantly from auditor-developed expectations. Planning stage
analytical review is typically used to calibrate the scope and intensity of substantive
testing planned for a specific financial statement area; substantive testing tends to be
heavier in areas where the risk of misstatement is deemed to be higher (Trompeter and
Wright 2010). Consequently, the use of analytical review during audit planning is not
only consistent with risk-assessment audit standards, but also amenable to practitioners’
desire to formulate a risk-based, efficient audit plan. In the past, planning stage analytical
review was conducted by only experienced auditors (Hirst and Koonce 1996;
Abdolmohammadi 1999). However, a recent study by Trompeter and Wright (2010)
finds that public accounting firms are increasingly using less experienced auditors to
perform, though not design, analytical review. For example, Trompeter and Wright
(2010) find that while seniors and managers design the analytical procedures to be used
80 percent of the time, staff auditors perform analytical review approximately 48 percent
of the time.
2.1.2 Using Analytical Review to Support Financial Statement Assertions.
Although AU 329 does not require auditors to use analytical review as a
substantive test to support financial statement assertions, it legitimizes the use of
analytical review for this purpose, subject to four considerations. Per AU 329, “The
expected effectiveness and efficiency of an analytical procedure in identifying potential
misstatements depends on, among other things, (a) the nature of the assertion, (b) the
plausibility and predictability of the relationship, (c) the availability and reliability of the
data used to develop the expectation, and (d) the precision of the expectation” (AICPA
2010a, paragraph 11). The goal of using analytical review to support financial statement

12

assertions is to determine the fairness of one or more financial statement account
balances. In contrast to audit planning, where the auditor typically uses highly
aggregated financial information, analytical review used to support financial statement
assertions is often applied using disaggregated data (Hirst and Koonce 1996). Thus,
auditors using analytical review to test assertions may use data from a division or product
line as opposed to the firm level (Hirst and Koonce 1996).
International Standard on Auditing 520, Analytical Procedures (ISA 520),
legitimizes the use of analytical review as a substantive test to support financial statement
assertions (IAASB 2010a). Similar to US audit standards, international auditing
standards require the auditor to consider several factors before using analytical review as
a substantive test to support financial statement assertions. Specifically, the auditor
should determine the suitability of the analytical procedure employed for testing the
assertion, evaluate the reliability of the data from which the auditor’s expectation is
developed, develop an expectation sufficiently precise to identify misstatements, and
determine the amount of deviation from auditor expectations that is acceptable without
further investigation (IAASB 2010a).
2.1.3 The Role of Analytical Review in the Overall Review Stage.
Performing analytical review during the overall review stage of the audit is
presumptively mandatory under both US and international audit standards. AU 329
states that the auditor should employ analytical review during the overall review stage to
“…assist the auditor in assessing the conclusions reached and in the evaluation of the
overall financial statement presentation.” (AICPA 2010a, paragraph 23). Similarly, ISA
520 states “The auditor shall design and perform analytical procedures near the end of the

13

audit that assist the auditor when forming an overall conclusion as to whether the
financial statements are consistent with the auditor’s understanding of the entity.”
(IAASB 2010a, paragraph 6). Thus, standard setting bodies around the world recognize
that conducting analytical review during the final stage of the audit serves as an overall
reasonableness test to evaluate the financial statements as a whole. Consequently, the
standards imply that analytical review detects unusual or inconsistent patterns that may
go unnoticed during fieldwork.12
2.2 The Value of Analytical Review
When analytical review is applied correctly, empirical evidence demonstrates it
can be effective in detecting misstatements. For example, Hylas and Ashton (1982)
present evidence that when financial statement errors are identified during an
engagement, analytical review was the tool that identified them 40 percent of the time.
Loebbecke and Steinbart (1987) find that analytical review can be effective in detecting
errors and Kinney (1987) applies a model to demonstrate how analytical review can
effectively identify material misstatements when reasonably disaggregated data (e.g., by
store, department, product line, etc) are used.
Within the practitioner literature, Joseph T. Wells, a well-known fraud examiner,
discusses how the use of analytical review would have enabled ZZZZ Best’s auditor to
easily identify client fraud risks (Wells 2001). Further, Wells suggests that analytical
review is an effective tool for identifying fraud because client personnel are generally
unable to manipulate all the information necessary to produce normal or expected
account relationships or account balances (Wells 2007). In summary, regardless of
12

Although audit standards permit staff auditors to conduct analytical review during overall review stage,
this study does not examine this use of analytical review because an informal conversation with two Big
Four managers suggests that staff auditors do not perform analytical review during the overall review stage.
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whether a material financial misstatement is caused by error or fraud, the audit standards,
academic literature, and practitioner literature all suggest analytical review is a useful
tool for identifying material misstatements.
Recognizing the value of analytical review procedures, standard setting bodies
around the world have promulgated standards prescribing the use of analytical review in
a variety of risk assessment contexts. For example, within the United States both the
PCAOB and the ASB have adopted a set of risk assessment standards that require
auditors to gain an in-depth understanding of the client, client operating environment, and
client internal control. The purpose of requiring this in-depth understanding is to help the
auditor assess the risk of material misstatement.13 AU 314, Understanding the Entity and
Its Environment and Assessing the Risks of Material Misstatement, contains a
presumptively mandatory requirement that the auditor use analytical review to help
develop this understanding (AICPA 2010b). Similarly, PCAOB Auditing Standard No.
12, Identifying and Assessing Risks of Material Misstatement, specifies that the auditor
should apply analytical review designed to enhance the auditor’s understanding of the
client’s business, to identify significant transactions occurring since year-end, and to test
revenue accounts to identify unusual or unexpected relationships (PCAOB 2010). In a
fraud risk-assessment context, AU 316, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement
Audit, suggests that the auditor should consider results of analytical review procedures
performed during audit planning as part of the information consulted to identify risks of
material misstatement due to fraud (AICPA 2010c). Finally, International Standards on
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Statements on Auditing Standards No. 104 – 111 are the ASB’s risk assessment standards (AICPA 2007).
Similarly, Auditing Standards 8-15 are the PCAOB’s risk assessment standards (PCAOB 2010). Both ASB
and PCAOB risk assessment standards are effective now. The SEC recently approved the PCAOB’s risk
assessment standards on December 23, 2010 (SEC 2010).
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Auditing also prescribe the use of analytical review to help identify and assess risk. For
example, International Standard on Auditing 315, Identifying and Assessing the Risk of
Material Misstatement Through Understanding the Entity and Its Environment (ISA
315), makes it presumptively mandatory for the auditor to apply analytical review to
identify and assess risks of material misstatement at the financial statement and assertion
level (IAASB 2010b). In sum, the fact that global standard setting bodies continue to
expand the recommended applications of analytical review to achieve a wide variety of
audit objectives highlights the importance of analytical review as a valuable audit tool.
2.3 The Analytical Review Task Setting
As opposed to contexts where auditors typically work in groups, such as fraudrisk brainstorming (Lynch, Murthy, and Engle 2009), analytical review is generally
conducted individually.14 Thus, an auditor must utilize his or her accounting-domain and
client-specific knowledge for effective performance. For example, an auditor conducting
analytical review must understand how each financial statement account relates to
another (accounting domain knowledge), understand the client’s business operations
(client-specific knowledge), then synthesize his or her domain- and context-specific
knowledge to make inferences about how client activities should affect financial
reporting.
Once an unexpected fluctuation is identified, the audit literature categorizes
analytical review into three distinct, though inter-related, and sometimes iterative stages:
hypothesis generation (and information search), hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis
selection (Koonce 1993; Asare and Wright 1997; Asare and Wright 2001). These stages
14

This does not imply that analytical review is conducted by an individual in a vacuum. Since auditors
generally conduct an audit as part of a team, discussions between auditors can and do occur. However,
audit standards do not require analytical review to be conducted by more than one individual.
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end when the auditor identifies, evaluates, and selects a hypothesis as the cause of the
unexpected fluctuation. In this study, I investigate the analytical review effectiveness of
inexperienced auditors during these three stages. Although Koonce (1993) and Asare and
Wright (2001) classify the subsequent action taken by an auditor after hypothesis
selection as part of the hypothesis selection stage, I suggest that since inexperienced
auditors are increasingly performing analytical review it is more appropriate to recognize
the subsequent action taken by an auditor in a new “subsequent action stage” because
inexperienced auditors are unlikely to be the ones to decide what subsequent action to
take (Abdolmohammadi 1999; Trompeter and Wright 2010). Figure 1 illustrates the
stages of analytical review and denotes the three stages examined within this study.
Since analytical review can be cognitively demanding, this study explores the use of
decision aids to mitigate the effects of excessive cognitive load. Applying Cognitive
Load Theory, I suggest the use of decision aids during analytical review should reduce
the cognitive load placed upon the auditor, leading to more effective task performance.
Thus, I expect cognitive load to mediate the relationship between decision aid use and
task effectiveness.
To explain why I predict the use of decision aids will lead to more effective
analytical review, I next provide an examination of the decision aid literature and
Cognitive Load Theory. Then, I provide an in-depth examination of the hypothesis
generation stage, the hypothesis evaluation stage, and hypothesis selection stage,
identifying known auditor judgment and decision making deficiencies and apply
Cognitive Load Theory to explain these deficiencies. Finally, I discuss how the
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deficiencies I identify may be mitigated by using decision aids that are designed to reduce
cognitive load.
2.4 Decision Aids
Decision aids are tools designed to improve decision quality by addressing
specific aspects of the judgment and decision making process (Rose 2002). Decision aids
are perceived to have positive effects on the quality of an individual’s judgment and
decision making. Research in both accounting and psychology examines a wide variety
of decision aid designs, ranging from simple instructions such as “be sure to consider
inherent client risk when planning the audit” to complex expert systems created to make
the decision quality of a novice comparable to that of an expert (Bonner 2008). Decision
aids have also been investigated in a myriad of contexts. A considerable body of research
supports the notion that decision aids outperform unaided humans; decision aids can
improve decision making and decision quality (Kleinmuntz 1990; Benbasat and Nault
1990; Eining, Jones, and Loebbecke 1997), overcome cognitive constraints (Butler 1985),
and improve judgment consistency (Ashton 1992). Further, decision-aid users have been
found to process information more consistently than non-aid users (Peterson and Pitz
1986; Ashton 1992).
Within the audit literature, decision aids are perceived to have positive effects on
the quality of an individual’s cognitive processing, memory retrieval, information search,
problem representation, hypothesis generation, and evidence evaluation (Bonner 2008).
Checklists and brief instructions are two of the most popular decision aids examined.
Checklist research finds that providing lists to auditors results in more planned testing
(Blocher et al. 1983) and leads to the collection of more information (Pincus 1989).
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Checklist length inversely affects auditor probability assessments and explanations not
included in a checklist are deemed less likely to occur than included explanations
(Johnson and Kaplan 1996). Explicitly instructing auditors to eliminate hypotheses
results in the elimination of fewer hypotheses compared to situations where these
instructions are not provided (Muller and Anderson 2002). McDaniel and Kinney (1995)
find that asking auditors to form their expectations before performing analytical review
results in superior performance relative to auditors not asked to do so.
In practice, decision aids are used by accounting firms to improve auditors’
judgment and decision making. Each of the Big Four public accounting firms utilize
some sort of decision aid (Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 2001; Dowling and Leech 2007).
Accounting firms use decision aids to provide structure to the audit process, to help
auditors make better decisions, and to reduce the variability of decisions made by
auditors across different accounting firm offices (Abdolmohammadi and Usoff 2001;
Dowling and Leech 2007). For example, each of the Big Four use a decision aid
application that tailors audit programs to achieve country-specific audit objectives,
providing structure to the audit process. Another example of an audit structuring aid is
the use of audit support software to embed electronic files containing suggested
substantive tests, accessible to the auditor during key phases of the audit (Dowling and
Leech 2007). Thus, audit firms use decision aids to improve audit effectiveness and audit
efficiency.
2.4.1 Decision Aids Used by Audit Practitioners in Analytical Review.
Although accounting firms use decision aids in numerous audit tasks, Trompeter
and Wright (2010) find analytical review to be an area where decision aids are “rarely
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used” (p. 690). This finding by Trompeter and Wright in 2010 is consistent with results
presented 15 years earlier by Hirst and Koonce (1996), who found 85 percent of auditors
“never use” decision aids during any stage of analytical review. Dowling and Leech
(2007) provide direct evidence that decision aids are not frequently used by auditors
during analytical review and provide indirect evidence that decision aids like the ones
investigated in this study are not widely used. Dowling and Leech (2007) conduct semistructured interviews with audit partners and audit managers from the Big Four and one
other international public accounting firm to obtain an understanding of the audit support
systems and decision aids used in public accounting firms. They find that among these
five public accounting firms, only two use decision aids related to analytical review: one
firm uses a decision aid that helped with ratio calculation while the other firm uses “tools
to extract and analyze data” (p. 99). Although specifics regarding the functionality of the
tools audit firms use to extract and analyze data during analytical review are not
presented by Dowling and Leech, the decision aids examined in this study differ from the
decision aid used to calculate ratios because this study’s aids do not focus on ratio
calculation, rather they heighten the salience of information needed to effectively perform
analytical review, which should reduce the cognitive load placed upon an auditor during
the task. Consequently, only one of the accounting firms examined by Dowling and
Leech potentially uses a decision aid comparable to the ones examined in this study.
Thus, the findings of Trompeter and Wright (2010) provide direct empirical evidence that
decision aids are not widely used during analytical review, while Dowling and Leech
(2007) provide indirect evidence that the decision aids utilized in this study are not
already widely used.
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Although decision aids are not widely used by practice during analytical review,
empirical evidence suggests that auditors believe decision aids could be useful within this
context. In a study that employed an instrument containing over 300 audit tasks across
six different audit phases, Abdolmohammadi and Usoff (2001) asked a group of 90 audit
partners and managers to evaluate each task’s suitability to decision aid development and
use. Participants could also indicate that a task was best performed by human processing
alone. Broadly speaking, auditors indicated that some type of decision aid (either
completely automating the task or using a decision support system) was preferable to
unaided human processing during analytical review tasks; 57 percent of respondents felt
decision aids would be useful during the planning stage, 46 percent felt aids would be
useful to corroborate and support financial statement assertions, and 46 percent believed
decision aids would be useful during the final review stage. Further, although not
specific to the analytical review context, Dowling and Leech (2007) provide evidence
that partners at Big Four accounting firms believe decision aids are useful because they
improve audit efficiency, help to control junior staff (i.e. provide structure to the audit
process), and promote compliance with accounting standards and the firm’s audit
methodology. Therefore, drawing upon the audit literature, I suggest that public
accounting firms are receptive to using decision aids during analytical review even
though the use of aids is not yet widespread.
2.4.2 Why Decision Aids Must be Introduced into New Contexts with Caution.
Although academic research finds many benefits to employing decision aids there
are some potential drawbacks associated with decision aid use. For example, decision
aids can prolong the decision making process (Mackay et al. 1992). Additionally,
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decision aids can actually decrease decision quality when users place inappropriate
reliance on them (Glover et al. 1997; Kowalczyk and Wolfe 1998). Further, research
demonstrates that introducing a decision aid into an untested setting can have unexpected
consequences, especially when the new context requires domain-specific knowledge. For
example, although the decision aid literature suggests checklists help to improve
judgment and decision making, Pincus (1989) finds auditors using a fraud risk checklist
assess fraud risk as lower than non-checklist users when fraud is actually present because
checklist users fixate on the fraud risks provided and do not fully consider fraud risks that
are present, but not identified in the checklist. Ashton (1990) finds that introducing a
decision aid into a setting where competitive monetary incentives are present can reduce
users’ effectiveness because individuals attempt to outperform the decision aid to obtain
higher compensation. Ashton’s finding is especially counterintuitive because he asks
inexperienced participants to conduct a bond-rating task requiring specialized knowledge
the participants do not have. The fact Ashton’s participants try to outperform the
decision aid without possessing the required specialized knowledge serves as a
cautionary tale illustrating why decision aids must be introduced into new contexts with
care. Thus, it is not necessarily appropriate to presume the findings of one context will
seamlessly generalize to another.
Accordingly, this study contributes to the accounting decision aid literature by
examining whether auditor effectiveness during hypothesis generation, hypothesis
evaluation, and hypothesis selection can be improved by providing auditors with decision
aids. I next present an overview of Cognitive Load Theory, the theory I apply to explain
why reducing cognitive load should lead to improved task effectiveness.
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2.5 Cognitive Load Theory
Originally proposed by Sweller (1988), Cognitive Load Theory maintains that
learning will not be successful if the decision maker faces heavy cognitive load because
an individual’s working memory (i.e., short-term memory) is limited. Sweller defines
cognitive load as the burden placed upon working memory in the conduct of a task.
Working memory can be thought of as the amount of space available to an individual for
retaining, processing, and manipulating information (Baddeley 1992). Although
researchers agree that individuals’ working memory is not unlimited, the size of its limits
is widely debated. Sweller suggests that working memory can contain seven pieces of
information at any one time (plus or minus two pieces) while Miller (1956) suggests
working memory may be even more constrained.15 Regardless of working memory’s
exact size, there is consensus that working memory is substantially limited (Simon 1974;
Penney 1989; Baddeley 1992).
In many respects, the manner in which cognitive load and working memory
function are similar to that of a personal computer; working memory is analogous to the
amount of random-access memory installed on the computer and cognitive load is
analogous to the amount of random-access memory in use at a given time. Just as a
computer cannot engage in any incremental processing once its random access memory is
full, an individual can only process as much information as he or she has working
memory space. Consequently, once an individual’s working memory is fully consumed
no incremental learning occurs.

15

Fittingly, research within analytical review suggests that the number of hypotheses explored at any one
point in time is usually between four and five with an upper bound of six or seven (Libby 1985; Asare and
Wright 1997).
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2.5.1 Schemata and Their Relationship to Cognitive Load.
Schemata (also referred to in the literature as mental models and chunks)
represent the structure and organization of knowledge within long-term memory (Rose
and Wolfe 2000). Schemata are described as “a cognitive construct that permits problemsolvers to recognize a problem as belonging to a specific category requiring particular
moves for solution” (Tarmizi and Sweller 1988, p.424). An individual’s knowledge of
subject matter is organized into schemata and this organization helps determine how to
deal with new information (Sweller 1994). Schemata may contain multiple information
components, permitting individuals to hold and organize vast amounts of information
(Horcher and Tejay 2009). Individuals with knowledge and experience related to a task
are believed to perform the task with greater efficiency and effectiveness because they
develop schemata permitting them to retrieve and process relevant information better
than novices (Rose and Wolfe 2000). Although a single schemata may contain a vast
amount of information each schemata is processed by working memory as a single
working memory item (Kirschner 2002). Thus, an individual’s information processing is
greatly enhanced when the individual possesses the relevant schemata because a vast
amount of information can be maintained and processed as a single working memory unit
instead of a separate working memory unit for each piece of information. As a result,
possessing the relevant problem-specific schemata generally improves an individual’s
problem-solving performance.
When an individual is presented with new information or an unfamiliar task, the
individual’s working memory is used to process the information. If the processing
requirements of a task do not consume all of the individual’s working memory, the
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available working memory will be used to encode the new information into long-term
memory, thereby building an individual’s schemata. Thus, the amount of working
memory available bounds the limits of schemata acquisition (Sweller 1988; Mousavi et
al. 1995; Rose and Wolfe 2000). As a result, reducing an individual’s cognitive load
during a task should help to improve an individual’s schemata development.
2.5.2 Extending Cognitive Load Theory to Analytical Review.
Although Cognitive Load Theory was originally applied within a learning
context, I extend the theory to task effectiveness because I suggest the same cognitive
resource constraints that inhibit learning will also inhibit task effectiveness. In other
words, I suggest that once the cognitive demands of the task (i.e., the cognitive load)
consume all available working memory, no incremental processing can occur.
Consequently, I suggest that when the cognitive processing requirements of a task exceed
an individual’s working memory capacity, task effectiveness will suffer because the
individual will be unable to attend to all of the elements necessary for successful task
completion. My theoretical application is consistent with Brewster (2010), who
investigates the link between cognitive load and effectiveness in an inference task and
finds that reducing cognitive load results in better task effectiveness among individuals
asked to make predictions about how changing business conditions should impact a
firm’s operating results.
Cognitive load is created by the demands of the problem solving requirements.16
Recalling, acquiring, processing, and manipulating information are all examples of
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The inherent nature of analytical review is complex and this study’s task process requirements are also of
a complex nature. By complex, I mean the consideration of a variety of factors (i.e. cues, mental processes,
etc) is required for successful task completion. Thus, a maintained assumption of this study is that the
results may be generalizable only to situations where both task and processing requirements are complex.
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problem solving processes that create cognitive load. Thus, task complexity increases
with the number of informational cues a decision-maker is required to acquire and
evaluate (Speier 2006). As cognitive load is created, working memory is consumed,
leaving less working memory available for the acquisition, processing, and storage of
information (Rose and Wolfe, 2000). As an individual’s available working memory
decreases, the cognitive resources available for problem solving decrease, ultimately
having a negative effect on task performance (Rose and Wolfe 2000; Rose 2004). When
there are not enough cognitive resources available to process information (i.e., when
there is too much information to process), an individual often chooses to reduce their
cognitive load by attempting to reduce the cognitive demands of the task. For example,
Speier (2006) finds individuals are willing to trade a significant degree of decision
accuracy for reduced cognitive load. This behavior is consistent with Simon’s (1956)
concept of satisficing, whereby an individual seeks to perform a task in a manner that is
good enough, though not optimal, due to human processing constraints. Bonner (2008)
finds evidence that auditors attempt to reduce their cognitive load by reducing the cue set
considered. Thus, while satisficing and cue set reduction may be useful strategies in
some contexts, such as the consideration of factors to help an individual decide which
apartment to rent, these strategies are not acceptable within analytical review since
generating and selecting the correct answer is most likely when all the relevant
information cues are considered by the auditor.
2.5.3 The Three Types of Cognitive Load.
The amount of cognitive load imposed by a task is the additive result of three
elements: intrinsic cognitive load, germane cognitive load, and extraneous cognitive load
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(Sweller 1994). Intrinsic cognitive load is characterized by the amount of cue
interactivity inherent in the task; higher levels of cue interactivity lead to greater
cognitive load. A cue is a piece of information that needs to be acquired to successfully
complete a task. Cue interactivity refers to the extent to which each cue can be
meaningfully acquired without having to consider the relationship between it and other
cues (Sweller 1994). Thus, cues interact if they are related in a manner which requires
them to be considered simultaneously for successful task completion. Intrinsic cognitive
load is constant and un-alterable for a given task because it is inherent to the task itself.
In other words, an individual will experience a certain amount of cognitive load from the
underlying nature of task itself. Therefore, intrinsic cognitive load is task idiosyncratic.
Analytical review is an inherently complex task since there is a great degree of
interactivity among the elements of the task (i.e., accounting relationships and cues
necessary for successful task completion). Thus, analytical review should impose a
relatively high degree of intrinsic cognitive load. Since intrinsic cognitive load is created
by the task and since my task is the same across all treatment conditions, the level of
intrinsic cognitive load should be constant within this study. Further, the decision aids
utilized in this study should not reduce intrinsic cognitive load because they do not
change the underlying nature of the task.
Germane cognitive load is the mental effort an individual devotes to processing
information and acquiring task schema (Horcher and Tejay 2009). Since the amount of
mental effort an individual exerts during a given task varies by individual, a single task
can impose varying degrees of germane cognitive load. Consequently, individuals
experience varying degrees of germane cognitive load based upon an individual’s
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idiosyncratic cognitive resources and the mental effort expended by the individual.
Therefore, germane cognitive load is decision-maker idiosyncratic. Within this study,
although I acknowledge that germane cognitive load varies based upon idiosyncratic
factors, I assume the random assignment of participants to treatment conditions will
balance germane cognitive load. However, to measure and potentially control for
germane cognitive load, I ask participants to self-report the level of mental effort they
exerted during the task.
Extraneous cognitive load is characterized as the cognitive load that arises from
the method or processes an individual employs to perform a task (Sweller 1994). In other
words, extraneous cognitive load is the cognitive load generated by the individual’s
problem-solving approach (Chandler and Sweller 1991). Extraneous cognitive load is
thus controllable in the sense that the method or processes used to conduct a task may
lend themselves to alteration in a manner that reduces cognitive load.
The decision aids utilized in this study are specifically designed to reduce the
amount of extraneous cognitive load placed upon auditors during the analytical review
process by helping auditors with the process of accurately recalling and maintaining
information needed for successful task performance. Since the support provided by the
decision aids is external to working memory, the aids should reduce extraneous cognitive
load because auditors will not need to recall and maintain the information in working
memory. The ARD should reduce extraneous cognitive load because it helps auditors
with the process of accurately recalling and maintaining accounting relationships. The
PCA should reduce extraneous cognitive load because it helps auditors with the process
of accurately recalling and maintaining the auditor-identified relevant cues.
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I next present an in-depth discussion of the hypothesis generation stage, the
hypothesis evaluation stage, and the hypothesis selection stage, highlighting known
deficiencies in each stage and apply Cognitive Load Theory to provide an explanation for
these deficiencies. After a discussion of the three stages, I introduce each of my
interventions (i.e., decision aids) by treatment condition, explain how the design of each
intervention is rooted in Cognitive Load Theory, and provide an overview of why each
intervention should reduce the level of extraneous cognitive load placed upon auditors
during the hypothesis generation, hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis selection stages.
I frame my intervention predictions as hypotheses.
2.6 The Hypothesis Generation Stage
After using analytical review procedures to identify an unexpected fluctuation, the
auditor begins an investigation to find its cause. During hypothesis generation, the first
stage of the investigation process, the auditor obtains plausible hypotheses to explain why
the unexpected fluctuation occurred.17 The auditor can acquire hypotheses externally or
self-generate them using his or her domain and context specific knowledge (Koonce
1993; Asare and Wright 2001).18 The literature suggests hypothesis generation is the
most important stage of analytical review because the failure to generate sufficient
hypotheses negatively impacts performance across the other stages (Asare and Wright
1997, Asare and Wright 2003; Green 2004). In practice, the auditor usually asks the
client for an explanation once an unexpected fluctuation is identified; 53 percent of
17

Recognizing that the information search and hypothesis generation is likely to occur at the same time, the
analytical review literature classifies both hypothesis generation and information search as part of the same
stage, even though the auditor is likely to have acquired some relevant information prior to this stage based
upon their knowledge of the client (Koonce 1993; Asare and Wright 2001).
18

An example of an externally obtained explanation is when the auditor directly asks the client to explain
why the fluctuation occurred.
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auditors make client inquiry their first step, while 33 percent of auditors make client
inquiry their second step (Trompeter and Wright 2010). Thus, client explanation is
usually the first source in hypothesis generation.
Although client explanations should be corroborated with additional audit
evidence, the extent to which auditors’ accept client explanations remains an empirical
question. Since client inquiry is generally the first step of the investigation process,
academics and public watchdogs have voiced concern that this practice may lead to
biased judgments (Trompeter and Wright 2010). For example, The Public Oversight
Board’s Panel of Audit Effectiveness specifically raised this concern in its annual report,
recommending that standards setters “Develop more guidance on when it is appropriate
(and when it is inappropriate) for the auditor to rely on management’s explanations
during the course of the audit and on obtaining additional evidence to corroborate those
explanations” (POB 2000, p. 43). More recently, empirical evidence suggests auditors
may accept a client’s explanation without corroboration nearly one-third of the time
(Trompeter and Wright 2010).
2.6.1 Risks Associated With Client Explanations.
Although it may be more efficient to initially approach the client for an
explanation (i.e., it may be quicker to get a client explanation as compared to the amount
of time required to self-generate one or more explanations), doing so raises audit
effectiveness concerns. While auditors are cognizant of source reliability limitations,
making sure to evaluate the competence of source of the information when evaluating an
explanation’s sufficiency (Hirst 1995), accounting research demonstrates auditors may
inappropriately fixate on inherited client explanations. Bedard and Biggs (1991) find the
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receipt of an inherited client explanation negatively affects subsequent hypothesis selfgeneration because even experienced auditors fixate on the client’s explanation,
generating fewer alternative hypotheses than if a client explanation was not first obtained.
In an experimental setting, Anderson and Koonce (1995) found that senior auditors
accept the client’s incorrect explanation as the cause of the unexpected fluctuation nearly
66 percent of the time even though the client’s explanation accounted for only 40 percent
of unexpected fluctuation’s variance.19 Further, a wealth of studies demonstrate that both
inexperienced and experienced auditors generate fewer alternative hypotheses in the
presence of an inherited explanation, regardless of the source (Anderson et al. 1992;
Church and Schneider 1993; Asare and Wright 1997; Bierstaker et al. 1999; Asare and
Wright 2003). In an experimental setting, Green (2004) finds that although auditors’
overall analytical review effectiveness did not differ based upon inheriting an incorrect
client explanation, auditors who receive an inherited and incorrect client explanation
selected it approximately 40 percent of the time, whereas auditors who did not receive the
incorrect client explanation never selected it as the cause of the unexpected fluctuation.20
Further, auditors receiving the inherited and incorrect client explanation clustered their
substantive testing around it (Green 2004). In sum, there is empirical evidence to support
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Within the analytical review literature, the term “explanation inherited from the client” or “inherited
client explanation” means the explanation provided to participants by the researcher (ostensibly from the
client) before participants are asked to formulate their own hypothesis. This operationalization is necessary
within laboratory settings because participants are not able to personally ask the client for an explanation.
20

Green (2004) operationalizes analytical review effectiveness as the auditor’s selection of the correct
cause of the unexpected fluctuation. Auditors’ overall analytical review effectiveness did not differ based
upon the presence of an inherited and incorrect hypothesis because 76.2 percent of auditors who received
an inherited and incorrect hypothesis failed to select the correct hypothesis compared to 75.0 percent of
auditors who did not receive an inherited and incorrect hypothesis.
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audit effectiveness concerns stemming from the auditor’s decision to approach the client
for an explanation before self-generating hypotheses.
I examine hypothesis self-generation due to the audit effectiveness concerns
associated with the practice of approaching the client first and because asking the client
for an explanation is not likely to be the best course of action in at least two situations:
when an accounting error is the cause of the unexpected fluctuation and when
management fraud is the cause of the unexpected fluctuation. In the case of accounting
errors, the client is not likely to be aware that an error exists since the client would
presumably not permit known, uncorrected errors within their financial statements.21 In
the case of management fraud, client personnel associated with the fraud have a
disincentive to disclose the actual cause of the unexpected fluctuation. Since
restatements arising from accounting errors are far more prevalent than intentional
manipulation (Palmrose et al. 2004; Hennes et al. 2008; Plumlee and Yohn 2010), this
study examines a situation where the unexpected fluctuation is the result of an accounting
error.22 Since seeking a client explanation is moot in a client error scenario, auditors
within my study are asked to self-generate their own hypotheses. Throughout the rest of
the study, any references to “hypothesis generation” imply hypothesis self-generation. 23
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It should be recognized that the decision aids utilized in this study could be used to examine the veracity
of a client’s explanation in situations where the auditor first asks the client for an explanation before selfgenerating hypotheses. However, as an examination of inherited client explanations is beyond the scope of
this study, I leave the question open to future research.
22

These studies suggest intentional manipulation is responsible for financial restatements 21 percent, 25
percent, and 3 percent of the time, respectively. Internal client error is responsible for financial restatements
76 percent and 57 percent of the time (Hennes et al. 2008; Plumlee and Yohn 2010, respectively).
23

I do not suggest the auditor must refrain from approaching the client for an explanation, rather, I suggest
it is a more appropriate course of action after the auditor has self-generated his or her own hypotheses
because research suggests it is difficult for an auditor to completely disregard an inherited client
explanation.
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2.6.1.1 Hypothesis Self-Generation.
During the hypothesis generation stage, auditors generally propose multiple
hypotheses because an unexpected fluctuation can have many potential causes and it is
unlikely the auditor’s first proposed hypothesis will identify the correct cause. To
effectively generate hypotheses, the auditor needs to develop a mental model that
organizes the relevant information into a pattern.24 Then, the auditor draws upon his or
her accounting knowledge to make inferences about potential causes of the unexpected
fluctuation from the pattern.
Accounting research suggests that auditors have trouble performing hypothesis
generation effectively. While auditors are generally able to identify the relevant cues
needed to generate the correct hypothesis (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Bedard, Biggs, and
Maroney 1998), they have trouble considering the cues in combination and, therefore,
frequently fail to generate a hypothesis that addresses all cues. This gives rise to the first
part of the analytical review paradox: even though auditors usually identify the relevant
information cues needed to propose the correct cause of an unexpected fluctuation, they
frequently do not propose the correct cause.
In an experimental setting Bedard, Biggs, and Maroney (1998) find 82 percent of
experienced auditors acquire and correctly interpret the relevant cues needed to propose
the correct hypothesis. A similar study by Bedard and Biggs (1991) find 86 percent of
experienced auditors do so. However, these two studies find only 9 percent and 29
percent of experienced auditors propose the correct hypothesis, respectively. 25 In a more
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Some examples of potentially relevant information are macro economic conditions, industry norms,
client operations, how operational activities impact account balances, and how inter-related accounts affect
financial reporting.
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recent study that utilized a computerized analytical review task, Green and Trotman
(2003) find that 61 percent of experienced auditors propose the correct hypothesis. From
an effectiveness standpoint, I suggest these results leave room for improvement.
Drawing upon cognitive load theory, I suggest that the inherent complexity of the
hypothesis generation stage explains why auditors’ performance can be sub-optimal.
Hypothesis generation is inherently complex because auditors must draw upon their
domain-specific knowledge to recall how the numerous accounts relate to each other,
apply context-specific knowledge to successfully identify the relevant cues, and mentally
arrange the relevant cues into a meaningful pattern which enables them to propose the
correct hypothesis. Research provides evidence working memory limitations reduce
individuals’ ability to construct proper mental models of complex environments even in
situations where individuals possess all the relevant information (Sterman 1989; Sweeney
and Sterman 2000). This occurs because individuals can process and retain only a few
items in working memory and an individual’s ability to hold and manipulate items in
working memory quickly decreases as the inter-relationships among items increases
(Sweller et al. 1998; Engle and Kane 2003; Brewster 2010).
2.7 The Hypothesis Evaluation Stage
When the auditor finishes generating hypotheses, the next step is to evaluate
each hypothesis to determine if any satisfactorily explain the cause of the unexpected
fluctuation (Koonce 1993; Hirst and Koonce 1996). This evaluation process is called the
25

These two studies constitute the known universe of research examining whether auditors are able to
identify to the relevant cues during analytical review. While a bit dated, there is no empirical evidence
suggesting that auditors’ cue identification effectiveness has improved. Further, I argue that since these
two studies examine experienced auditors, who are more likely to be able to identify the relevant cues, the
fact that inexperienced auditors are increasingly performing analytical review suggests auditors’ analytical
review effectiveness may actually be decreasing since it is less likely the correct hypothesis will be
proposed if all the relevant cues are not identified.
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hypothesis evaluation stage. During hypothesis evaluation, the auditor must consider the
plausibility of each hypothesis in terms of whether the account relationships embedded
within it are consistent with the unexpected fluctuation. The auditor must also consider
the completeness of each hypothesis in terms of how much of the unexpected
fluctuation’s variance it explains. Therefore, the auditor must determine how many
relevant cues support each proposed hypothesis. Theoretically, as the number of relevant
cues supporting a proposed hypothesis increases, the amount of variance explained by the
hypothesis increases. The correct hypothesis should be plausible and account for the
unexpected fluctuation’s variance.26 During the hypothesis evaluation stage, the auditor
may decide that none of his or her proposed hypotheses correctly explain the cause of the
unexpected fluctuation; if this occurs, the auditor returns to the hypothesis generation
stage. Alternatively, the auditor may select one of his or her proposed hypotheses as the
correct explanation of the unexpected fluctuation, thus moving to the hypothesis selection
stage. The hypothesis evaluation stage has analytical review effectiveness implications
because the auditor’s final assessment of the likelihood that a given hypothesis is the
correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation will guide the auditor’s hypothesis selection
decision (Asare and Wright 2001).
Research demonstrates that both inexperienced and experienced auditors have
difficulty evaluating multiple hypotheses (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Jamal et al. 1995;
Anderson and Koonce 1995; Asare and Wright 2001; Asare and Wright 2003; Green and
Trotman 2003; Green 2004), leading them to frequently perform hypothesis evaluation

26

Although the correct hypothesis should account for all the variance from expectation, given that the
expectation setting process is usually not perfect leads both academics and practitioners to generally hold
that a correct hypothesis will account for substantially all the variance from the expectation.
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poorly, which ultimately results in the selection of an incorrect hypothesis.27 Using
verbal protocol analysis to obtain insight into the hypothesis evaluation process, Bedard
and Biggs (1991) find that among auditors who correctly identify the cue pattern needed
to evaluate their proposed hypotheses, 57 percent fail to disconfirm hypotheses that are
not consistent with the cue pattern. When the auditor’s evaluation process does not
appropriately disconfirm a hypothesis, the hypothesis remains available to the auditor for
selection even though it should be discarded. Green and Trotman (2003) provide further
evidence that auditors have difficulty evaluating competing hypotheses during analytical
review; in an experiment containing 63 experienced auditors who self-generated the
correct hypothesis during the hypothesis generation stage, only 38 percent ultimately
selected the correct hypothesis. Anderson and Koonce (1995) also provide evidence that
auditors have difficulty evaluating hypotheses; in a between-subjects experiment,
experienced auditors were asked to evaluate a client’s explanation for the reason gross
margin unexpectedly increased. When given a client explanation that accounted for only
40 percent of the unexpected fluctuation, 66 percent of the auditors rated it as likely to be
the correct cause.
Applying Cognitive Load Theory, I suggest that auditors lack the cognitive
resources required to effectively evaluate the plausibility and completeness of each
proposed hypothesis because I posit the cognitive load associated with recalling,

27

An experimental study by Bedard, Biggs, and Maroney (1998) finds the correct hypothesis was selfgenerated and selected by 1 auditor out of 11. However, combining the performance of individuals and
groups, when self-generated the correct hypothesis was selected 50.0 percent of the time. In a study where
auditors were given hypotheses and asked to choose the correct one Asare and Wright (2003) finds that 43
percent of auditors select the correct hypothesis. I suggest these numbers are sub-optimal from an audit
effectiveness standpoint.
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maintaining, and processing the relevant information often exceeds the auditors’
available working memory.
2.8 The Hypothesis Selection Stage
The hypothesis selection stage is characterized by the auditor’s decision to select
one of their proposed hypotheses as the cause of the unexpected fluctuation. The
auditor’s decision-making performance in this stage is critical to performing analytical
review effectively (Asare and Wright 2001). If the auditor accepts an incorrect
hypothesis to explain the cause of the unexpected fluctuation four negative audit
outcomes may follow. Three of the negative outcomes have audit effectiveness
implications: If the auditor accepts an incorrect, non-error explanation when the
unexpected fluctuation is actually caused by an error the financial statements may be
misstated. If the auditor accepts an incorrect, non-fraud explanation when the unexpected
fluctuation is actually caused by fraud the auditor will fail to recognize audit fraud risks
and the financials may be misstated. If the auditor accepts an incorrect, non-error
explanation when the unexpected fluctuation is actually caused by another non-error
cause, the financial statements will not be materially misstated, but the auditor may
acquire an incorrect understanding of the client, affecting the overall effectiveness of the
audit.
The fourth negative outcome has audit efficiency implications: The auditor may
conclude the unexpected fluctuation is caused by an error or fraud when it is not.
Although efforts taken by the auditor to substantiate the false explanation should reveal
the auditor’s mistake, the additional audit effort results in wasted time and wasted audit
resources.
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The auditor’s hypothesis selection effectiveness is dependent upon both the
hypothesis generation stage and the hypothesis evaluation stage (Asare and Wright 2001).
Since it is not possible to select the correct hypothesis if it is not proposed, the hypothesis
generation stage impacts the auditor’s hypothesis selection effectiveness. Additionally,
because the hypothesis evaluation stage ends once the auditor believes he or she has
identified the actual cause of the unexpected fluctuation, the judgments made during the
hypothesis evaluation stage directly impact the auditor’s hypothesis selection decision.
Analytical review research consistently finds that experienced auditors frequently
fail to select the actual cause of the unexpected fluctuation, giving rise to the second half
of the analytical review paradox: Even when auditors propose the correct cause of the
unexpected fluctuation, they often fail to select it. For example, Bedard, Biggs, and
Maroney (1998) find that only nine percent of the experienced auditors who participated
in their experiment ultimately selected the correct hypothesis. This finding is consistent
with more recent experimental research by Green and Trotman (2003), Asare and Wright
(2003), and Green (2004) who find that experienced auditors select the correct hypothesis
only 29, 28, and 25 percent of the time, respectively. Additionally, Asare and Wright
(2003) investigate what impact giving an auditor the correct hypothesis in a set of
plausible hypotheses has on selection effectiveness. Although Asare and Wright’s results
suggest this improves the auditor’s hypothesis selection effectiveness, more than fifty
percent of the auditors inheriting the correct hypothesis still failed to select it.
Hypothesis selection is the culmination of an auditor’s analytical review efforts.
Effective hypothesis selection depends upon the joint outcomes of hypothesis generation
(because it is not possible to select the correct hypothesis if it is not proposed) and
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hypothesis evaluation (because the hypothesis ultimately selected as the correct one is a
direct result of judgments made during hypothesis evaluation). Applying Cognitive Load
Theory, I suggest that hypothesis selection is difficult for auditors because the cognitive
requirements of the preceding two stages can exceed the auditor’s cognitive resources,
making it difficult for auditors to select the correct hypothesis. I suggest this explains
why auditors tend to perform hypothesis generation poorly, which leads to ineffective
hypothesis evaluation, and ultimately leads to poor hypothesis selection.
Now that I have discussed the decision aid literature, Cognitive Load Theory, and
presented an in-depth examination of the stages of analytical review investigated within
this study, I next synthesize this discussion by introducing my study’s two decision aids
by treatment condition and illustrate how the design of each decision aid is rooted in
theory. I then formally hypothesize how each treatment intervention should reduce
cognitive load and lead to better analytical review effectiveness.
2.9 Hypotheses Development
2.9.1 The No-Aid Intervention.
The no-aid intervention reflects the current state of analytical review practice.
This condition provides the base from which I compare the relative effectiveness of each
decision aid intervention. Auditors in the no-aid intervention condition conduct
analytical review without decision aids. Mirroring the analytical review process as
currently conducted in practice, auditors in this condition are free to conduct analytical
review in whatever individual manner they wish and are not restricted from taking notes
or making their own decision aids to help conduct the task.
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2.9.2 The Activity Relationship Diagram Intervention.
Since finding the cause of an unexpected fluctuation requires the consideration of
multiple interacting accounts, the cognitive load involved with recalling and maintaining
these relationships in working memory is likely to be high. The application of a diagram
to a context where the task places a large demand upon working memory can be useful
since the diagram can serve as a form of external memory, reducing the cognitive load
placed upon the user (Hegarty and Steinhoff 1997; Rose 2002). Consequently, a
diagram-type decision aid can permit the user to maintain a picture of a whole
representation simultaneously (Scaife and Rogers 1996). Accordingly, I have created an
“activity relationship diagram” (ARD), a diagram-type decision aid that provides auditors
with a graphical depiction of common accounting relationships in a flowchart-type
presentation format.28
The ARD provides a diagram that depicts common client operations, how these
operations impact the appropriate accounts, and how these accounts are related to other
accounts. The aid pictorially displays the duality of accounting by demonstrating how an
increase (decrease) in one account results in a concomitant decrease (increase) in related
accounts. 29 Consequently, the ARD should permit auditors to recognize and recall their
domain-specific knowledge of the relationships that exist between financial statement
accounts and how operating activities are reflected in the financial statements. A key

28

The use of flowcharts for documenting and presenting information is common-place in auditing and
auditors are generally very conversant with the technique. For example, most auditors rely upon
flowcharting to document business processes and internal controls as required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (Romney and Steinbart 2009).
29

The operating activities depicted by the ARD are common in the sense that they are not specific to the
operations of the firm presented within my case materials.
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aspect of the ARD is that it does not provide any new or problem-specific information.30
For readability, I present the activity relationship diagram in two parts, Figure 2.1 and
Figure 2.2.
By making common accounting relationships available to an auditor, the ARD
should heighten the salience of these account relationships. This heightened relationship
salience should help the auditor to perform the task more effectively because analytical
review specifically requires the auditor to draw upon his or her domain-specific
knowledge for effective task completion. Further, because it takes fewer cognitive
resources to recognize information than recall it (Haist et al. 1992), the ARD should
reduce an auditor’s cognitive load because it eliminates the need to expend cognitive
resources recalling and maintaining domain-specific knowledge (i.e., the account
relationships) in working memory. I predict that by reducing the cognitive load placed
upon an auditor during analytical review, the ARD will free cognitive resources that the
auditor can use for task problem solving, leading to improved analytical review
effectiveness compared to auditors who conduct the task without a decision aid.

30

Because the ARD only presents information already known to auditors, this rules out the alternative
explanation that ARD intervention participants are more effective at analytical review because they are
provided with more information compared to other intervention treatments.

41

FIGURE 2a. The activity relationship diagram. (Part 1 of 2).
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FIGURE 2b. The activity relationship diagram. (Part 2 of 2).
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2.9.2.1 Hypothesis Generation Stage Predictions.
The ARD should help auditors during the hypothesis generation stage because it
provides them with a graphical depiction of common accounting relationships, permitting
auditors to accurately recall domain-specific knowledge. Specifically, by depicting
common client operations, how these operations impact the appropriate accounts, and
how these accounts are related to other accounts, the ARD should reduce the extraneous
cognitive load imposed by the task during hypothesis generation since it eliminates the
need for auditors to recall domain-specific information (i.e., accounting knowledge) and
because it provides auditors with a place outside of working memory to maintain this
information.31 In other words, the ARD should improve the hypothesis generation
process by reducing extraneous cognitive load.
Since I predict the ARD will reduce extraneous cognitive load, aid users should
have more working memory available for hypothesis generation. By increasing the
amount of working memory available for problem-solving and by heightening the
salience of account relationships, I predict that auditors within the activity relationship
diagram intervention will conduct hypothesis generation more effectively by proposing
more plausible hypotheses and by generating the correct hypothesis more often compared

31

There is a wealth of studies examining how information presentation impacts decision effectiveness.
Generally, these studies look at whether information provided in tabular or graphical form impacts
performance. An important distinction between this stream of literature and my study is that the decision
aids utilized in this study do not present new information, and therefore, my study does not compare the
effect of presenting information in one format over another on performance. Consequently, I do not focus
on how presentation format affects performance, but rather whether presenting information that is already
known to participants can reduce their cognitive load during analytical review, leading to better
performance.
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to auditors within the no-aid intervention. These predictions are stated formally in the
following hypotheses:
H1a: A larger number of plausible hypotheses will be proposed by
inexperienced auditors using the activity relationship diagram aid
than by inexperienced auditors not using any aid.
H1b: The correct hypothesis will be proposed more often by inexperienced
auditors using the activity relationship diagram aid than by
inexperienced auditors not using any aid.
2.9.2.2 Hypothesis Evaluation Stage Predictions.
Since discerning the correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation is the goal of the
hypothesis evaluation stage, an auditor’s performance during this stage is effective in two
situations. In the first situation, the auditor decides to return to the hypothesis generation
stage because he or she realizes that none of the proposed hypotheses adequately explain
the cause of the unexpected fluctuation. In the second situation, the auditor appropriately
discerns the correct hypothesis by ruling out all incorrect hypotheses, leaving the correct
hypothesis available for selection during the hypothesis selection stage. Therefore, a
necessary prerequisite for effective hypothesis evaluation is that the correct hypothesis
must be obtained.
To evaluate the plausibility of each hypothesis, the auditor must draw upon his or
her accounting knowledge to determine whether the account relationships embedded
within each hypothesis are consistent with the unexpected fluctuation. If the auditor does
not properly construct and maintain the proper accounting relationships, he or she may
fail to remove hypotheses that involve accounts that are not related to the unexpected
fluctuation. For example, suppose the client’s gross margin unexpectedly increases by
$120,000. Utilizing his or her knowledge of accounting, the auditor should start the
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hypothesis evaluation stage by ruling out proposed hypotheses that involve accounts not
associated with gross margin. Thus, a hypothesis proposing the gross margin increase is
caused by a reduction in advertising should be removed since advertising has no impact
on gross margin.32 Once an auditor has obtained the correct hypothesis, a decision aid
can be said to improve the auditor’s hypothesis evaluation effectiveness if using the aid
helps the auditor to discern the correct hypothesis from the set of proposed hypotheses.
I predict that when an auditor evaluates a hypothesis set containing the correct
hypothesis, the ARD should reduce the extraneous cognitive load experienced by the
auditor during hypothesis evaluation by eliminating the need for the auditor to tie up
working memory in recalling and maintaining account relationships. By lowering
cognitive load, the ARD should increase the amount of working memory available for
problem-solving. Further, by heightening the salience of account relationships, I predict
it will be easier for auditors in the ARD intervention to rule out hypotheses that involve
accounts that are not related to the unexpected fluctuation.
Consequently, by lowering cognitive load and heightening the salience of account
relationships, the ARD should improve the auditor’s hypothesis evaluation effectiveness.
As a result, the correct hypothesis should be identified more often by auditors in the ARD

32

Scenarios similar to these can occur because the analytical review process is not static. Rather, the
auditor’s understanding of the unexpected fluctuation frequently changes during the information search
process (which is classified as part of the hypothesis generation stage) based on the auditor’s application of
her accounting knowledge, the identification of cues believed to be relevant, and the formation of the cues
into a meaningful pattern. Thus, auditors can (and do) propose implausible hypotheses during the analytical
review.
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intervention as compared to auditors in the no-aid intervention. This prediction is stated
formally in the following hypothesis:
H2:

When the hypothesis set contains the correct hypothesis,
inexperienced auditors using the activity relationship diagram aid will
identify the correct hypothesis more often when compared to
inexperienced auditors not using any aid.

2.9.2.3 Hypothesis Selection Stage Predictions.
Recognizing that hypothesis selection effectiveness is a direct result of the
effectiveness of both hypothesis generation and hypothesis evaluation, I predict that by
heightening the salience of account relationships throughout the entire analytical review
task it will be easier for auditors within the activity relationship diagram intervention to
select the correct hypothesis compared to auditors within the no-aid intervention. I
predict this because ARD aid users should more easily recall and reference the
accounting relationships necessary to select the correct hypothesis and because they
should experience lower extraneous cognitive load, leaving them with more working
memory available for problem solving. Thus, the ARD should improve the effectiveness
of the hypothesis selection stage; this prediction is stated formally in the following
hypothesis:
H3:

The correct hypothesis will be selected more often by inexperienced
auditors in the activity relationship diagram intervention when
compared to inexperienced auditors in the no-aid intervention

2.9.3 The Pattern-Consideration Aid Intervention.
Conducting effective analytical review requires an auditor to accurately recall,
simultaneously consider, and successfully manipulate the cues relevant to the unexpected
fluctuation. Without a decision aid, the auditor must perform these activities using
working memory. In light of the high degree of cue interactivity existing within the
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analytical review setting (i.e., that the consideration of each relevant cue must take into
account the relationship existing between it and the other cues to be meaningfully
processed), the cognitive load associated with these three activities is likely to be high. A
decision aid that provides the auditor with a place outside of working memory to store
and accurately recall the relevant cues should reduce the cognitive load placed upon the
auditor during analytical review.
Consequently, I have created a pattern-consideration aid (PCA), a textual decision
aid that stores and accurately recalls the auditor-identified relevant cues.33 A key aspect
of the PCA is that it does not provide users with any information that they do not selfidentify. That is, the PCA does not provide users with any information that they do not
type into the electronic PCA application.34 The PCA should help an auditor to accurately
recall and simultaneously consider the relevant information cues during the analytical
review task, reducing the auditor’s cognitive load by eliminating the need to expend
cognitive resources recalling and maintaining the relevant cues in working memory. I
predict that by reducing the cognitive load placed upon an auditor during analytical
review, the PCA will free cognitive resources that the auditor can use for task problem
solving, leading to improved analytical review effectiveness compared to auditors who
conduct the task without a decision aid. Further, by textually presenting the auditor-
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I do not imply that auditors do not currently record the cues they identify as relevant. Further, studies
which examine analytical review in the literature (i.e., Bedard and Biggs 1991; Bedard et al. 1998, etc) do
not prohibit auditors from taking notes or recording cues. Rather, I examine whether enhancing the
salience of the auditor-identified cues by automatically presenting them to the auditor at the appropriate
time during analytical review can improve task effectiveness.
34

Although discussed in depth in subsequent pages, the PCA will automatically recall the participantidentified relevant cues during the hypothesis generation, hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis selection
stages. Further, the PCA will also require the user to evaluate each proposed hypothesis against the
participant-identified relevant cues during the hypothesis selection stage.

48

identified relevant cues, the PCA should also heighten the salience of the cues, helping
the auditor to simultaneously consider them during hypothesis generation, hypothesis
evaluation, and hypothesis selection.
2.9.3.1 Hypothesis Generation Stage Predictions.
Although research suggests auditors may reduce the number of cues they consider
to decrease their cognitive load during analytical review (Bonner 2008), proposing the
correct hypothesis is most likely when an auditor considers as many relevant cues as
possible. Consequently, the use of a reduced-cue set strategy is not desirable during
hypothesis generation. The PCA should help auditors perform hypothesis generation
because it assists with cue recall and helps auditors to consider all cues simultaneously.
Specifically, by storing and automatically presenting auditors with the cues they identify
as relevant, the PCA should reduce the extraneous cognitive load associated with
maintaining and recalling the cues in working memory. Further, by textually presenting
auditors with a list that contains all of the cues, the PCA should heighten the salience of
the cues, permitting auditors to more effectively consider the cues simultaneously while
generating hypotheses. Auditors in the no-aid intervention must use their working
memory to maintain the identified cues, correctly arrange the cues into a meaningful
pattern, and propose explanations that address the relevant cues.
I predict that since auditors within the pattern-consideration aid intervention
should experience lower extraneous cognitive load, they will have more working memory
available for hypothesis generation. By increasing the amount of working memory
available for problem-solving and by heightening the salience and processability of the
auditor-identified relevant cues, I predict auditors within the pattern-consideration aid
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intervention will conduct hypothesis generation more effectively by proposing more
plausible hypotheses and by generating the correct hypothesis more often than auditors
within the no-aid intervention. These predictions are stated formally in the following
hypotheses:
H4a: A larger number of plausible hypotheses will be proposed by
inexperienced auditors using the pattern-consideration aid than by
inexperienced auditors not using any aid.
H4b: The correct hypothesis will be proposed more often by inexperienced
auditors using the pattern-consideration aid than by inexperienced
auditors not using any aid.

2.9.3.2 Hypothesis Evaluation Stage Predictions.
A decision aid can be said to improve an auditor’s hypothesis evaluation
effectiveness if using the aid helps the auditor to discern the correct hypothesis. Recall
that obtaining the correct hypothesis is a necessary prerequisite for effective hypothesis
evaluation since the auditor cannot identify the correct hypothesis if it has not been
obtained.35 To evaluate the completeness of a proposed hypothesis, the auditor must
evaluate how well it addresses the cues identified as relevant to the unexpected
fluctuation. In other words, the auditor must determine how well each proposed
hypothesis matches the overall cue pattern. Ideally, the auditor will evaluate each
proposed hypothesis to find one that is supported by the relevant cues. Because the
correct hypothesis is most likely the one that is supported by every relevant cue,

35

This does not imply that the correct hypothesis must be proposed the first time the auditor engages in
hypothesis generation. The auditor may discover that none of his or her proposed hypotheses satisfactorily
explain the unexpected fluctuation while conducting hypothesis evaluation. Thus, the auditor would return
to the hypothesis generation stage to propose a hypothesis that appropriately explains the unexpected
fluctuation.
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employing a reduced-cue set strategy during hypothesis evaluation is likely to lead to
ineffective hypothesis evaluation, ultimately leading to incorrect hypothesis selection.
The pattern-consideration aid intervention should reduce the extraneous cognitive
load placed upon auditors during the hypothesis evaluation stage by giving auditors an
external place to maintain, recall, and view the cues they identify as relevant. During the
hypothesis evaluation stage, the PCA automatically presents an auditor with the cues the
auditor previously identified as relevant. This should reduce the auditor’s extraneous
cognitive load because he or she will not tie up working memory maintaining and
recalling the relevant cues during the hypothesis evaluation process.
In addition to reducing cognitive load and increasing the amount of working
memory available for problem-solving, the PCA contains check-box functionality
designed to help auditors determine how many cues support each proposed hypothesis.
During the hypothesis evaluation stage, auditors are asked to click a box next to each cue
the hypothesis under evaluation supports.36 Then, a check mark appears next to the cue
to indicate that the cue supports the hypothesis. After all the hypotheses have been
evaluated, the PCA stores and displays the number of cues that support each hypothesis.37
PCA users (i.e., auditors) can then click on each proposed hypothesis to see which
specific cues support it. Logically, one would expect the correct hypothesis to be the one
that is supported by all the relevant cues. Auditors who do not receive the PCA must use
their working memory to determine how many cues support each of their proposed

36

The cues contained within the PCA will be the ones entered into the application by each individual user.
The PCA will not contain any cues or other information besides the information entered by the user.
37

Pattern-consideration aid users can also “drill down” by double clicking on any hypothesis to see which
specific cues support the hypothesis.
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hypotheses. Further, auditors who do not receive the PCA must also use their working
memory to keep track of the specific cues that support a given hypothesis.
Consequently, I predict the PCA’s check-box functionality should reduce the
cognitive load required to determine how many cues support each proposed hypothesis.
Thus, it should be easier for auditors to discern which (if any) of their proposed
hypotheses is best supported by the relevant cues, making it easier for auditors to identify
the correct hypothesis. This prediction is stated formally in the following hypothesis:
H5:

When the hypothesis set contains the correct hypothesis,
inexperienced auditors using the pattern-consideration aid will
identify the correct hypothesis more often when compared to
inexperienced auditors not using any aid.

2.9.3.3 Hypothesis Selection Stage Predictions.
I suggest the most important aspect of hypothesis selection is the auditor’s ability
to determine which hypothesis best explains the cause of an unexpected fluctuation. By
heightening the salience of the relevant cues and by reducing the cognitive load required
to identify which of an auditor’s proposed hypotheses is supported by the greatest
number of relevant cues, I predict that the PCA’s check-box functionality will lead
auditors to select the correct hypothesis more often than auditors in the no-aid
intervention. My prediction is formally stated in the following hypothesis:
H6:

The correct hypothesis will be selected more often by inexperienced
auditors using the pattern-consideration aid when compared to
inexperienced auditors not using any aid.

2.9.4 Combined-Aid Intervention Predictions
Auditors receiving the combined-aid intervention conduct the analytical review
task using both the activity relationship diagram and the pattern-consideration aid.
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Because I expect each decision aid to reduce the cognitive load required to perform
unique aspects of the analytical review task, I predict that auditors receiving both
decision aids will experience the lowest levels of cognitive load compared to all other
interventions. In other words, since I expect the ARD to reduce cognitive load by
eliminating the auditor’s need to expend cognitive resources recalling and maintaining
common accounting relationships and since I expect the PCA to reduce cognitive load by
eliminating the auditor’s need to expend cognitive resources recalling and maintaining
the relevant cues in working memory, I expect that auditors receiving both decision aids
will experience less overall cognitive load than auditors receiving one (or none) of the
decision aids because each aid should reduce the auditor’s cognitive load in an
independent way.
Although I suggest that giving auditors both decision aids should reduce their
cognitive load, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that providing individuals
with multiple decision aids may actually increase the level of cognitive load through a
phenomenon termed the “split-attention effect” (Tarmizi and Sweller 1988). The
cognitive literature demonstrates that the split-attention effect can occur in tasks that
require individuals to use working memory to hold information from one source while
simultaneously requiring individuals to integrate information from other sources for
successful task completion. The split-attention effect increases cognitive load within
problem-solving contexts. Consequently, empirical evidence demonstrates that requiring
individuals to consider information from multiple sources of information can create
cognitive load (Tarmizi and Sweller 1988; Ward and Sweller 1990; Sweller, Chandler,
Tierney, and Cooper, 1990; Chandler and Sweller, 1992; Rose and Wolfe 2000).
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Recognizing the split-attention effect research, I maintain that auditors who use
both decision aids should experience the lowest levels of cognitive load compared to all
other interventions because each of my decision aids is expected to reduce cognitive load
through a different mechanism. The ARD should reduce cognitive load by providing an
auditor with a place to store common accounting relationships outside of working
memory, while the PCA should reduce cognitive load by providing an auditor with a
place to store the task relevant cues outside of working memory. Further, in contrast to
the tasks utilized in split-attention studies, which (by design) require an individual to
maintain and integrate information from multiple sources in working memory, my
decision aids provide auditors with a place to store information that is external to
working memory. Consequently, I suggest that my decision aids do not constitute
separate sources of information, but rather separate storage repositories that the auditor
can use to offload information he or she would otherwise be required to maintain in
working memory.
Since I expect each decision aid to incrementally reduce the cognitive load placed
upon an auditor during analytical review by providing them with a place to store
information outside of working memory, I predict that auditors within the combined-aid
intervention will experience the lowest level of cognitive load, leading them to exhibit the
most effective task performance. Consequently, I suggest that auditors in the combinedaid intervention will conduct hypothesis generation more effectively by proposing more
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plausible hypotheses and by generating the correct hypothesis more often than any other
intervention. These predictions are formally stated in the following hypotheses:
H7a: A larger number of plausible hypotheses will be proposed by
inexperienced auditors using both aids than by inexperienced auditors
using each aid individually or no aid.
H7b: The correct hypothesis will be proposed more often by inexperienced
auditors using both aids than by inexperienced auditors using each
aid individually or no aid.
Because I suggest both the ARD and PCA interventions will lead to more
effective hypothesis evaluation as compared to the no-aid intervention, I propose that the
combined-aid intervention will result in the most effective hypothesis evaluation because
auditors within it will receive the predicted benefits of both decision aids during the task.
Thus, I propose:
H8:

When the hypothesis set contains the correct hypothesis,
inexperienced auditors using both aids will identify the correct
hypothesis more often than inexperienced auditors using each aid
individually or no aid.

Finally, because auditors within the combined-aid intervention have access to
decision aids that both heighten the salience of the account relationships and the relevant
cues, I predict they will select the correct hypothesis more often because it will be easier
for them to identify which of their proposed hypotheses most plausibly and sufficiently
explains the cause of the unexpected fluctuation. This prediction is formally stated:
H9:

The correct hypothesis will be selected more often by inexperienced
auditors using both aids than by inexperienced auditors using each
aid individually or no aid.

Table 2.1 presents this study’s hypotheses by decision aid and analytical review stage.
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TABLE 2.1. Hypotheses by Decision Aid Intervention and Stage.
Hypothesis

Decision Aid
Intervention

Analytical
Review
Stage
Hypothesis
Generation

H1a

A larger number of plausible hypotheses will be proposed by
inexperienced auditors using the activity relationship diagram aid than
by inexperienced auditors not using any aid.

Activity
Relationship
Diagram

H1b

The correct hypothesis will be proposed more often by inexperienced
auditors using the activity relationship diagram aid than by
inexperienced auditors not using any aid.

Activity
Relationship
Diagram

Hypothesis
Generation

H2

When the hypothesis set contains the correct hypothesis, inexperienced
auditors using the activity relationship diagram aid will identify the
correct hypothesis more often when compared to inexperienced auditors
not using any aid.

Activity
Relationship
Diagram

Hypothesis
Evaluation

H3

The correct hypothesis will be selected more often by inexperienced
auditors in the activity relationship diagram intervention when compared
to inexperienced auditors in the no-aid intervention

Activity
Relationship
Diagram

Hypothesis
Selection

H4a

A larger number of plausible hypotheses will be proposed by
inexperienced auditors using the pattern-consideration aid than by
inexperienced auditors not using any aid.

Pattern
Consideration
Aid

Hypothesis
Generation

H4b

The correct hypothesis will be proposed more often by inexperienced
auditors using the pattern-consideration aid than by inexperienced
auditors not using any aid.

Pattern
Consideration
Aid

Hypothesis
Generation

H5

When the hypothesis set contains the correct hypothesis, inexperienced
auditors using the pattern-consideration aid will identify the correct
hypothesis more often when compared to inexperienced auditors not
using any aid.

Pattern
Consideration
Aid

Hypothesis
Evaluation

H6

The correct hypothesis will be selected more often by inexperienced
auditors using the pattern-consideration aid when compared to
inexperienced auditors not using any aid.

Pattern
Consideration
Aid

Hypothesis
Selection

H7a

A larger number of plausible hypotheses will be proposed by
inexperienced auditors using both aids than by inexperienced auditors
using each aid individually or no aid.

CombinedAid
Intervention

Hypothesis
Generation

H7b

The correct hypothesis will be proposed more often by inexperienced
auditors using both aids than by inexperienced auditors using each aid
individually or no aid.

CombinedAid
Intervention

Hypothesis
Generation

H8

When the hypothesis set contains the correct hypothesis, inexperienced
auditors using both aids will identify the correct hypothesis more often
than inexperienced auditors using each aid individually or no aid.

CombinedAid
Intervention

Hypothesis
Evaluation

H9

The correct hypothesis will be selected more often by inexperienced
auditors using both aids than by inexperienced auditors using each aid
individually or no aid.

CombinedAid
Intervention

Hypothesis
Selection
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2.9.5 Planned Mediation Analysis.
A mediator is a variable that helps account for the relationship existing between
an independent variable and a dependent variable (Baron and Kenny 1986). Thus, a
mediator is a third variable that helps to explain how or why the relationship between the
independent variable and dependent variable exists. The basic causal chain involved in
mediation is illustrated in Figure 3, Panel A. The basic model is comprised of a threevariable system where two causal paths impact the dependent variable. The first path is
the direct impact of the independent variable (Path A) upon the dependent variable. In
the second path, the independent variable directly impacts the mediating variable (Path
B), which in turn causes the mediating variable to directly impact the dependent variable
(Path C). Thus, the second path involves an indirect relationship between the
independent variable and the dependent variable.
Baron and Kenny (1986) note that a variable functions as a mediator when it
meets the following three conditions: (1) the level of the independent variable
significantly impacts the presumed mediator, (2) variations in the mediator significantly
impact the dependent variable, and (3) when Paths B and C are controlled, a previously
significant relationship between the independent and dependent variable is either
decreased in significance or is no longer significant.38
To test for mediation, Baron and Kenny suggest a series of regression models be
estimated. Within this study, I apply Cognitive Load Theory to suggest that the level of
cognitive load mediates the relationship between decision aid use and analytical review
effectiveness. Accordingly, to test my assertion I conduct a planned mediation analysis.

38

If the significance level is decreased, the mediation is said to be partial; if the direct relationship between
the independent and dependent variable is no longer significant, mediation is said to be full.
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Using the mediation analysis steps recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986), I use a
mediation model to test whether the auditor’s use of a decision aid results in better
analytical review effectiveness through a reduction in cognitive load, a mediating factor.
Figure 3, Panel B illustrates the mediating relationship that I predict exists between the
use of decision aids, the level of cognitive load, and analytical review effectiveness.

FIGURE 3. Mediation Models.

Specifically, I examine the extent to which decision aid use reduces cognitive load and
the extent to which reductions in cognitive load are associated with improved analytical
review effectiveness. A detailed discussion of the mediation analysis and results is
presented in the Results section. Next, I discuss the experimental design, participants,
and variables of interest in the Method section.
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3.0 METHOD
3.1 Experimental Design
To test the hypotheses, I employ a 1 x 4 between-subjects design. I use this design
because although I examine two distinct treatment interventions, both are manifestations
of the same factor (i.e., decision aids). Thus, the two interventions are not independent
factors, precluding a 2 x 2 factorial design.
The decision aid factor is manipulated at four levels: a no-aid intervention, an
activity relationship diagram intervention, a pattern-consideration aid intervention, and a
combined-aid intervention. The research design is illustrated in Figure 4.

FIGURE 4. Research Design.
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3.2 Case Design Considerations.
The case materials used in this study are developed to achieve three goals: to
appropriately reflect the diagnostic nature of analytical review, to achieve reasonable
external validity, and to permit experimental tractability.
To appropriately reflect the diagnostic nature of analytical review, the case
requires participants to consider multiple cues to identify the correct cause of the
unexpected fluctuation. To achieve reasonable external validity the case materials have
been validated by practicing Big Four audit managers and seniors. Lastly, for
experimental tractability the case is designed to have only one correct answer. However,
I recognize this is abstraction from practice where an unexpected fluctuation may be the
result of multiple underlying causes.39 While the case materials used in this study are
original, they have been modeled after prior analytical review research (Libby 1985;
Bedard and Biggs 1991; Asare and Wright 1997; Asare and Wright 2001; Green and
Trotman 2003). I abstract from practice for experimental tractability, particularly with
regards to data coding. Employing only one correct answer simplifies the data coding
analysis, which permits me to more accurately interpret the results. While designing a
task to have more than one correct answer may improve external validity, doing so
introduces more variation into the results, reducing strength of the inferences that can be
made for each aid. For example, as the number of correct answers increases, it becomes
increasingly difficult to discern the direct impact that each aid has in facilitating

39

Though by no means the definitive guide to the proportion of times an unexpected fluctuation is
comprised of more than one cause, a field study examining 19 unexpected fluctuations revealed that
approximately 47 percent of the time an unexpected fluctuation was the result of more than one cause
(Coglitore and Berryman 1988).
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participants to a specific correct answer.40 Further, designing a task with only one correct
answer biases against finding results since participants must hypothesize, evaluate, and
select the correct answer as opposed to a correct answer.41
3.3 Task
The task requires participants to explain the cause of an unexpected decline in an
audit client’s cost of sales ratio. The case was developed by establishing the correct
account and ratio balances and then seeding the appropriate discrepancy cues. My seeded
cue pattern was adopted from Kinney (1987) and there are six relevant cues that
participants need to identify and consider to deduce the cause of the unexpected
fluctuation: (1) the inventory turnover ratio is lower than expected, (2) the accruals ratio
is higher than expected, (3) the gross margin ratio is higher than expected, (4) purchases
are lower than expected, (5) accounts payable is less than expected, and (6) inventory
costs did not decrease (i.e., the inventory purchase price, direct labor costs, and shipping
costs did not change from the prior period). When the six relevant cues are considered as
one pattern, the resulting conclusion is that the client failed to record an inventory
purchase in the same period that it was subsequently recorded as a sale. In accordance
with Kinney (1987), there are four alternative plausible explanations for this cue pattern.
To rule out the four plausible alternatives participants are told the client, a fictitious
company named Bean Co., buys and sells only one product - commoditized Jamaican
coffee beans. Participants are also told that ending inventory is not miscounted or
40

Using a case that contains more than one correct answer raises a host of coding issues, which ultimately
affect the interpretation of results. For example, when there is more than one correct answer the researcher
needs to consider whether both answers equally correct.
41

The more correct answers there are, the more likely it is that a participant will choose a correct answer
through chance as opposed to successful task performance.

61

overpriced and that there is no evidence of inventory theft. Participants are also
presented with information that explicitly tells them that inventory costs (i.e., the price
per pound of coffee purchased, direct labor, indirect labor, shipping costs, overhead, and
“all other costs required to make coffee beans available for resale”) have not changed
from the prior year. Consequently, the seeded error, relevant cue pattern, and correct
answer are consistent with those originally developed and used in Kinney (1987).
To increase task complexity, two irrelevant information cues are seeded into the
case materials: (1) a significant reduction in general and administrative expenses, (2) and
a significant increase in net income. While both of these cues significantly deviate from
expectations, both cues are inconsistent with the cause of the unexpected fluctuation
because the each cue is not related to the cost of sales ratio. The seeding of these two
irrelevant cues is modeled after Bedard and Biggs (1991), who use irrelevant cues to
increase task complexity.
3.4 Case Materials
Case materials inform participants, who assume the role of staff auditors on a
financial statement audit, that their engagement senior has identified an unexpected
decline in the cost of sales ratio during fieldwork. The case materials are fashioned after
audit work papers and contain client background information, account balances, and
ratios. The case materials are seeded with the appropriate cues necessary to explain the
cause of the decline in the cost of sales ratio. Account balances and ratios are presented
as “Audited,” “Expected,” and “Unaudited.” Audited information is described as the
result of last year’s audit and, therefore, can be considered completely accurate. Expected
information is described as the account expectations developed by the engagement
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partner based upon his past client experience and current industry trends. To prevent
participants from questioning the reliability of the partner’s expectations, participants are
told that the partner’s expectations can be considered completely reliable. Unaudited
information is described as current year information that has been provided by the client
without any verification to its accuracy. As a result, participant attention should not be
focused on the accuracy or reliability of the information provided by their audit firm, but
rather on the information provided by the client. The information given to participants
contains a column labeled “Threshold” which provides the upper and lower bounds of the
partner’s expectations. During training, participants learn that account balances or ratios
that fall outside of threshold bounds indicate a material departure from audit
expectations. The case materials specify that the Partner set the threshold to three percent
of the expectation. Appendix A presents the case materials.
3.5 Participants
One hundred and twenty nine accounting students from a large southeastern
public university served as this study’s participants. To best reflect inexperienced audit
staff, only MAcc and senior accounting students are included in the study’s analysis.42
Participants were drawn from a rigorous accounting program whose audit curriculum
emphasizes the audit standards.43 The participants assumed the role of audit staff asked
to find the cause of an unexpected fluctuation. Since MAcc and senior accounting
students are almost identical demographically to staff auditors, these participants are an

42

Of the 129 participants, five were junior accounting students. All of the junior accounting students were
excluded from this study’s analysis because they were not exposed to Audit I. Additionally, all of the
junior accounting students failed the accounting knowledge test (discussed in further detail under the
heading titled Pre-Test Knowledge Assessment in the Results section).
43

Excluding the five junior accounting students, all of this study’s participants had exposure to Audit I.
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appropriate proxy for staff auditors who now conduct analytical review 48 percent of the
time (Trompeter and Wright 2010). Additionally, following the recommendation of
Peecher and Solomon (2001), participants in all conditions were given a detailed
analytical review training session before they started the task to impart the requisite taskspecific domain knowledge and to equalize participants’ knowledge of analytical review.
To best reflect the content and presentation style of analytical review training received by
audit practitioners, this study’s training session was crafted using analytical review
training materials obtained from a Big Four public accounting firm. Consequently, the
training session provided to participants reflected the appropriate analytical review
standards (i.e., AU 329, Analytical Procedures) and was similar to analytical review
training received by staff auditor in public accounting.
3.6 Analytical Review Software Application
Participants perform the analytical review task using a customized Excel software
application. The application displays Bean Co.’s financial information, permitting
participants to manipulate the information as they would a normal Excel workbook. The
application contains an administrator menu button, six action buttons, and three stage
control buttons. Figure 5 presents a screenshot of the top part of the application’s main
screen and all ten buttons.
The administrator menu button is used by the researcher to manage the
application. The six action buttons are used by participants to conduct the analytical
review task. By clicking the first action button, a participant can record a cue they believe
to be relevant to the cause of the unexpected fluctuation. Clicking the second action
button brings up a screen that permits a participant to review, edit, or delete the cues the
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participant has previously identified as relevant. Clicking the third action button brings
up a screen where a participant can enter a proposed hypotheses. Clicking the fourth

FIGURE 5. Screenshot of the Analytical Review Application’s Main Screen.

action button brings up a screen that permits a participant to review, edit, or delete their
proposed hypotheses. The fifth action button permits a participant to engage in
hypothesis evaluation and selection. Finally, the sixth action button solicits a
participant’s input regarding the likelihood that each of their proposed hypotheses is the
actual cause of the unexpected fluctuation.
The three stage control buttons are designed to structure the analytical review task
in a manner that is consistent with the literature’s classification of the steps in analytical
review. The three stage control buttons help structure the task by restricting the action
buttons a participant can see during each stage of the analytical review task. When the
application is first launched a participant can only see the first two action buttons; these
two buttons permit the participant to identify and edit the cues they believe to be relevant
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to the unexpected fluctuation. Clicking the password-protected Stage 2 button permits a
participant to see the next two action buttons, enabling the participant to engage in
hypothesis generation. Pressing the password-protected Stage 3 button displays the final
two action buttons which permit a participant to engage in hypothesis evaluation and
selection. Finally, clicking the End button prompts the application to verify that a
participant has both selected a hypothesis to explain the cause of the unexpected
fluctuation and that the participant has rated the probability that each of their remaining
proposed hypotheses were the “correct” explanation. If a participant failed to perform
these two actions, the application displays a pop-up box instructing the participant to
engage in the appropriate action. If a participant successfully completed these two
actions, the application automatically saves the participant’s work, closes the application,
returns the participant to the desktop, and prompts the participant to raise his or her hand
for the last part of the experiment, the post-experiment questionnaire.
3.7 Experimental Procedure
The experiment consists of six parts: an online pre-test, analytical review
training, case familiarization, hypothesis generation, hypothesis evaluation and selection,
and an online post-experiment questionnaire. Figure 6 presents an illustration of the
experimental procedure.
All experimental sessions took place within a university lab setting. Upon arrival,
participants were asked to sit in front of an open laptop. The laptop contained the
analytical review application which automatically recorded each participant’s work. At
the appointed start time, the researcher closed the lab doors close and no additional
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participants were admitted. After completing requisite IRB informed consent forms,
participants completed an online pre-test designed to gauge their understanding of
common account relationships. The pre-test also contained an activity designed to
measure the size of each participant’s working memory. Appendix B contains the online
pre-test administered to participants. Next, participants were given a 20 minute training
session. The purpose of training was to provide all participants with a basic

FIGURE 6. Experimental Procedure

understanding of analytical review. The training session explained why audit firms
conduct analytical review and provided insight regarding the way analytical review is
commonly conducted. Although the training session was much briefer than training
provided in practice, the session was based on Big Four analytical review training
materials. Appendix C contains the training materials used.
Although multiple experimental sessions were conducted, every participant within
a given session experienced the same intervention treatment. The intervention
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administered for any given session was determined by randomly selecting one of four
numbered slips of paper from a hat. The purpose of this technique was to ensure that the
researcher was blind to the experimental treatment during the training phase, to avoid
introducing bias into the training procedure.
3.7.1 The Analytical Review Task and Decision Aid Manipulations.
The analytical review task consisted of three stages. After the training session,
participants were instructed to open an envelope containing the case materials. In Stage
1, participants were advised that their engagement senior had discovered the audit client’s
cost of sales ratio was lower than expected during audit fieldwork. Participants then
spent 15 minutes becoming familiar with the case materials.
Participants in all treatment conditions were explicitly asked to identify and
record the cues they felt were relevant to the unexpected fluctuation. Participants in the
ARD intervention, the PCA intervention, and the combined-aid intervention were asked
to electronically record each cue by clicking the appropriate button on their analytical
review application (i.e., button one) and by typing each cue into a prompt. Participants in
the no-aid intervention were explicitly told that they could take notes in the task
application’s spreadsheet, in a separate electronic word processing document (i.e.,
Microsoft Word), or on any of the paper materials given to them. Additionally, to
facilitate note taking across all interventions, participants in every intervention were
given a new pen they could use to take notes.
Although the cues a participant typed into the software application were later used
by pattern-consideration aid users in Stage 2, no explicit decision aid interventions
occurred in Stage 1. After 15 minutes, the researcher instructed all participants to move
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to Stage 2, hypothesis generation. The analytical review application prevented
participants from moving to Stage 2 until instructed.
In Stage 2, the researcher orally asked participants to spend at least 15 minutes
generating as many hypotheses as possible to explain the cause of the unexpected
fluctuation. Participants within all conditions typed their proposed hypotheses into the
analytical review application by clicking the appropriate button (i.e., button three). After
the researcher introduced Stage 2, but before participants started proposing hypotheses,
the decision aid manipulations occurred.
Participants who received the activity relationship diagram were then handed a
one-page flowchart that depicted common accounting relationships. After every
participant had a copy of the ARD, the researcher orally announced that the ARD might
help participants formulate their proposed hypotheses because it might make it easier to
see the links between the unexpected fluctuation and its’ related accounts.
Participants in the pattern-consideration aid treatment were electronically
presented with the cues they previously identified as relevant each time they clicked the
button to propose a new hypothesis. Thus, PCA participants could easily refer to their
cues each time they proposed a new hypothesis. To make the presentation of cues more
salient, the application told participants that they might find it helpful to refer to the cues
in formulating their proposed hypotheses. Figure 7 presents an example that illustrates
how the PCA electronically presented the cues to participants during hypothesis
generation. After 15 minutes, participants were permitted to move to Stage 3, hypothesis
evaluation and selection. A participant was not forced to move to Stage 3 until they were
ready. The application prevented participants from moving to Stage 3 until instructed.
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When a participant was ready to move to Stage 3, the participant raised his or her hand.
The researcher then handed the participant a sheet of paper asking the participant to
evaluate each of their proposed hypotheses and to select the hypothesis the participant
believed best explained the reason the cost of sales ratio declined. The handout also
explained how to use the electronic application to complete Stage 3. For participants in
the ARD intervention, the handout also informed participants that they might find it

FIGURE 7. Screenshot Example of Participant-Identified Cues Displayed by the PCA During Hypothesis
Generation.

helpful to refer to the ARD during the stage because the accounting relationships
displayed in the ARD might make it easier to evaluate how well each proposed
hypotheses addressed the cost of sales ratio decline.
To evaluate their proposed hypotheses, a participant clicked the appropriate
button in the analytical review application (i.e., button five). The application then
displayed all the participant’s proposed hypotheses. To select a hypothesis as the correct
reason the cost of sales ratio declined, participants in both the no-aid intervention and
ARD intervention double clicked the desired hypothesis from a screen that displayed all
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of the participant’s proposed hypotheses. After a participant double-clicked the desired
hypothesis, a pop-up box asked the participant to confirm his or her selection. Figure 8
presents an example of a screenshot that illustrates how participants in both the no-aid
intervention and ARD intervention viewed their proposed hypotheses during hypothesis
evaluation and selection.
The application required participants who received the PCA to evaluate each of
their proposed hypotheses against the cues they previously identified as relevant before
the application would permit them to select a “correct” hypothesis. To evaluate their

FIGURE 8. Screenshot Example of the Hypothesis Evaluation and Selection Screen. This is an example
of the screen viewed by participants in the no-aid and activity relationship diagram interventions during
hypothesis evaluation and hypothesis selection.

proposed hypotheses, a PCA user clicked on a proposed hypothesis, opening a new
screen that displayed the participant-identified relevant cues. A check-box appeared to
the left of each cue and the PCA user was instructed to check the box of each cue that
supported the hypothesis. Figure 9 provides a screenshot example illustrating the PCA’s
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check-box functionality. After a PCA user evaluated all of their proposed hypotheses
individually, the application permitted the user to select a hypothesis they felt best
explained the cause of the unexpected fluctuation.

FIGURE 9. Screenshot Example of the Hypothesis Evaluation Checklist. This is an example of the screen
viewed by participants in the pattern-consideration aid and combined-aid interventions during hypothesis
evaluation.

Figure 10 provides a screenshot example that illustrates how PCA users selected the
correct hypothesis.
In all treatment conditions participants were free to propose new cues and
potential hypotheses during Stage 3. A participant might choose to do so if he or she felt
none of the proposed hypotheses correctly explained the cause of the decline in the cost
of sales ratio. After selecting the “correct” hypothesis, the application asked participants
to assess the probability that each of their proposed hypotheses (including the hypothesis
they selected as the correct one) was the actual cause of the cost of sales ratio decline.
Participants entered their probability assessment for each proposed hypothesis into a
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prompt provided by the application. Due to the iterative nature of analytical review, there
was no specific time limit enforced for the completion of Stage 3.44

FIGURE 10. Screenshot Example of the Hypothesis Selection Screen. This is an example of the screen
viewed by participants in the pattern-consideration aid and combined-aid interventions during hypothesis
selection.

After completing Stage 3, participants completed an online post-experiment
questionnaire. Once a participant completed the post-experiment questionnaire they were
dismissed from the lab. Appendix D presents the questions asked in the post-experiment
questionnaire.
To more clearly illustrate the oral and written instructions given to participants
during the main task Appendix E contains the oral script for Stage 1 and Stage 2.
Appendix F contains the written instructions given to participants after they finished
Stage 2.

44

Although it may seem desirable to impose a time limit on participants for control purposes, such a limit
actually constitutes both a significant departure from practice and could lead to false results. In practice,
aside from budgetary considerations, there is no time limit imposed upon auditors to evaluate and select the
cause of an unexpected fluctuation. Within this experimental setting, imposing a time limit may force
some participants to choose an explanation they would not otherwise select due to time considerations.
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3.8 Dependent Measures
I use four dependent measures to test my hypotheses. The first dependent variable
is the mean number of plausible hypotheses generated by a participant within each
intervention. A hypothesis is deemed plausible if it is consistent with the case
information. That is, a hypothesis is plausible if it is both supported by information
contained within the case and not contradicted by information provided in the case. The
second dependent variable is the percentage of times the correct hypothesis is proposed
by participants within each intervention. The third dependent variable is the percentage
of times the correct hypothesis is identified by participants within each intervention. I
operationalize this dependent variable by first discarding the data from those instances
where participants did not propose the correct hypothesis. I do not use this data to analyze
participants’ hypothesis evaluation effectiveness because a participant cannot possibly
identify the correct hypothesis if the participant did not propose it. Then, in those
instances where the correct hypothesis was proposed, I calculate the percentage of times
the correct hypothesis was actually selected by intervention condition. This proportion
serves as my third dependent variable. I assert that this is an appropriate way to
operationalize participants’ hypothesis evaluation effectiveness because a participant will
ultimately select the proposed hypothesis that he or she has evaluated to best explain the
cause of the unexpected fluctuation. If my decision aids help participants to evaluate
their proposed hypotheses, I would expect that in cases where the correct hypothesis is
proposed, the correct hypothesis will be selected more often by aid users than by non-aid
users. The fourth dependent variable is the percentage of times the correct hypothesis
was selected by participants within each intervention condition.
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The following example may help to illustrate the differences between dependent
variables two, three, and four. Suppose the ARD intervention was administered to ten
participants. Suppose further that of the ten participants, six proposed the correct
hypothesis. The value of dependent variable two would be 60 percent for the ARD
intervention. Now, suppose that of the six participants who proposed the correct
hypothesis, three ultimately select it as the correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation.
Thus, the value of dependent variable three would be 50 percent for the ARD
intervention. Last, because three out of the ten participants in the ARD condition
ultimately select the correct hypothesis, the value of dependent variable four would be 30
percent.

3.9 Data Coding
The researcher and one Ph.D candidate in the final stages of a doctoral program
served as data coders. To prevent coding bias, neither coder was provided with
information that could be used to identify the intervention treatment (i.e., no-aid, ARD,
PCA, or combined-aid interventions) of the data. Thus, even though coders were not
blind to the study’s hypotheses, they were unable to identify the intervention from which
any given piece of datum originated. Further, both coders independently classified the
data in separate locations. After both coders classified the data, they met to disclose the
classification that each coder assigned to every piece of datum. Coder responses were
then compared and any discrepancies were reconciled.
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3.9.1 Hypotheses Coding.
Coders were first asked to identify instances where a participant proposed the
same hypothesis more than once. After removing duplicate hypotheses, coders were then
instructed to use their judgment in determining whether each of the participant’s
proposed hypotheses were consistent with the case information. The coders
independently classified each hypothesis as either “plausible” or “implausible” and then
reconciled any discrepancies in their classification. Prior to resolving discrepancies, the
Cohen’s Kappa coefficient, a measure of inter-rater reliability, was 0.858 for 508 items
coded, suggesting a high degree of coding agreement.45 These coding results formed the
data used to calculate the average number of plausible hypotheses proposed by
participants in each intervention condition.
Next, coders were asked to review the set of plausible hypotheses to identify
instances where the correct hypothesis was proposed. The coders independently classified
each plausible hypothesis as either “correct” or “incorrect” and then reconciled any
discrepancies. Prior to resolving discrepancies, the Cohen’s Kappa coefficient was 0.927
for 79 items coded, suggesting a high degree of coding agreement. These coding results
formed the data used to calculate the percentage of participants who proposed the correct
hypothesis. Additionally, these coding results were also used to identify the instances
where a participant’s hypotheses set contained the correct hypothesis.
Lastly, coders were asked to examine each participant’s selected hypothesis to
determine if the participant chose the correct hypothesis. The coders independently
45

Zwick (1988) notes that Cohen’s Kappa is the most popular index for assessing inter-rater agreement of
nominal categories. The degree of inter-rater agreement is determined by the value of the Cohen’s Kappa
coefficient. The strength of the inter-rater agreement (based on the Cohen’s Kappa coefficient) is generally
considered to be as follows: 0.00 to 0.20 poor, 0.21 to .40 fair, 0.41 to 0.60 moderate, 0.61 to 0.80 good,
0.81 to 1.00 very good (Fleiss et al. 2003).
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classified each participant’s hypothesis selection as “right” or “wrong” and then
reconciled any discrepancies. Prior to resolving discrepancies, the Cohen’s Kappa
coefficient was 0.815 for 78 items coded, suggesting a high degree of coding agreement.
These coding results formed the data used to calculate the percentage of times
participants selected the correct hypothesis by intervention condition.
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4.0 RESULTS
The Results section begins with a discussion of this study’s participants. First, I
present the criteria used to identify participants who failed the experiment’s manipulation
check, then I present the criteria used to assess participants’ knowledge of the general
accounting relationships depicted within the decision aid, discuss the criteria used to
exclude these participants from my analysis, and present descriptive statistics on the final
set of participants. Then, I test each of the hypotheses and report the results. I then
present the results of the planned mediation analysis. Finally, I conclude the section by
discussing the results of supplemental analysis.
One hundred and twenty nine individuals participated in my experiment.
Participants were recruited from masters and upper-level accounting undergraduate
courses at a large university in the Southeastern United States. Because my study
examines the analytical review effectiveness of inexperienced auditors and because
accounting seniors and MAcc students are hired by public accounting firms as new audit
staff, I suggest that upper-level accounting students are an appropriate proxy for
inexperienced auditors.
4.1 Analysis of Participant Demographic Information and Responses
Although one hundred and twenty nine individuals participated in my experiment, not all
participant responses were useable. One participant was excluded from the analysis
because their Excel application became corrupted during the experiment, making it
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impossible to extract the data. Additionally, two questions in the post experiment
questionnaire served as manipulation checks. The purpose of these questions was to
identify whether participants were attentive to the task. The first manipulation check
question asked participants to “Please select the unexpected fluctuation you investigated
today.” The correct response to this question was “The unexpected fluctuation involved
Bean Co.’s cost of sales ratio.” The second manipulation check question asked
participants to “Please indicate what materials were available to you while conducting
analytical review today (Check all that apply).” The available responses were: (1)
Background information about Bean Co., (2) a flowchart depicting common accounting
relationships, (3) an Excel application / workbook, (4) an electronic check-box screen
that helped you evaluate your proposed explanations. Eleven participants were
eliminated from the analysis because they failed the manipulation check questions,
suggesting these participants did not conduct the experiment conscientiously. Of the 11
participants who failed the manipulation check questions, nine were accounting seniors
and two were MAcc students.46 There was no significant difference between the
proportion of MAcc students and senior accounting students failing the manipulation
check questions ( = 0.252, df=1, p=0.615).
4.1.1 Pre-Test Knowledge Assessment.
A maintained assumption of this study is that participants already know the
general accounting relationships depicted within the ARD. To verify this assumption, all
participants took a pre-test before the main task to assess their understanding of the
general accounting relationships depicted within the ARD. Excluding the participants
46

Further, all 11 participants who failed the manipulation check questions also failed the accounting
knowledge test (described in the next paragraph). This provides further evidence to support the claim that
these 11 participants were not attentive to the task.
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that failed the manipulation check questions, thirty-five participants failed the accounting
relationship knowledge test by indicating that a sale of goods causes general and
administrative expenses to increase. Participants were asked the question, “Which of the
following would occur after a sale is made and the product is delivered?” Four clickable
choices were presented and participants were asked to select all the choices that applied.
The four choices presented were (1) sales revenue increases, (2) sales revenue increases
but only when payment is received, (3) general and administrative expenses increase, and
(4) general and administrative expenses increase but only when actually paid. The only
correct answer is that sales revenue increases. However, 35 participants responded that
general and administrative expenses would increase. A participant may have answered
incorrectly due to a variety of factors: a participant may have not known the correct
answer (i.e., they incorrectly believe that general and administrative expenses are related
to cost of sales), a participant may have known the correct answer but was unable to
recall it, or a participant may not have taken the question seriously. Since the unexpected
fluctuation employed within this study is related to cost of sales, these participants were
excluded from the analysis because it was unclear as to whether or not they possessed the
accounting knowledge required to successfully complete the task. As expected,
participants who failed the accounting relationship question were significantly less
effective at analytical review than those who did not miss the question (df=1,
p=0.044). Further, because the purpose of the ARD is to help a participant recall
accounting relationship knowledge the participant already knows, rather than to provide
the participant with new accounting relationship knowledge it was important to remove
those who failed the accounting relationship test because the ARD might have presented
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them with new accounting knowledge. Excluding the participants who failed the
accounting relationship test biased against finding results because the relationships
depicted in the ARD made users more effective in conducting the task. The analytical
review effectiveness results for both the ARD and the combined-aid intervention were
stronger when the participants who failed the accounting relationship knowledge test
were not removed.
Of the 35 participants who failed the accounting relationship test, five were
accounting juniors, 23 were accounting seniors, and seven were MAcc students. While
none of the accounting juniors who participated in this experiment failed the
manipulation check questions, all of the accounting juniors failed the accounting
relationship knowledge test. There was no significant difference between the proportion
of MAcc students and accounting senior students failing the accounting relationship test
( = 0.061, df=1, p=0.805). Of those who failed the accounting relationship test, seven
were in the no-aid intervention, nine in the ARD intervention, nine in the PCA
intervention, and 10 in the combined-aid intervention. There was no significant
difference in the proportion of those who failed the accounting relationship test by
intervention condition ( = 2.717, df=3, p=0.437).
4.1.2 Participants Reporting No Decision Aid Reliance.
To properly attribute a participant’s task effectiveness to the decision aid(s) they
received, my statistical analysis only includes participants who reported that they placed
reliance on the decision aid(s) provided to them. Four participants that received a
decision aid were excluded from my analysis because they reported placing no reliance
on it while conducting the task. Of the four, one participant proposed the correct cause of
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the unexpected fluctuation. The same participant ultimately chose the correct cause.
Table 4.1 provides a summary of all the participants excluded from this study.
4.1.3 Participant Descriptive Statistics.
Data from 78 participants were used to test this study’s hypotheses.47 Table 4.2
presents participant descriptive statistics. Aside from the amount of time spent on the
task and participant reported grade point averages between the ARD intervention and the
combined-aid intervention (which are both discussed in detail below), the demographics
of participants across the four interventions were not found to be significantly different (p
< 0.10), providing evidence that participants were randomly assigned to the four
treatment conditions.
Twenty-four percent of the participants were MAcc students and 76 percent were
accounting seniors.48 On average, participants completed 5.5 accounting courses and
0.69 audit courses, with approximately 21 percent of participants reporting public
accounting internship experience. The average size of each participant’s working
memory was 4.4 pieces of information, proxied as the number of historical phrases a
participant was able to recall. On average, participants spent 39.7 minutes conducting the
main task. There was a significant difference in the amount of time spent on the task
between the no-aid intervention and the PCA intervention (p=0.02) and the No-Aid
intervention and the combined-aid interventions (p=0.00). This difference is not
unexpected since participants within PCA and combined-aid interventions were required
47

Although data gathered from 78 participants provides the foundation from which this study’s results are
drawn, it should be noted that not every statistical test contains 78 observations due to the fact that useable
participant responses were not always obtained. Thus, the actual number of useable observations may vary
slightly between tests.
48

There were no significant main effects or interactions for analytical review effectiveness based on class
standing (MAcc or accounting senior) at p < 0.10.
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to use the PCA’s checkbox functionality to evaluate each of their proposed hypotheses
before they could select the hypothesis they believe best explained why the cost of sales
ratio declined. Finding that participants within these interventions took longer to
complete the task provides evidence they attended to the decision aids and took the task

TABLE 4.1. Descriptive Statistics on Participant Exclusion.
Panel A: Participant Exclusion Descriptive Information
No-Aid
ARD
Total Participants
Corrupted Data File
Accessible Participant Responses
Failed Manipulation Check
Questions
Failed Accounting Knowledge Test
Reported No Decision Aid Reliance
Participants Used in Analysis

PCA

CombinedAid

Total

31
(1)

31
(2)

33
(5)

33
(3)

129
(1)
128
(11)

(7)
N/A
23

(9)
(4)
16

(9)
0
19

(10)
0
20

(35)
(4)
78

No significant difference in manipulation check failure rate or accounting knowledge failure rate between treatment conditions
(p=0.437, Pearson chi-squared)

Panel B: Descriptive Information on Participants Who Failed the Manipulation Check Questions
Junior
Senior
Masters of
Accounting
Accounting
Accountancy
Students
Students
Students
Accessible Participant Responses
5
93
30
Failed Manipulation Check
0
(9)
(2)
Proportion Who Failed
0.0%
9.7%
6.7%

Total

128
(11)
8.6%

No significant difference in the manipulation check failure rate between masters of accountancy students and senior accounting
students between treatment conditions (p=0.615, Pearson chi-squared)

Panel C: Descriptive Information on Participants Who Failed the Accounting Knowledge Test
Junior
Senior
Masters of
Accounting
Accounting
Accountancy
Students
Students
Students
Participants Who Passed the
5
84
28
Manipulation Check
Failed Accounting Knowledge Test
(5)
(23)
(7)
Proportion Who Failed the
100.0%
27.3%
25.0%
Knowledge Test

Total

117
(35)
29.9%

No significant difference in the accounting knowledge failure rate between masters of accountancy students and senior accounting
students between treatment conditions (p=0.805, Pearson chi-squared)

seriously. To examine whether the amount of time taken on the task was related to
analytical review effectiveness, task time was included as a covariate in each of the
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logistic regression models used to test hypothesis generation, evaluation, and selection.
However, task time was not found to be significant at p<0.10.
Using a 6-point interval scale to capture participants’ grade point averages (where
One = grade point averages of 1.0 to 1.4; Two = 1.5 to 1.9; Three = 2.0 to 2.4; Four = 2.5
to 2.9; Five = 3.0 to 3.4; Six = 3.5 to 4.0), grade point average was found to be
marginally different between conditions (F = 2.348, df = 3, p = 0.079). Results of a oneway ANOVA test revealed this difference was caused by a difference between ARD
(xResponse_Scale = 5.13) and combined-aid (xResponse_Scale = 4.50) interventions (F = 5.433, df = 1, p
= 0.025). There were no statistically significant GPA differences between the other
intervention conditions. Because this study’s hypotheses examine the analytical review
effectiveness of participants within decision aid interventions to participants within the
no-aid intervention, the GPA difference that exists between the participants in the ARD
intervention and participants in the combined-aid intervention should have no impact on
this study’s results. To provide empirical evidence that GPA does not affect this study’s
results, I conducted sensitivity analysis by including GPA as a covariate in the statistical
models used to test this study’s hypotheses. I found that including GPA as a covariate
had no effect on this study’s results.
To measure participant responses to questions asked in the post-experiment
questionnaire, I used a variety of 7-point Likert scales. Using a 7-point Likert scale (1 =
Very Easy, 7 = Very Difficult), participants generally found the case material easy to
understand (x = 2.1) and found it somewhat easy to identify the pieces of information
related to the unexpected fluctuation (x = 2.8). Using a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Not at
All Rushed, 7 = Completely Rushed), participants indicated they did not feel the task was
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hurried (x = 2.1). On a 7-point Likert scale (1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High), participants
reported exerting a relatively high amount of mental effort (x = 4.9). Finally, participant
responses (1 = Not at All Important, 7 = Completely Important) indicate that it was of
high importance for participants to find the correct answer to the task (x = 5.7).49 These
demographics suggest that participants did not find the case confusing or rushed and also
suggest that participants were diligent in conducting the task.
Additionally, the researcher closely and conspicuously observed participants
during all experiment sessions to encourage them to conscientiously apply themselves
during the task. Thus, the researcher’s monitoring activity provides additional assurance
that participants were diligent in conducting the task.
4.1.4 Participant Note-Taking Descriptive Statistics.
Participants in decision aid interventions were explicitly asked to identify and
record the pieces of information they felt were relevant to the decline in the cost of sales
ratio by typing them into the electronic software application used during the task. Every
participant in the decision aid interventions complied with these instructions.50
Like participants in decision aid interventions, participants in the no-aid intervention
were also explicitly asked to identify the pieces of information they felt were relevant to
the decline in the cost of sales ratio. To facilitate note-taking in the no-aid condition,
participants were verbally told that they were free to take notes in the task application
spreadsheet, in a separate electronic word processing document, or on any of the paper

49

All participant response means were significantly different from the 7-point Likert scale neutral point of
four at p=0.000.
50

Although all decision aid participants complied with the note-taking instructions, not all of them
necessarily successfully identified relevant pieces of information.
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TABLE 4.2. Participant Descriptive Statistics.
Panel A: Participant Demographics by Treatment Condition
No-Aid
ARD
23
17.3%
(n = 4)
5.5
(1.5)

16
43.8%
(n = 7)
5.8
(1.5)

19
21.1%
(n = 4)
5.4
(1.6)

CombinedAid
20
25.0%
(n = 4)
5.4
(1.6)

Mean Number of Audit Courses
Taken (Standard Deviation)

0.6
(0.7)

0.9
(0.7)

0.6
(0.6)

0.8
(0.7)

0.69
(0.7)

Public Accounting Internship
Experience
Mean Size of Working Memory
(Standard Deviation)

21.7%

20.0%

15.7%

25.0%

21.0%

4.2
(1.2)

4.5
(1.6)

4.4
(2.1)

4.6
(2.0)

4.4
(1.7)

37.7
(3.4)
4.65
(1.0)

38.4
(3.8)
5.13
(0.9)

40.9
(5.1)
5.00
(0.7)

42.0
(4.9)
4.50
(0.9)

39.7
(4.7)*
4.8
(0.9)**

Total Participants
Masters of Accountancy Students
Mean Number of Accounting
Courses Taken (Standard Deviation)

Mean Time Spent on the Main Task
in Minutes (Standard Deviation)
Grade Point Average
(Standard Deviation)

PCA

Overall
78
24.4%
(n = 19)
5.5
(1.5)

Where one = 1.0 to 1.4, two = 1.5 to 1.9,
three = 2.0 to 2.4, four = 2.5 to 2.9, five = 3.0
to 3.4, six = 3.5 to 4.0
*Significant difference between the No-Aid intervention, PCA intervention, and Combined-Aid intervention
(p=0.02 and p=0.00, respectively)
** Significant difference between the ARD intervention and the Combined-Aid intervention (p = 0.025)

Panel B: Participant Task Perceptions by Treatment Condition: Means and (Standard Deviation)
No-Aid
ARD
PCA
CombinedOverall
Aid
Ease or difficulty understanding
2.1
2.0
2.1
2.0
2.1
case material
(1.1)
(1.2)
(1.0)
(1.1)
(1.1)
(1 = Very Easy, 7 = Very Difficult)

Ease or difficulty in identifying the
pieces of information relevant to the
unexpected fluctuation

2.8
(1.3)

3.3
(1.5)

2.6
(1.2)

2.5
(1.1)

2.8
(1.3)

2.0
(1.1)

2.3
(1.2)

1.9
(1.1)

2.3
(1.6)

2.1
(1.2)

4.7
(1.2)
5.8
(0.9)

5.1
(1.4)
6.0
(0.7)

4.9
(1.2)
5.6
(0.9)

4.7
(1.3)
5.6
(0.9)

4.9
(1.2)
5.7
(0.9)

(1 = Very Easy, 7 = Very Difficult)

How hurried was the pace of the
task?
(1 = Not at all Hurried, 7 = Completely
Hurried)

Mental Effort Exerted
(1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High)

How important was it to you to find
the correct answer?
(1 =Not at All Important, 7 = Completely
Important)
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materials given to them. To facilitate non-electronic note taking across all interventions,
participants in every intervention were given a new pen they could use to take notes.
An ex-post examination of note taking among no-aid intervention participants was
conducted for two reasons: (1) to determine the extent to which no-aid participants
complied with the experimental instructions, and (2) to empirically test whether the
decision to take notes is significantly related to this study’s results. Consequently, two
coders examined no-aid participants’ paper case materials and electronic files to
determine the extent of note-taking. Note-taking was coded at three levels: no notes,
light notes, and heavy notes. “No notes” means that no participant markings were found,
“light notes” means the participant made markings of some kind, and “heavy notes”
means the participant made many markings and expressed developed thoughts. Eightyseven percent of no-aid participants (n = 20) were found to take heavy notes, four percent
took light notes (n = 1), and nine percent took no notes (n = 2). Two coders
independently classified the level of note-taking and then reconciled any discrepancies in
their classification. Prior to resolving discrepancies, the Cohen’s Kappa coefficient, a
measure of inter-rater reliability, was 0.805 for 23 items coded. The analytical review
effectiveness between those who took notes and those who did not was not significant at
p < 0.10. Additionally, a sensitivity analysis of this study’s results was conducted by
excluding participants who did not take notes from the statistical analysis. Excluding
participants who did not take notes had no effect on the results.51 Thus, there is empirical
evidence that note-taking did not drive this study’s results. Table 4.3 presents descriptive
statistics regarding no-aid intervention note-taking.
51

I also conducted another sensitivity analysis that excluded the participants who took no notes or light
notes (n=3). Excluding these participants had no significant effect on this study’s results.
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4.1.5 Decision-Aid Reliance and Usefulness Descriptive Statistics.
Descriptive statistics regarding decision aid reliance indicate that participants
placed reliance upon the decision aids in conducting the task. Table 4.4 presents decision
aid reliance descriptive statistics. Using a 7-point Likert scale to measure decision aid

TABLE 4.3. Ex-Post Note-Taking Analysis Among No-Aid Intervention Participants.
Participant
Intervention
Level of Note-Taking
Rocky3
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky4
No-Aid
Light Notes
Rocky5
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky6
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky7
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky8
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky9
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky10
No-Aid
No Notes
Rocky11
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky12
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky13
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky33
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky34
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky51
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky52
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky55
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky56
No-Aid
No Notes
Rocky57
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky61
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky122
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky127
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky129
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Rocky130
No-Aid
Heavy Notes
Level of note-taking was not significantly related to analytical review effectiveness at p < 0.10. Excluding
No-Aid intervention participants who did not take notes has no effect on this study’s results. Further,
excluding No-Aid intervention participants who took either no notes or light notes has no effect on this
study’s results.

reliance (1 = Not at all, 7 = A Great Deal) during the task, both ARD and PCA users
reported placing reliance on the aids during the task (xARD reliance = 3.9, xPCA reliance = 5.3).52

52

Four participants reported placing “no reliance” on the decision aids. These four participants were in the
ARD intervention and were removed from my statistical analysis because their task performance cannot be
appropriately attributed to the ARD. Of the four, one participant proposed the correct hypothesis and
subsequently evaluated and selected it the as the cause of the unexpected fluctuation.
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Users of both the ARD and PCA reported finding the aids as helpful during hypothesis
generation, hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis selection (xARD = 3.7, xPCA = 4.9).53 To
test whether the degree to which a participant relied upon a decision aid was significantly
related to task effectiveness, two LOGIT models were estimated (one model for ARD
users and one model for PCA users) regressing decision aid reliance upon whether a
participant selected the correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation. Decision aid reliance

TABLE 4.4. Decision Aid Reliance and Usefulness Descriptive Statistics.
Decision Aid Reliance and Usefulness: Means and (Standard Deviation)
Reliance Question
ARD Decision Aid+

PCA Decision Aid^

(1 = Not at All, 4 = Somewhat, 7 = A Great Deal)

How much did you rely on the decision aid to
conduct the task?

3.9
(1.7)
n=34++

5.3
(1.5)
n=37^^

How much did the decision aid help you to
generate potential reasons to explain why the
cost of sales ratio declined?

4.1
(1.9)
n=34

5.3
(1.4)
n=37

How much did the decision aid help you to
evaluate each of your proposed reasons?

3.5
(1.7)
n=34

4.6
(1.8)
n=37

How much did the decision aid help you to select
the best reason the cost of sales ratio declined?

3.6
(1.9)
n=34

4.4
(1.9)
n=37

Overall, how helpful was the decision aid?

4.2
(2.0)
n=34

5.1
(1.5)
n=37

Reliability analysis of the five-question “ARD reliance and usefulness” 7-point Likert scale indicated high reliability (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.963)
++
The sample size reflects participant responses from both ARD interventions and combined-aid interventions since the ARD was
made available to participants in both intervention conditions
^
Reliability analysis of the six-question “PCA reliance and usefulness” 7-point Likert scale indicated high reliability (Cronbach’s
alpha = 0.913)
^^
The sample size reflects participant responses from both PCA interventions and combined-aid interventions since the PCA was made
available to participants in both intervention conditions
+

53

These means reflect participants’ responses to a multiple question (five questions for ARD users, six
questions for PCA users), 7-point Likert scale reliance and usefulness questionnaire administered at the end
of the experiment. Chronbach’s alpha for these questions and responses were 0.963 for ARD users and
0.913 for PCA users.
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was not found to be significantly related to analytical review effectiveness for ARD users
( = 0.023, df=1, p=0.628) or for PCA users ( = 0.083, df=1, p=0.773). In sum, there
is evidence that participants within decision aid interventions placed reliance upon the
aids and found them to be helpful in conducting analytical review.
4.1.6 Participant Proposed Hypotheses.
The purpose of conducting analytical review is to identify the cause of an
unexpected fluctuation. Consequently, to properly perform analytical review each
participant must generate at least one potential reason to explain why the unexpected
fluctuation occurred. Within this study, each participant generated at least one potential
reason to explain the cause of the unexpected fluctuation.54
4.2 Assumption Testing
4.2.1 Univariate Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).
Before hypotheses testing, I first investigate whether any of the statistical
procedures I plan to use violate their related assumptions. ANOVA makes several
assumptions regarding the sampling units employed and the overall sample distribution.
ANOVA assumes that units are randomly sampled from the population of interest, that
observations are statistically independent of each other, that dependent variables are
normally distributed, and that within-intervention variances are homogenous.
Each participant self-selected the experimental session they participated in. Thus,
I did not have control over the distribution of participants to any specific experimental
session. Further, to promote random assignment and guard against introducing bias into
a specific experimental session, the intervention treatment administered for a given
54

The mean number (standard deviation) of hypotheses generated by intervention condition was as follows:

xNo-Aid = 4.26 (1.54), xARD = 3.31 (2.02), xPCA = 4.00 (1.86), xCombined-aids = 3.70 (1.72). There
was no significant difference in the number of hypotheses proposed by intervention condition at p<0.10.
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session was determined by randomly selecting one of four numbered slips of paper from
a hat. An empirical investigation of participant demographics between treatment
conditions (previously discussed above in detail in the section sub-titled “Participant
Descriptive Statistics”) reveals that all interventions were not significantly different from
each other in terms of the proportion of MAcc students participating, the number of
accounting courses completed by participants, the number of audit courses completed by
participants, the working memory size of participants, and participants’ public accounting
experience.
The assumption of statistical independence of observations is satisfied by using a
between-subjects experiment design. Normality of the distribution of the dependent
variable “Number of plausible hypotheses proposed” was examined by creating a
scatterplot that depicted the number of plausible hypotheses proposed by participant.
There appeared to be no extreme deviations from normality for this dependent variable.
To test whether within-intervention variances were homogenous, a Levene’s test was
conducted and test results indicated that the homogeneity assumption was not violated (F
= 0.598, df = 3, p = 0.619).
4.2.2 Logistic Regression (LOGIT).
LOGIT is a statistical test used to estimate the odds of a discrete outcome.
LOGIT assumes that the dependent variable is discrete and that observations are
independent. The dependent variables I propose examining with LOGIT are (1) whether
the correct hypothesis is proposed, (2) whether the correct hypothesis is selected, and (3)
in cases where the correct hypothesis is proposed, whether the correct hypothesis is
selected. These three dependent variables are dichotomous in nature, thus they are
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discrete. The assumption of observation statistical independence is satisfied by using a
between-subjects experiment design.
4.3 Hypotheses Testing
Hypothesis 1a (H1a) predicts that participants in the ARD intervention will
generate more plausible hypotheses compared to those in the no-aid intervention.
Contrary to my expectations, there is no statistical difference in the mean number of
plausible hypotheses proposed by participants in the ARD intervention (xARD = 1.13)
compared to participants in the no-aid intervention (xNo-Aid = 0.91) as reported in Panel A in
Table 4.5 (F = 0.521, df = 3, p=0.669). Further, a significant difference was not found
using either Dunnette’s post hoc analysis or by planned contrast testing. Thus, H1a is not
supported.

TABLE 4.5. Number of Plausible Hypotheses Proposed by Intervention.
Panel A: Treatment Descriptive Statistics
Intervention
Range
Mean
(# of Plausible
Hypotheses Proposed)

No-Aid
ARD
PCA
Combined-Aid

0–5
0–4
0–5
0–3

0.91
1.13
1.21
0.75

Standard
Deviation

N

1.345
1.31
1.398
0.967

23
16
19
20

Dependent Variable: The average number of plausible hypotheses proposed by each participant

Panel B: ANOVA Model and Significance
Analysis of
Sum of Squares
Degrees
variance source
of
of variation
Freedom
Model
2.503
3
Intercept
76.643
1
Intervention
2.503
3
Error
118.484
74
Total
197.000
78

Mean Square

F-stat

F-Significance

0.834
76.643
0.834
1.610

0.521
47.868
0.521

0.669
0.000
0.669

Hypothesis 1b (H1b) proposes that participants in the ARD intervention will
propose the correct hypothesis more often compared to participants in the no-aid
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intervention. Panel A in Table 4.6 presents descriptive statistics regarding the number of
times the correct hypothesis was proposed. Seven out of 16 participants (43.8 percent) in
the ARD intervention proposed the correct hypothesis, while seven out of 23 participants
(30.4 percent) proposed the correct hypothesis in the no-aid intervention. To put these
percentages in perspective with prior research, analytical review studies find between
nine and twenty-nine percent of experienced auditors propose the correct hypothesis
(Bedard, Biggs, and Maroney 1998; Bedard and Biggs 1991, respectively). Panel B in
Table 4.6 presents the results of a LOGIT model that regresses whether a participant
received the ARD against whether a participant proposed the correct hypothesis,
controlling for cognitive load, the number of non-audit accounting courses completed,
and the number of audit courses completed. As the results in Panel C of Table 4.6
indicate, the odds a participant proposes the correct hypothesis increase by a
multiplicative factor of 3.834 when a participant uses the ARD as compared to conditions
where a participant is not given any decision aid ( = 2.383, df = 1, p=0.062, one-tailed).
Thus, there is evidence that the ARD helps to improve participant hypothesis generation
effectiveness, in support of hypothesis H1b.
Results indicate that participants in the ARD intervention are more effective at
hypotheses evaluation than those who do not receive any decision aid. Participants were
able to identify the correct hypothesis six out of the seven times (85.7 percent) it was
proposed in the ARD intervention, as compared to three out of seven times (42.8 percent)
in the no-aid intervention. Panel A in Table 4.7 presents descriptive statistics regarding
the number of times participants were able to identify the correct hypothesis. Using
instances where a participant proposed the correct hypothesis, a LOGIT model was
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estimated regressing whether a participant received the ARD against whether a
participant selected the correct hypothesis, controlling for cognitive load. As the results

TABLE 4.6. Hypothesis 1b: Hypothesis Generation Effectiveness (ARD vs. No-Aid).
Panel A: Hypothesis Generation Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics by Intervention
Intervention
N
Number of Times Correct
Percentage of Times Correct
Hypothesis Proposed
Hypothesis Proposed
No-Aid
23
7
30.4%
ARD
16
7
43.8%
Panel B: LOGIT Model and Significance
LOGIT
Overall
Degrees of
Freedom
Model
Model
12.358
4
Panel C: LOGIT Model Detailed Statistics
B
Decision Aid

Exp(B)

Significance
0.015
Wald 

df

Significance

2.383

1

0.062*

1.344

3.834

Standard
Error
0.871

-0.735

0.480

0.281

6.812

1

0.009**

2.644

14.071

1.634

2.617

1

0.106

-1.525+

0.218

0.968

2.483

1

0.115

-2.881

0.056

3.570

0.651

1

0.165

(0 = No-Aid, 1 = ARD)

Covariate: Cognitive Load
(1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High)

Covariate: Number of Non-Audit
Accounting Courses Completed
Covariate: Number of Audit
Courses Completed
Constant

Dependent Variable: The proportion of times the correct hypothesis was proposed
*Significant at p<0.10, one-tailed
**Significant at p<0.05
+
The non-intuitive coefficient direction is due to overconfidence and is discussed in the post-hoc analysis

presented in Panel B of Table 4.7 reveal, the odds that a participant discerns the actual
cause of the unexpected fluctuation increase when the participant uses the ARD as
compared to participants in the no-aid intervention (dfp=0.067, onetailed). Results indicate that the odds the participant will discern the correct hypothesis
increase by a multiplicative factor of 160.99 if the ARD is used, providing support for
H2.
Hypothesis 3 (H3) proposes that the correct hypothesis will be selected more
often by participants in the ARD intervention when compared to participants in the no-
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aid intervention. Six out of 16 participants (37.5 percent) selected the correct hypothesis
in the ARD intervention, as compared to three out of 23 participants (13.0 percent) in the
no-aid intervention. Panel A in Table 4.8 presents descriptive statistics regarding the

TABLE 4.7. Hypothesis 2: Hypotheses Evaluation and Effectiveness (ARD vs. No-Aid).
Panel A: Hypothesis Evaluation Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics by Intervention
Intervention

Number of Times
Correct Hypothesis
Proposed

Number of Times Correct
Hypothesis Identified

Percentage of Times Correct
Hypothesis Identified When
Proposed

No-Aid

7

3

42.8%

ARD

7

6

85.7%

Panel B: LOGIT Model and Significance
LOGIT
Overall
Model
Model
11.420

Degrees of
Freedom
2

Panel C: LOGIT Model Detailed Statistics
B
Exp(B)
Decision Aid
5.081
160.999

Significance
0.003

Standard Error
3.388

Wald 
2.250

df
1

Significance
0.067*

(0 = No-Aid, 1 = ARD)

Covariate: Cognitive Load

-1.964

0.140

1.033

3.612

1

0.057**

4.388

80.447

2.682

2.677

1

0.102

(1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High)

Constant

Dependent Variable: The proportion of times the correct hypothesis was selected when it was proposed
*Significant at p<0.10, one-tailed
**Significant at p<0.10

number of participants that selected the correct hypothesis. To test H3, a LOGIT model
was estimated regressing whether a participant received the ARD against whether a
participant selected the correct hypothesis, controlling for cognitive load. Consistent
with H3, the results presented in Panels B and C of Table 4.8 indicate that the odds a
participant selects the correct hypothesis increase by a multiplicative factor of 5.464
when the ARD is used (dfp=0.038, one-tailed). Thus, there is evidence
that the ARD improves overall analytical review effectiveness, supporting H3.
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TABLE 4.8. Hypothesis 3: Hypothesis Selection Effectiveness (ARD vs. No-ARD).
Panel A: Hypothesis Selection Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics by Intervention
Intervention
N
Number of Times
Percentage of Times Correct Hypothesis
Correct Hypothesis
Selected
Selected
No-Aid
23
3
13.0%
ARD
16
6
37.5%
Panel B: LOGIT Model and Significance
LOGIT
Overall
Degrees of Freedom
Model
Model
12.568
2
Panel C: LOGIT Model Detailed Statistics
B
Exp(B)
Decision Aid

Significance
0.002
Wald 

df

Significance

3.167

1

0.038*

1.698

5.464

Standard
Error
0.954

-0.906

0.404

0.376

5.792

1

0.016**

0.652

1.920

1.087

0.360

1

0.548

(0 = No-Aid, 1 =
ARD)

Covariate:
Cognitive Load
(1 = Very Low, 7 =
Very High)

Constant

Dependent Variable: The proportion of times participants selected the correct hypothesis
*Significant at p<0.10, one-tailed
**Significant at p<0.10

Hypothesis 4a (H4a) proposes that participants in the PCA intervention will
generate more plausible hypotheses compared to participants in the no-aid intervention.
Contrary to my expectations, there is no statistical difference in the mean number of
plausible hypotheses proposed by participants in the PCA intervention (xPCA= 1.21)
compared to those generated by participants in the no-aid intervention (xNo-Aid = 0.91) as
reported in Panel A in Table 4.5 (F = 0.521, df = 1, p = 0.669). Further, a significant
difference was not found using either Dunnette’s post hoc analysis or by planned contrast
testing. Thus, H4a is not supported.
Hypothesis 4b (H4b) proposes that participants in the PCA intervention will
propose the correct hypothesis more often compared to participants in the no-aid
intervention. Seven out of 19 (36.8 percent) participants in the PCA intervention
proposed the correct hypothesis, while seven out of 23 participants (30.4 percent)
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proposed the correct hypothesis in the no-aid intervention. These results are consistent
with prior research which finds that between nine and twenty-nine percent of experienced
auditors propose the correct hypothesis (Bedard, Biggs, and Maroney 1998; Bedard and
Biggs 1991, respectively). Although the proportion of participants that proposed the
correct hypothesis is higher in the PCA intervention, the results are not statistically
significant. Panel B in Table 4.9 presents the results of a LOGIT model which was
estimated by regressing whether a participant received the PCA against whether a
participant proposed the correct hypothesis, controlling for cognitive load. As the results
in Panel B of Table 4.9 indicate, neither the overall regression model (=3.635, df = 2,
p=0.162) or the PCA intervention were significant (=0.582, df = 1, p=0.223, onetailed). Thus, the PCA is not found to significantly increase the odds that a participant
will propose the correct hypothesis as compared to participants in the no-aid intervention.
Consequently, there is no evidence the PCA helps improve participants’ hypothesis
generation effectiveness. Therefore, H4b is not supported.
Results reported in Table 4.10 indicate that participants in the PCA intervention
are more effective at hypotheses evaluation than those in the no-aid intervention.
Participants were able to identify the correct hypothesis six out of the seven times (85.7
percent) it was proposed in the PCA intervention, as compared to three out of seven times
(42.8 percent) in the no-aid intervention. Panel A in Table 4.10 presents descriptive
statistics regarding the number of times participants were able to identify the correct
hypothesis. Using cases where a participant proposed the correct hypothesis, a LOGIT
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TABLE 4.9. Hypothesis 4b: Hypothesis Generation Effectiveness (PCA vs. No-Aid).
Panel A: Hypothesis Generation Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics by Intervention
Intervention
N
Number of Times Correct
Percentage of Times Correct
Hypothesis Proposed
Hypothesis Proposed
No-Aid
23
7
30.4%
PCA
19
7
36.8%
Panel B: LOGIT Model and Significance
LOGIT
Overall
Degrees of
Freedom
Model
Model
3.635
2

Significance
0.162

Panel C: LOGIT Model Detailed Statistics
B
Exp(B)
Decision Aid

0.536

1.709

Standard
Error
0.702

Wald

0.582

df

Significance

1

0.223

-0.380

0.684

0.218

3.052

1

0.081*

0.562

1.754

0.892

0.397

1

0.529

(0 = No-Aid, 1 = PCA)

Covariate: Cognitive Load
(1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High)

Constant

Dependent Variable: The proportion of times the correct hypothesis was proposed
*Significant at p<0.10

model was estimated regressing whether a participant received the PCA against whether a
participant discerned the correct hypothesis, controlling for cognitive load. Consistent
with expectations, the results presented in Panel B of Table 4.10 indicate the odds that a
participant is able to discern the correct hypothesis increase when the participant uses the
PCA as compared to participants in the no-aid intervention (=2.850, df = 1, p=0.046,
one-tailed). The odds that a participant discerns the correct hypothesis increase by a
multiplicative factor of 100.09 if the PCA is used, providing support for H5.
Hypothesis 6 (H6) proposes that the correct hypothesis will be selected more
frequently by participants in the PCA intervention when compared to participants in the
no-aid intervention. Six out of 19 participants (31.6 percent) selected the correct
hypothesis in the PCA intervention, as compared to three out of 23 participants (13.0
percent) in the no-aid intervention.

98

TABLE 4.10. Hypothesis 5: Hypothesis Evaluation Effectiveness (PCA vs. No-Aid).
Panel A: Hypothesis Evaluation Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics by Intervention
Intervention

Number of Times
Correct Hypothesis
Proposed

Number of Times
Correct Hypothesis
Identified

Percentage of Times Correct
Hypothesis Identified When
Proposed

No-Aid

7

3

42.8%

PCA

7

6

85.7%

Panel B: LOGIT Model and Significance
LOGIT
Degrees of
Overall Model
Freedom
Model
6.783
2
Panel C: LOGIT Model Detailed Statistics
B
Exp(B)
Decision Aid

Significance
0.034

4.606

100.095

Standard
Error
2.728

Wald

2.850

df

Significance

1

0.046*

-1.171

0.310

0.792

2.187

1

0.139

2.539

12.667

2.045

1.541

1

0.214

(0 = No-Aid, 1 = PCA)

Covariate: Cognitive Load
(1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High)

Constant

Dependent Variable: The proportion of times the correct hypothesis was selected when it was proposed
*Significant at p<0.10, one-tailed

regarding the number of participants that selected the correct hypothesis. To test H6, a
LOGIT model was estimated regressing whether a participant received the PCA against
whether a participant selected the correct hypothesis, controlling for cognitive load, the
number of audit courses completed, and the number of non-audit accounting courses
completed. Consistent with H6, results in Table 4.11 indicate that the odds a participant
selects the correct hypothesis significantly increase by a multiplicative factor of 10.06
when the PCA is used (p=0.023, one-tailed). Thus, there is evidence that the
PCA improves overall analytical review effectiveness, supporting H6.
Hypothesis 7a (H7a) proposes that participants in the combined-aid intervention
condition will generate more plausible hypotheses compared with participants in all other
conditions. However, ANOVA results indicate that there is no statistical difference in the
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TABLE 4.11. Hypothesis 6: Hypothesis Selection Effectiveness (PCA vs. No-Aid).
Panel A: Hypothesis Selection Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics by Intervention
Intervention
N
Number of Times Correct
Percentage of Times Correct
Hypothesis Selected
Hypothesis Selected
No-Aid
23
3
13.0%
PCA
19
6
31.6%
Panel B: LOGIT Model and Significance
LOGIT
Overall
Degrees of
Freedom
Model
Model
17.116
4
Panel C: LOGIT Model Detailed Statistics
B
Exp(B)
Decision Aid

Significance
0.002
Wald 

df

Significance

4.004

1

0.023*

2.309

10.066

Standard
Error
1.154

-0.721

0.486

0.314

5.264

1

0.022**

-4.372

0.013

1.797

5.919

1

0.015***

1.780

5.931

0.918

3.757

1

0.053**

-6.531

0.001

3.935

2.755

1

0.097**

(0 = No-Aid, 1 = PCA)

Covariate: Cognitive Load
(1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High)

Covariate: Number of
Audit Courses Completed
Covariate: Number of NonAudit Accounting Courses
Completed
Constant

Dependent Variable: The proportion of times the correct hypothesis was selected when it was proposed
*Significant at p<0.05, one-tailed
**Significant at p<0.10
***Significant at p<0.10. The non-intuitive coefficient direction is due to participant overconfidence and is discussed in the
post-hoc analysis

mean number of plausible hypotheses proposed by participants in the combined-aid
intervention (xCombined-Aid = 0.75) compared to those generated by participants in the no-aid
intervention (xNo-Aid = 0.91) as reported in Panel A in Table 4.5 (F = 0.521, df = 3,
p=0.669). Further, because a visual examination of the descriptive statistics regarding the
number of plausible hypotheses generated by combined-aid users reveals that participants
in this condition actually proposed the least average number of plausible hypotheses, no
further statistical analysis was conducted (xCombined-Aid = 0.75, xARD = 1.13, xPCA = 1.21).
Consequently there is no support for H7a.
Hypothesis 7b (H7b) proposes that participants in the combined-aid intervention
condition will generate the correct hypothesis more often compared to participants in all
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other conditions. A simple visual examination of the descriptive statistics presented in
Panel A in Table 4.12 reveals that participants in the combined-aid intervention did not
propose the correct hypothesis more often than any other intervention. Five out of 20
participants (25.0 percent) in the combined-aid intervention proposed the correct
hypothesis as compared to seven out of 23 participants (30.4 percent) in the no-aid
intervention, seven out of 16 participants (43.8 percent) in the ARD intervention, and
seven out of 19 participants (36.8 percent) in the PCA intervention. Thus, H7b is not
supported.
Hypothesis 8 (H8) proposes that when the correct hypothesis is proposed, it will
be identified more often by participants in the combined-aid intervention when compared
to participants in all other interventions. A visual examination of the descriptive statistics
presented in Panel A in Table 4.13 reveals that participants in the combined-aid
intervention did not identify the correct hypothesis more often than all other
interventions, as participants in both the ARD intervention and the PCA intervention
identified the correct hypothesis more often, providing no support for H8 (Percent
IdentifiedCombined-Aid = 80.0 percent, Percent IdentifiedARD = 85.7 percent, Percent
IdentifiedPCA = 85.7 percent). However, results reported in Table 4.13 indicate that
combined-aid users are more effective at hypotheses evaluation than those in the no-aid
intervention. When a participant proposes the correct hypothesis during the task, the
odds that the participant is able to discern it as the actual cause of the unexpected
fluctuation increase by a multiplicative factor of 34.46 when the participant uses both
decision aids as compared to when the participant is provided with no decision aids
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TABLE 4.12. Descriptive Statistics: Hypothesis Generation, Evaluation, and Selection.
Panel A: Hypothesis Generation Descriptive Statistics
Intervention
N
Number of Times Correct
Hypothesis Proposed
No-Aid
ARD
PCA
Combined-Aid

23
16
19
20

7
7
7
5

Panel B: Hypothesis Evaluation Descriptive Statistics
Intervention
Number of Times
Number of
Correct Hypothesis
Times Correct
Proposed
Hypothesis
Identified
No-Aid
7
3

Percentage of Times
Correct Hypothesis
Proposed
30.4%
43.8%
36.8%
25.0%

Percentage of Times
Correct Hypothesis
Identified When Proposed
42.8%

ARD
PCA

7
7

6
6

85.7%
85.7%

Combined-Aid

5

4

80.0%

Panel C: Hypothesis Selection Descriptive Statistics
Intervention
N
Number of Times Correct
Hypothesis Selected
No-Aid
ARD
PCA
Combined-Aid

23
16
19
20

3
6
6
4

Percentage of Times
Correct Hypothesis
Selected
13.0%
37.5%
31.6%
20.0%

(dfp=0.054, one-tailed). When the correct hypothesis was proposed,
participants in the combined-aid intervention were able to identify it four out of the five
times (80.0 percent) as compared to three out of seven times (42.8 percent) in the no-aid
intervention. Thus, participants using both decision aids performed hypothesis evaluation
more effectively than participants who did not receive any decision aids.
Hypothesis 9 (H9) proposes that the correct hypothesis will be selected more
often by participants in the combined-aid intervention when compared to participants
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TABLE 4.13. Hypothesis Evaluation Effectiveness (Combined-Aid vs. No-Aid).
Panel A: Hypothesis Evaluation Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics by Intervention
Intervention

Number of Times
Correct Hypothesis
Proposed

Number of Times
Correct Hypothesis
Identified

Percentage of Times
Correct Hypothesis
Identified When Proposed

No-Aid

7

3

42.8%

Combined-Aid

5

4

80.0%

ARD

7

6

85.7%

PCA

7

6

85.7%

Panel B: LOGIT Model and Significance: Combined-Aid vs. No-Aid
LOGIT
Degrees of Freedom
Significance

Model
7.737
2
0.021
Panel C: LOGIT Model Detailed Statistics: Combined-Aid vs. No-Aid
B
Exp(B)
Standard Error Wald 
Decision Aid
3.540
34.459
2.199
2.590

df
1

Significance
0.054*

(0 = No-Aid, 1 = Combined-Aid)

Covariate: Cognitive Load

-2.247

0.106

1.341

2.805

1

0.094**

5.063

158.000

3.428

2.181

1

0.140

(1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High)

Constant

Dependent Variable = The proportion of times the correct hypothesis was selected when it was proposed
*Significant at p<0.10, one-tailed
**Significant at p<0.10

within all other interventions. A visual examination of the descriptive statistics presented
in Panel A in Table 4.14 reveals that participants in the combined-aid intervention did not
select the correct hypothesis more often than all other interventions, as participants in
both the ARD intervention and the PCA intervention identified the correct hypothesis
more often (Proportion SelectedCombined-Aid = 20.0 percent, Proportion SelectedARD = 37.5
percent, Proportion SelectedPCA = 31.6 percent). Thus, H9 is not supported. Further, the
results presented in Panel B of Table 4.14 indicate that there was no significant
hypothesis selection effectiveness difference between participants in the combined-aid
intervention and participants in the no-aid intervention (1.535, df = 1, p=0.108).
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TABLE 4.14. Hypothesis 9: Hypothesis Selection Effectiveness (Combined-Aid vs. No-Aid).
Panel A: Hypothesis Selection Effectiveness Descriptive Statistics by Intervention
Intervention
N
Number of Times Correct
Percentage of Times Correct
Hypothesis Selected
Hypothesis Selected
No-Aid
23
3
13.0%
Combined-Aid
20
4
20.0%
ARD
16
6
37.5%
PCA
19
6
31.6%
Panel B: LOGIT Model and Significance: Combined-Aid vs. No-Aid
LOGIT
Overall
Degrees of
Significance
Freedom
Model
Model
12.658
4
0.013
Panel C: LOGIT Model Detailed Statistics: Combined-Aid vs. No-Aid
B
Exp(B)
Standard
Wald 
Error
Decision Aid
1.412
4.104
1.140
1.535

df

Significance

1

0.108

(0 = No-Aid, 1 = Combined-Aid)

Covariate: Cognitive Load

-1.178

0.308

0.544

4.683

1

0.031*

-2.878

0.056

1.616

4.683

1

0.075**

1.367

3.924

0.771

3.142

1

0.076*

-4.779

0.008

3.657

1.708

1

0.191

(1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High)

Covariate: Number of
Audit Courses Completed
Covariate: Number of
Non-Audit Accounting
Courses Completed
Constant

Dependent Variable: The proportion of times the correct hypothesis was selected
*Significant at p<0.10
**Significant at p<0.10. The non-intuitive coefficient direction is due to participant overconfidence and is discussed in the
post-hoc analysis

In summary, the study’s results indicate that use of the decision aids investigated
in this study significantly improve participants’ analytical review performance during
hypotheses evaluation and hypothesis selection, leading to better overall analytical
review effectiveness as compared to participants who are not provided with any decision
aids. Further, although participants within the ARD intervention proposed the correct
hypothesis significantly more often than the no-aid intervention, no significant difference
was found among PCA or combined-aid interventions. Results indicate that decision aid
users do not generate more plausible hypotheses than non-aid users. Finally, results
indicate that although the analytical review effectiveness of participants within the
combined-aid intervention is sometimes significantly better than that of the no-aid
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intervention, participants within the combined-aid intervention do not outperform
participants within the ARD intervention or the PCA intervention. Table 4.15 presents
the study’s hypothesis and identifies whether each was supported.

TABLE 4.15. Summary of Hypotheses and Results.

H1a

H1b

H2

H3

H4a

H4b

H5

H6

H7a

H7b

H8
H9

Hypothesis
A larger number of plausible hypotheses will be proposed by inexperienced
auditors using the activity relationship diagram aid than by inexperienced auditors
not using any aid.
The correct hypothesis will be proposed more often by inexperienced auditors
using the activity relationship diagram aid than by inexperienced auditors not using
any aid.
When the hypothesis set contains the correct hypothesis, inexperienced auditors
using the activity relationship diagram aid will identify the correct hypothesis more
often when compared to inexperienced auditors not using any aid.
The correct hypothesis will be selected more often by inexperienced auditors in the
activity relationship diagram intervention when compared to inexperienced auditors
in the no-aid intervention.
A larger number of plausible hypotheses will be proposed by inexperienced
auditors using the pattern-consideration aid than by inexperienced auditors not
using any aid.
The correct hypothesis will be proposed more often by inexperienced auditors
using the pattern-consideration aid than by inexperienced auditors not using any
aid.
When the hypothesis set contains the correct hypothesis, inexperienced auditors
using the pattern-consideration aid will identify the correct hypothesis more often
when compared to inexperienced auditors not using any aid.
The correct hypothesis will be selected more often by inexperienced auditors using
the pattern-consideration aid when compared to inexperienced auditors not using
any aid.
A larger number of plausible hypotheses will be proposed by inexperienced
auditors using both aids than by inexperienced auditors using each aid individually
or no aid.
The correct hypothesis will be proposed more often by inexperienced auditors
using both aids than by inexperienced auditors using each aid individually or no
aid.
When the hypothesis set contains the correct hypothesis, inexperienced auditors
using both aids will identify the correct hypothesis more often than inexperienced
auditors using each aid individually or no aid.
The correct hypothesis will be selected more often by inexperienced auditors using
both aids than by inexperienced auditors using each aid individually or no aid.
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Supported?
No.

Yes.

Yes.

Yes.

No.

No.

Yes.

Yes.

No.

No.

No.
No.

4.4 Planned Mediation Analysis
I conducted mediation analysis to empirically test my prediction that the level of
cognitive load mediates the relationship between decision aid use and analytical review
effectiveness. Applying the Baron and Kenny (1986) mediation model I examine
whether the three conditions necessary for mediation exist within this study: (1) the
independent variable should significantly impact the mediator variable, (2) changes in the
mediator variable should significantly impact the dependent variable, and (3) a previously
significant relationship between the independent and dependent variable should decrease
in significance when the mediator is introduced. I present these three conditions in
equation form below:
Equation 1: Y = i1 + cX + e1
Equation 2: Y = i2 +c′X +bM +e2
Equation 3: M = i3 + aX + e3
In the equations above Y serves as the dependent variable, X is the independent
variable, M is the mediator variable. i1 and i2 and i3 are the regression intercepts, c is the
coefficient relating the independent variable and the dependent variable, c′ is the
coefficient relating the independent variable to the dependent variable, which is adjusted
for the mediator variable, b is the coefficient relating the mediator to the dependent
variable, which is adjusted for the independent variable, a is the coefficient relating the
independent variable to the mediator, and e1 and e2 and e3 are the residuals (MacKinnon et
al. 2007). Applying the equations to my study, Y is analytical review effectiveness
(measured by each of the three dependent variables used to test my hypothesis), X is the
intervention (i.e., the ARD, PCA, or combined-Aid interventions), and M is cognitive
load as reported by study participants using a 7-point Likert scale administered during the
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post-experimental questionnaire. The coefficients represent the values obtained by
estimating the regression.
4.4.1 Measuring Cognitive Load.
The question of how to measure cognitive load has proven difficult for
researchers to solve (Paas et al. 2003). Researchers generally use two methods to
measure cognitive load: analytical methods and empirical methods (Paas et al. 2003).
Analytical methods seek to estimate cognitive load through the use of mathematical
models and task analysis. Analytical methods are not widely used to measure cognitive
load, as Paas et al. (2003) report that only one study has applied this method (p. 66).
Thus, I decided not to measure cognitive load using an analytical method.
Empirical methods attempt to measure cognitive load using psychophysiological
techniques and ratings scales (Paas et al. 2003). Psychophysiological techniques are
based on the presumption that changes in cognitive functioning are reflected in
individuals’ psychological responses. Some common psychophysiological variables of
interest are heart activity, brain activity, and eye activity (Paas et al. 2003). Because I did
not have access to instruments capable of measuring physiological variables, I decided
not to measure cognitive load in this way.
This study uses a 7-point Likert rating scale is to measure participants’ perceived
level of cognitive load. Measuring cognitive load through the use of a rating scale is
based on the assumption that individuals are able to accurately report the amount of
cognitive load they experience. While the use of self-rating scales may appear
questionable, research demonstrates that individuals are adept at giving an accurate
indication of their perceived cognitive load (Paas 1992; Paas and van Merrienboer 1994;
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Paas et al. 1994). Consequently, the 7-point Likert scale used to measure cognitive load
in this study is adapted from Paas (1992).55
4.4.1.1 Where I Measured Cognitive Load During the Task.
Within my study, determining the optimal point to measure cognitive load
presented a formidable challenge. Although asking participants to assess their cognitive
load at the end of each analytical review stage (i.e., after hypothesis generation,
hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis selection) seemed to be the optimal point to
measure cognitive load, having participants assess and report their cognitive load at the
end of each stage also seemed to constitute a distracter task. Consequently, I feared
having participants self-report their cognitive load at the end of each stage would clear
out at least a portion of their working memory, leaving participants with fewer relevant
cues to call upon in performing the task, artificially reducing participants’ analytical
review effectiveness. The risk was especially relevant to my task because asking
participants to self-report their cognitive load in the middle of the task might have
artificially increased the effectiveness of the decision aid interventions since participants
that do not receive any decision aids must rely more heavily upon their working memory
as compared to aid-users in conducting the task.
Consequently, I chose to measure cognitive load for each of the three stages at the
end of the experiment in the post-experiment questionnaire even though I knew ex ante

55

Underscoring the difficulty involved with measuring cognitive load, I originally proposed measuring
cognitive load using the NASA TLX Task Load Index. However, consistent with the findings of Rubio et
al. 2004, the pilot study results suggested the NASA TLX instrument was not sensitive enough to pick up
changes in cognitive load levels across intervention conditions. Thus, after consultation with my
dissertation chairman, the decision was made not to use the NASA TLX instrument to measure cognitive
load within this study.
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that a considerable amount of time and activity would occur between the point that
cognitive load was experienced and the point that cognitive load was measured.
4.4.2 Determining Whether a Mediating Relationship Exists.
To conclude that cognitive load mediates the relationship between analytical
review effectiveness and decision aid use, I must first demonstrate that each decision aid
intervention is significantly related to analytical review effectiveness without controlling
for cognitive load. To test this, I estimate a regression that excludes cognitive load from
the model. I expect this regression to estimate the coefficient c to be positive and
significantly related to analytical review effectiveness at conventional significance
levels.56
Next, I need to demonstrate that cognitive load is significantly related to
analytical review effectiveness when both decisions aid and cognitive load are modeled
as independent variables in equation 2. In other words, both cognitive load and the
decision aid must be statistically significant when estimating analytical review
effectiveness. Further, the coefficient of the decision aid in equation 1 should be
inversely related to the coefficient of the decision aid in equation 2.
Finally, I must demonstrate that there is a significant relationship between the
decision aid and cognitive load. To test this, I estimate a regression where cognitive load
is the dependent variable and the decision aid is the independent variable. I expect the
regression estimate of equation 3 to return a negative a coefficient since I predict that
decision aids reduce cognitive load. Further, I expect the regression estimate will
indicate the decision aid is significantly associated with cognitive load at conventional
significance levels.
56

Within this study conventional significance levels are defined as those below p=0.10.
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A variable may be considered a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the
relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable (Baron and
Kenny 1986). Full mediation occurs when the relationship, previously found to be
significant, between the independent variable and the dependent variable is reduced to
zero when the mediator is introduced. Partial mediation occurs when the relationship
between the independent variable and the dependent variable is reduced in the presence
of the mediator. Table 4.16 illustrates the four steps performed (and the required
outcome) to test whether cognitive load mediates the relationship between decision aids
and analytical review effectiveness.
TABLE 4.16. The Four Steps and Required Outcomes Necessary to Provide Evidence that Cognitive Load
Mediates Decision Aid Use and Analytical Review Effectiveness.
Step

Requirement

Test Applied

1

Demonstrate the
decision aid is
significantly related to
analytical review
effectiveness.

The decision aid must be
significantly related to
analytical review
effectiveness.

2

Demonstrate that both
the decision aid and
cognitive load are
significantly related to
analytical review
effectiveness.
Demonstrate that
cognitive load explains
a significant portion of
analytical review
effectiveness.
Demonstrate there is a
significant relationship
between the decision
aid and cognitive load.

Estimate a regression where
analytical review effectiveness is the
dependent variable and the decision
aid and other covariates are
independent variables. Cognitive
load may not serve as a covariate.
Estimate a regression where
analytical review effectiveness is the
dependent variable and decisions aid
and cognitive load are independent
variables.
Compare the decision aid coefficient
estimates from regression models in
Step 1 and Step 2.

The decision aid
coefficient from step 2
should be inversely
related to the decision aid
coefficient from step 1.
Decision aid users should
experience significantly
less cognitive load than
no-aid users.

3

4

Estimate a regression where
cognitive load is the dependent
variable and the decision aid is the
independent variable.

Required Outcome

Cognitive load and the
decision aid must be
significant when
estimating analytical
review effectiveness.

4.4.3 Activity Relationship Diagram Mediation Results.
Because hypotheses testing reveals the ARD improves the analytical review
effectiveness of participants during all three stages of analytical review (i.e., hypothesis
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generation, hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis selection), I examine whether cognitive
load mediates the relationship between the ARD and analytical review effectiveness in
these stages.
Examining whether cognitive load mediates the relationship between the ARD
and analytical review effectiveness in hypothesis generation, Step 1 results indicate that
the ARD does not significantly improve analytical review effectiveness when cognitive
load is removed as a covariate from the model (p=0.11, one-tailed. Thus,
cognitive load does not mediate the relationship between the ARD and analytical review
effectiveness during hypothesis generation. However, results do indicate that cognitive
load is significantly related to ARD hypothesis generation effectiveness
(p=0.01).
Results indicate the ARD is significantly related to hypothesis evaluation
effectiveness (Step 1: p=0.045, one-tailed) and adding cognitive load as a
predictor variable in the model is significant (Step 2: p=0.055). Further, the
coefficient of the ARD is inversely related to the level of cognitive load (Step 3: β=2.234
and 5.123, respectively). However, there is no significant relationship between cognitive
load and the ARD (Step 4: F=0.057, p=0.815). Thus, there is no evidence that cognitive
load mediates the relationship between the ARD and hypothesis evaluation effectiveness.
The ARD is significantly related to hypothesis selection effectiveness (Step 1:
p=0.017, one-tailed) and adding cognitive load as a predictor variable in the
model is significant (Step 2: p=0.006). Further, the coefficient of the ARD is
inversely related to the level of cognitive load (Step 3: β=2.037 and 2.576, respectively).
However, there is no significant relationship between cognitive load and the ARD (Step
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4: F=0.144, p=0.707). Thus, there is no evidence that cognitive load mediates the
relationship between the ARD and hypothesis selection effectiveness.
4.4.4 Pattern-Consideration Aid Mediation Results.
Hypothesis testing reveals the PCA improves the analytical review effectiveness
of participants during hypothesis evaluation and hypothesis selection, so I examine
whether cognitive load mediates the relationship between the PCA and analytical review
effectiveness in stages.
Examining whether cognitive load mediates the relationship between the PCA and
analytical review effectiveness in hypothesis evaluation, Step 1 results indicate that the
PCA significantly improves analytical review effectiveness when cognitive load is
removed as a covariate from the model (Step 1: p=0.058, one-tailed although
adding cognitive load as a predictor variable in the model is not significant (Step 2:
p=0.139). Consequently, there is no evidence that cognitive load mediates the
relationship between the PCA and hypothesis evaluation effectiveness.
The PCA is significantly related to hypothesis selection effectiveness (Step 1:
p=0.048, one-tailed) and adding cognitive load as a predictor variable in the
model is significant (Step 2: p=0.022). Further, the coefficient of the PCA is
inversely related to the level of cognitive load (Step 3: β=1.495 and 2.309, respectively).
However, there is no significant relationship between cognitive load and the PCA (Step
4: F=0.470, p=0.497). Thus, there is no evidence that cognitive load mediates the
relationship between the PCA and hypothesis selection effectiveness.
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4.4.5 Combined-Aid Mediation Results.
Because hypothesis testing reveals the combined-aid intervention improves the
analytical review effectiveness of participants during hypothesis evaluation, I examine
whether cognitive load mediates the relationship between decision aids and analytical
review effectiveness in this stage.
Examining whether cognitive load mediates the relationship between the
combined-aid intervention and analytical review effectiveness in hypothesis evaluation,
Step 1 results indicate that the combined-aid intervention does not significantly improve
analytical review effectiveness when cognitive load is removed as a covariate from the
model (Step 1: p=0.108, one-tailed Thus, there is no evidence that cognitive
load mediates the relationship between the combined-aid intervention and hypothesis
selection effectiveness.
4.4.6 Summary of Mediation Analysis Results and Discussion of the Implications.
In summary, I find no empirical evidence to suggest that cognitive load mediates
the relationship between the decision aids examined within this study and the positive
effect the aids are found to have on analytical review effectiveness.
Although I predicted that decision aids would improve participants’ analytical
review effectiveness by reducing the amount of cognitive load they experienced during
the task, I did not find a significant relationship between the decision aids examined in
this study and the level of cognitive load reported by participants. A potential
explanation for the reason I did not find cognitive load to be significantly lower among
decision aid users could be the timing of my cognitive load measurement. I measured
cognitive load during the post-experimental questionnaire, where participants were asked
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to indicate the level of cognitive load they experienced during each of the three analytical
review stages. A considerable amount of time and activity occurred between the point
where participants experienced the cognitive load of interest and the point that they selfreported their cognitive load. Thus, it may be possible that participants were unable to
accurately recall the amount of cognitive load they experienced in each stage.
I was aware, ex ante, that measuring cognitive load for each of the three analytical
review stages at the end of the experiment might diminish participants’ ability to
accurately recall how much cognitive load they experienced during each stage. However,
I decided against asking participants to gauge their cognitive load at the end of each
analytical review stage because I feared having participants respond in this manner would
essentially constitute a distracter task. It is likely that a distracter task would clear out at
least a portion of no-aid participants’ working memory, leaving them with fewer relevant
cues in working memory to call upon in performing the task, ultimately reducing their
analytical review effectiveness. Thus, a cognitive load questionnaire placed in the middle
of the task could artificially increase the effectiveness of the decision aid interventions
since it could clear the working memory of participants that do not receive a decision
aid(s) and who need to rely more heavily upon their working memory to effectively
conduct the task.
4.5Post Hoc Analysis
In this section, I present a discussion of the post hoc testing that I conducted. The
purpose of conducting post hoc analysis was to empirically investigate several
phenomena of interest that were identified during hypotheses testing.
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4.5.1 The ARD and the PCA as Memory Aids.
Another potential reason that I may not have found cognitive load to be lower
among decision aid users could be that the two decision aids examined in this study may
be more akin to memory aids than tools that reduce the cognitive load placed upon
participants during analytical review. Memory aids are decision aids whose purpose is to
assist individuals in recovering knowledge from memory that is relevant to a given
judgment and decision making task (Bonner 2008).
Research demonstrates that individuals are more accurate when using their
memory to recognize information as opposed to using their memory to recall information
(MacDougall 1904; Ratcliff 1978; Mandler 1980; Hintzman 1990). Within the context of
analytical review, auditors need to accurately recall accounting relationships because the
cause of the unexpected fluctuation is deduced by analyzing unanticipated fluctuations in
one or more specific accounts. Further, auditors need to accurately recall the cues they
believe to be relevant to the cause of the unexpected fluctuation in order to generate,
evaluate, and select the correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation.
Because people often fail to retrieve all the relevant information while performing
a task, memory aids can help users with the cognitive process of recovering knowledge
from memory (Bonner 2008). Within audit practice, the use of standard audit programs
are an example of a memory aid used to help the auditor recall relevant information in
conducting an audit engagement (Bonner 2008). Thus, the use of memory aids can help
individuals to improve the quality of the information they consider in conducting a
judgment and decision making task (Bonner 2008).
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4.5.1.1 The ARD as a Memory Aid.
Even though auditors learn the common accounting relationships depicted within
the ARD as part of their accounting education, an auditor’s ability to accurately recall
these relationships can vary due to a variety of factors such as cognitive interference,
memory decay, or lack of retrieval cues. Consequently, I suggest the ARD might serve
as a memory aid by helping auditors to recognize common accounting relationships while
performing an analytical review task. If the ARD functions as a memory aid, I would
expect participants using the ARD to have a better understanding of the accounting
relationships depicted in it. To find evidence of this, I examined the accuracy of
participant responses to the question, “When a company uses a periodic inventory
system, how is cost of goods sold (COGS) calculated at the end of the year?” Using a
Fishers Exact Test to examine the proportion of ARD participants who answered the
question correctly as compared to participants who did not receive the ARD, I find
marginal evidence to support the assertion that participants who relied on the ARD
correctly answered the question more often than participants who did not receive the
ARD ( = 2.318, df = 1, p = 0.129). This finding provides some evidence to suggest that
the ARD may function as a memory aid.
4.5.1.2 The PCA as a Memory Aid.
Even though auditors identify the cues they believe to be relevant to the cause of
the unexpected fluctuation during analytical review, an auditor’s ability to accurately
recall these cues may be negatively affected by the same cognitive factors that prevent
them from accurately recalling common accounting relationships. Consequently, I
suggest that the PCA may serve as a memory aid because it automatically presents an
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electronic list of the user-identified relevant cues, helping PCA users to accurately recall
and consider the cues during analytical review. If the PCA serves as a memory aid, I
would expect PCA users to more accurately estimate the likelihood that each of their
proposed hypotheses is the correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation because PCA
users should be more aware of the number of cues that support each hypothesis as
compared to those who do not use the aid. For example, to properly evaluate the merits
of each proposed hypothesis, non-PCA users must accurately recall the cues they
previously identified as relevant. Because auditors may not be able to accurately recall
all of the cues they identified due to cognitive constraints (Bonner 2008), I suggest that
non-PCA users may conduct hypothesis evaluation using a reduced cue set. If so, when a
non-PCA user evaluates the likelihood that each of his or her proposed hypotheses is the
correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation, the hypothesis that best matches the
individual’s reduced cue set should be rated as more probable. However, a non-PCA user
is likely to under-estimate the likelihood that each of the remaining proposed hypotheses
are the correct cause because he or she will not evaluate them against the full set of
relevant cues. Therefore, if the PCA serves as a memory aid, I would expect the
probability assessments of non-PCA users to exhibit greater variability between the
hypothesis rated most likely to be correct and the hypothesis rated the next most likely to
be correct.
Constructing an ANOVA model where I compare the difference between the
hypothesis rated most likely to be correct and the hypothesis rated the next most likely to
be correct, I find the average percentage difference for PCA users is 30.23 percent and
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the average percentage difference for no-aid users is 49.83 percent (F = 3.840, df = 1, p =
0.058), providing some empirical evidence that the PCA may serve as a memory aid.57
4.5.2 Overconfidence.
During hypothesis testing the number of audit courses completed by a participant
was unexpectedly found to be negatively related to hypothesis generation effectiveness
and hypothesis selection effectiveness during analytical review. This finding was
unexpected because it seems intuitive to assume that the number of audit courses
completed should improve task effectiveness. Consequently, I conducted post hoc
analysis to examine why the number of audit courses completed was negatively
correlated with task effectiveness.
A potential explanation for this counter-intuitive finding is a bias known within
the information-processing literature as “overconfidence” (Koriat et al. 1980;
Lichtenstein et al. 1982). Overconfidence is frequently defined as increases in decision
confidence without associated improvements in decision quality (Rose 2002).
Overconfidence is displayed when an individual’s confidence in the accuracy of their
response is greater than their actual accuracy (Bonner 2008). Empirical evidence
demonstrates that overconfidence results from an individual’s belief in their own
knowledge or expertise (Whitecotton 1996; Rose 2002). Thus, the more knowledgeable
individuals perceive they are in regards to a subject matter, the more confident they may
become in their ability to effectively perform a task related to the subject matter.
Because confidence comes from an individual’s perception of their knowledge, rather
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There was also a significant difference between PCA users (xPCA percentage difference = 30.23 percent)
and ARD users (xARD percentage difference = 55.95 percent), suggesting that the reduction in variance is
uniquely associated with the PCA and is not solely associated with providing a decision aid to participants.
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than from an individual’s actual knowledge, overconfidence often leads to suboptimal
task performance.
A considerable body of literature supports the notion that overconfidence is
directly related to task difficulty; in a review of the overconfidence literature,
Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982) conclude that “overconfidence is most
extreme with tasks of great difficulty” (p. 315).58 Due to the inherent complexity of
analytical review, it is a relatively difficult task. Thus, finding evidence that an
individual’s exposure to auditing concepts leads to overconfidence is consistent with
prior research.59 Although participants who completed more than one audit course felt it
was significantly easier to propose the correct hypothesis than those who had not
completed any audit courses (Panel A, Table 4.17: F=2.723, df = 2, p=0.072), the odds
that the correct hypothesis was proposed decrease by a multiplicative factor of 0.282 for
every audit course completed ( = 4.273, df = 1, p=0.039) after controlling for cognitive
load and the number of non-audit accounting courses completed. Results also indicate
that participants who completed more than one audit course felt it was significantly easier
to evaluate their proposed hypotheses (Panel B, Table 4.17: F=2.922, df = 2, p=0.060),
were significantly more confident that the hypothesis they selected was the “correct” one
(Panel C, Table 4.17: F=2.437, df = 2, p=0.094), and felt it was significantly easier to
conduct hypothesis selection (Panel D, Table 4.17: F=4.279, df = 2, p=0.018) as
compared to participants who completed more than one audit course. However, the odds
that the correct hypothesis was actually selected decreased by a multiplicative factor of
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In the research reviewed by Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips (1982), difficulty was defined on the
basis of participants’ performance.
59

Within this study the most audit courses completed by any participant was two.
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0.163 for every audit course completed ( = 5.820, df = 1, p=0.016) after controlling for
cognitive load, the number of non-audit accounting courses completed, and whether a
participant used a decision aid. Thus, while participants who completed more audit
courses felt it was easier to conduct analytical review and were more confident that they
successfully selected the correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation, they actually
performed analytical review less effectively than participants who completed fewer audit
courses. These results suggest that participants who completed more audit courses
suffered from overconfidence, which ultimately reduced their analytical review
effectiveness.

TABLE 4.17. Post Hoc Overconfidence Descriptive Statistics.
Panel A: Participant Reported Ease or Difficulty in Proposing the Correct Answer
Number of Audit
Mean Difficulty
Standard
(1 = Very Easy, 7 = Very Difficult)
Courses Completed
Deviation
0
4.03*
1.616
1
4.12
1.452
2
2.78*
1.856

N
32
34
9

*Significant difference at p<0.10

Panel B: Participant Reported Ease or Difficulty in Hypothesis Evaluation
Number of Audit
Mean Difficulty
Standard
(1 = Very Easy, 7 = Very Difficult)
Courses Completed
Deviation
0
3.41*
1.563
1
3.39
1.001
2
2.22*
1.481

N
32
34
9

*Significant difference at p<0.10

Panel C: Participant Reported Confidence That the Correct Hypothesis Was Selected
Number of Audit
Mean Confidence
Standard
(0% - 100%)
Courses Completed
Deviation
0
70.09%*
21.511
1
70.37%
20.398
2
85.89%*
8.905
*Significant difference at p<0.10
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N
32
34
9

4.5.3 Effective Hypothesis Generation.
Although participants in the ARD intervention proposed the correct hypothesis
more often than participants who did not receive any decision aid, neither the PCA nor
the combined-aid interventions were found to help participants propose the correct cause
of the unexpected fluctuation. Thus, I conducted post hoc analysis in an attempt to
identify other non-decision aid factors that may be significantly related to hypothesis
generation effectiveness.
The covariates included in the LOGIT model estimated to test Hypothesis 1b
(H1b) suggest that cognitive load, the number of non-audit courses completed, and the
number of audit courses completed are at least marginally significant predictors of
whether a participant generates the correct hypothesis. The beta of these coefficients in
H1b’s LOGIT model have intuitive appeal: As a participant’s cognitive load increases,
the beta shows that it is less likely the participant will propose the correct hypothesis.
This suggests cognitive load is negatively associated with analytical review effectiveness.
Consistent with intuition that accounting knowledge should be positively associated with
accounting task effectiveness, the odds that a participant proposes the correct hypothesis
increase with each non-audit accounting course a participant completes. This suggests
that a participant’s analytical review effectiveness improves as the participant’s
knowledge of accounting concepts increases. Finally, due to overconfidence (which was
discussed earlier), it is not surprising to find the odds that a participant proposes the
correct hypothesis decrease as the number of audit courses the participant completed
increases. In sum, it seems reasonable to predict that these three covariates might be
factors associated with hypothesis generation effectiveness.
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To test the suggestion that cognitive load, accounting knowledge, and
overconfidence are related to hypothesis generation effectiveness, I estimate a Logistic
regression model that regresses these three variables against whether a participant
proposes the correct hypothesis. Table 4.18 presents the logistic regression model and
descriptive statistics. The logistic regression model is populated with data from all
interventions. Results indicate that the model is significant ( = 11.347, df = 3,
p=0.010) and each of the three independent variables are significant (pcognitive load = 0.018,
pnumber of non-audit accounting courses completed = 0.024, poverconfidence = 0.043). The odds that the correct
hypothesis is proposed by a participant decrease by a multiplicative factor of 0.663 for
every one unit cognitive load increase that a participant experiences. For every non-audit
accounting course a participant completes, the odds that the participant generates the
correct hypothesis increase by a multiplicative factor of 2.462. Presumably due to
overconfidence, the odds that the correct hypothesis is proposed by a participant decrease
by a multiplicative factor of 0.299 for every audit course the participant completes.

TABLE 4.18. Post Hoc Analysis: Hypothesis Generation Effectiveness.
Panel A: LOGIT Model and Significance
LOGIT
Overall Model
Model

11.347

Panel B: LOGIT Model Descriptive Statistics
B
Exp(B)
Cognitive Load
-0.411
0.663

Degrees of
Freedom
3

Significance
0.010

Standard Error
0.173

Wald 
5.632

df
1

Significance
0.018*

(1 = Very Low, 7 = Very High)

Accounting Knowledge

0.901

2.462

0.597

5.076

1

0.024*

-1.208

0.299

0.597

4.093

1

0.043*

-2.641

0.071

1.739

2.307

1

0.129

(Number of Non-Audit Courses
Completed)

Overconfidence
(Number of Audit Accounting
Courses Completed)

Constant

Dependent Variable: Whether the correct hypothesis was proposed
*Significant at p<0.05
**Significant at p<0.10
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4.5.4 Summary of Post Hoc Findings.
To summarize my post hoc analysis, there is empirical evidence to suggest that a
participant’s exposure to auditing concepts may engender a sense of overconfidence,
ultimately leading to reduced analytical review effectiveness. Further, I find some
empirical evidence that cognitive load, accounting knowledge, and overconfidence are all
associated with a participant’s hypothesis generation effectiveness. Finally, I found some
empirical evidence to suggest that the ARD and the PCA may function as memory aids.
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5.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
5.1 Summary of Key Findings
This study uses a realistic analytical procedures task in which inexperienced
auditors conducted analytical review across three stages: hypothesis generation,
hypothesis evaluation, and hypothesis selection. Prior research finds it is difficult for
experienced auditors to propose, evaluate, and select the correct cause of an unexpected
fluctuation (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Anderson and Koonce 1995; Bedard, Biggs, and
Maroney 1998; Asare and Wright 2001; Asare and Wright 2003; Green and Trotman
2003; Green 2004). As a result, experienced auditors often have difficulty conducting
effective analytical review.
The results of this study indicate that like experienced auditors, inexperienced
auditors have difficulty conducting analytical review effectively. As predicted, both of
the decision aids examined in this study were found to increase auditors’ analytical
review effectiveness when auditors placed at least some reliance upon them. However,
contrary to my predictions, auditors who used both decision aids did not perform
analytical review more effectively than auditors who used only one decision aid.
I found empirical evidence to suggest that the level of cognitive load is negatively
related to analytical review effectiveness. As an auditor’s self-reported cognitive load
increased, the auditor’s analytical review effectiveness declined. Cognitive load was
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found to be negatively associated with hypothesis generation effectiveness, hypothesis
evaluation effectiveness, and hypothesis selection effectiveness.
My post hoc analysis results suggest that even inexperienced auditors can fall
prey to the overconfidence bias. As the number of audit courses completed by an
inexperienced auditor increased, the auditor became more confident that he or she
selected the correct cause of the unexpected fluctuation. Further, the auditor also felt it
easier to propose, evaluate, and select the correct cause. However, my results show that
the odds that an inexperienced auditor conducted analytical review effectively actually
decreased with every additional audit course completed. Although the judgment and
decision making literature has extensively established the link between knowledge and
overconfidence, finding that even inexperienced auditors can fall victim to
overconfidence was unexpected. Extending this finding to experienced auditors, who
have more accounting knowledge than inexperienced auditors, a potential implication is
that experienced auditors may exhibit overconfidence to a greater degree than
inexperienced auditors within the context of analytical review. Therefore, the analytical
review effectiveness of experienced auditors is likely to be more negatively affected by
the overconfidence bias as compared to the analytical review effectiveness of
inexperienced auditors. Thus, overconfidence may help to explain the existence of the
analytical review paradox.
Within my post hoc analysis, I find evidence to suggest that accounting
knowledge is a significant factor that increases the odds that an auditor will propose the
correct hypothesis. I also find some evidence to support the notion that the decision aids
examined within this study may function as memory aids.
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Finally, given that all of the junior-level accounting students who participated in
my experiment were unable to answer questions regarding common accounting
relationships, this suggests that junior-level accounting students may not have a
developed grasp of basic accounting principles. This finding suggests that junior-level
accounting students may not be an inappropriate proxy for auditors. Consequently,
researchers should exercise caution when generalizing the results of studies that proxy
junior-level accounting students as auditors.
5.2 Contributions
The major contribution of this study is that I find evidence that decision aids can
significantly improve auditors’ analytical review effectiveness without unduly increasing
the time needed to conduct the task.60 The ARD was found to improve auditors’
analytical review effectiveness during hypothesis generation, hypothesis evaluation, and
hypothesis selection without increasing the time needed to conduct the task.61 The PCA
was found to improve auditors’ analytical review effectiveness during hypothesis
evaluation and hypothesis selection. Although it took approximately 3 minutes longer for
auditors using the PCA to conduct analytical review than auditors that did not use the aid,
this relatively small time increase does not seem likely to dissuade auditors from using
the PCA since it improves auditors’ hypothesis evaluation effectiveness and hypothesis
selection effectiveness.

60

Time is always an important practitioner consideration because auditors have to accomplish their work
under tight time budgets.
61

While participants that relied on the ARD were found to generate the correct hypothesis more often than
those who did not use any decision aid (Percent GeneratedARD = 43.75 vs. Percent GeneratedNo-Aid =
30.43), care should be taken when making inferences about the practical significance of this difference due
to the fact that participants within both interventions generated the correct hypothesis seven times.
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These findings have two practical implications: First, because auditors using
either decision aid significantly outperformed auditors not provided with a decision aid, it
seems logical to suggest that auditors should use some type of decision aid during
analytical review. Thus, a major contribution of this study is in providing audit
practitioners with two relatively easy-to-deploy decision aid tools that should improve
auditors’ analytical review effectiveness. The second implication is that practitioners
should exercise care with regard to the number of decision aids they provide to auditors.
Although the use of one decision aid was found to improve auditors’ analytical review
effectiveness, the use of more than one decision aid was not found to incrementally
improve auditors’ analytical review effectiveness.
This study contributes to the decision aid reliance literature by finding that
individuals can improve their task effectiveness by placing even a light degree of reliance
upon a decision aid. Since both of the decision aids examined within this study were
found to improve aid users’ analytical review effectiveness regardless of the self-reported
degree of reliance, this also suggests that it may not be necessary or desirable to force
individuals to place complete reliance on a decision aid. This finding also suggests that in
some situations individuals may be able to effectively determine the appropriate degree
of reliance to place on an aid. Of course, more research is needed before definitive
conclusions can be drawn.
Finding cognitive load to be negatively related to task effectiveness contributes to
the Cognitive Load Theory stream of literature by providing empirical evidence that
cognitive load can have task performance implications. Consequently, in finding
cognitive load to be negatively related to analytical review effectiveness, I extend the
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tenets of cognitive load theory outside its traditional learning context by providing
evidence that cognitive load can also inhibit task effectiveness. One practical implication
of this finding is to suggest that audit practitioners seek to minimize the amount of
cognitive load placed upon them while conducting analytical review. Reducing the
cognitive load placed upon an auditor during analytical review should lead to improved
analytical review effectiveness.
This study contributes to the audit overconfidence literature by finding evidence
that even inexperienced auditors can succumb to the overconfidence bias. A practical
implication of this finding is that both accounting practitioners and accounting educators
need to take greater efforts to educate auditors on the dangers of overconfidence.
Finding that accounting knowledge increases the odds that an auditor proposes the
correct hypothesis has two primary contributions: First, it contributes to the academic
literature by providing evidence of a positive relationship between accounting knowledge
and analytical review effectiveness. Second, this finding provides evidence that domainspecific knowledge is positively related to task effectiveness. One practical implication
of this finding is that audit practitioners need to be aware that a task is more likely to be
performed effectively when the individual(s) conducting the task possess greater degrees
of domain-specific knowledge.
5.3 Limitations
This study’s findings and conclusions should be considered in light of its
limitations. First, because I employ students as surrogates for inexperienced auditors, the
results of this study may not generalize to settings where experienced auditors conduct
analytical review. However, prior research finds that even experienced auditors have
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great difficulty conducting analytical review (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Bedard, Biggs, and
Maroney 1998). Thus, examining whether the decision aids investigated within this
study can improve the analytical review effectiveness of experienced auditors is an
extension I leave to future research.
Second, the unexpected fluctuation used in this study had only one cause. Thus,
this study’s results may be less generalizable as the number of causes associated with an
unexpected fluctuation rises. Lastly, this study only examines an unexpected fluctuation
arising due to client error. Although I have no basis to predict my findings will not
generalize to settings where the unexpected fluctuation is caused by factors besides client
error, whether the effectiveness of the two decision aids investigated in this study will
hold outside of client error remains an empirical question.
5.4 Future Research Opportunities Arising from this Study’s Results
The results of this study may provide some future research opportunities.
Contrary to my predictions, I found that auditors who used both decision aids did not
perform analytical review more effectively than auditors using only one decision aid. A
potential explanation for this result may be that the use of both decision aids increased
the level of cognitive load placed upon the auditor. This explanation is consistent with
the “split attention effect” (Rose and Wolfe 2000), where an individual who receives
multiple decision aids actually experiences a cognitive load increase, instead of a
cognitive load decrease, because the individual’s working memory must be split between
the multiple aids. Finding that auditors in the combined-aid intervention proposed the
fewest mean number of plausible hypotheses provides some evidence that combined-aid
users may have experienced a split attention effect.
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Future research could investigate whether providing auditors with both decision
aids in a sequential order might improve their analytical review effectiveness compared
to auditors that only receive one decision aid. For example, since the ARD alone was
found to improve hypothesis generation effectiveness, perhaps the ARD should be
provided by itself to auditors during the hypothesis generation stage. After hypothesis
generation ends, the researcher could then remove the ARD, leaving auditors to complete
hypothesis evaluation and hypothesis selection using only the PCA, which was found to
be as effective as the ARD in both these stages. Providing auditors with both decision
aids in a sequential fashion might be a way to eliminate the split attention effect, leading
to better analytical review effectiveness.
Future research could also examine the impact of decision aid training on task
effectiveness. Within this study, the fact that auditors received both decision aids without
receiving any training on how to use each aid may have overwhelmed auditors. This
suggests training can play a vital role in decision aid effectiveness.
Researchers may find it fruitful to examine whether decision aids can be a
suitable substitute for domain-specific knowledge. Additionally, researchers could
examine whether decision aids can help individuals recall domain-specific knowledge
that may have receded from memory. Thus, future research could examine whether
decision aids can permit individuals to more effectively perform tasks for which their
domain-specific knowledge has atrophied.
Future research could also examine the process-level strategies of inexperienced
auditors during analytical review by comparing and contrasting the process-level steps of
successful and unsuccessful inexperienced auditors during an analytical review task.
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This extension would complement the work of Bedard and Biggs (1991), who examine
the process-level strategies of experienced auditors during analytical review.
5.5 Future Research Opportunities Extending this Study’s Decision Aids
Extending the two decision aids investigated within this study to an analytical
review experiment employing experienced auditors is a natural and logical extension of
the current study. This study provides evidence that both the ARD and PCA improve the
analytical review effectiveness of inexperienced auditors, who conduct analytical review
approximately 48 percent of the time (Trompter and Wright 2010). However, it is less
clear whether these findings can be generalized to the remaining 52 percent of settings
where experienced auditors conduct analytical review. Extending the decision aids used
within this study to a setting comprised of experienced auditors is important not only to
determine whether the results found within this study hold among experienced auditors,
but also because experienced auditors may possess characteristics that differentially
impact each aid’s effectiveness. For example, since experienced auditors usually identify
the cues needed to propose the correct hypothesis (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Bedard,
Biggs, and Maroney 1998), the PCA may be especially useful to experienced auditors
during hypothesis generation because it automatically displays the auditor-identified
relevant cues, making the cues more available to the auditor while he or she attempts to
propose the correct hypothesis. Additionally, given that experience is often negatively
correlated with decision aid reliance, this study’s findings may not hold among
experienced auditors because experienced auditors may opt not to rely upon the aids
during analytical review.
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Second, future research could extend the two decision aids investigated within
this study to examine whether these aids help auditors to more effectively evaluate the
sufficiency of client-provided explanations. The two decision aids used within this study
may help debias auditor judgment and decision making when evaluating client-provided
explanations. This extension appears particularly promising considering evidence that
once an unexpected fluctuation is uncovered, auditors usually make client inquiry their
first step (Trompeter and Wright 2010) and given that research finds auditors
inappropriately fixate on client-provided explanations (Bedard and Biggs 1991; Anderson
and Koonce 1995; Green 2004).
Third, future research could extend the use of inexperienced auditors to twoperson groups, as prior research has only examined the analytical review effectiveness of
experienced auditors within two-person groups (Bedard, Biggs, and Maroney 1998). The
decision aids used within this study could serve as a manipulated variable. There are a
few reasons to expect that investigating the analytical review performance of
inexperienced auditors may yield different results that those previously found in the
experienced auditor group literature. For example, an inexperienced auditor likely has
less overall accounting knowledge than an experienced auditor. Thus, putting two
inexperienced auditors together may increase the group’s pool of available accounting
knowledge more than a group comprised of two experienced auditors, whose pool of
available knowledge may not increase as much because each experienced auditor
possesses a larger accounting knowledge base. Further, due to their lack of audit
experience, inexperienced auditors may be more willing to consider each other’s input
during analytical review as compared to a group of experienced auditors who may place

132

more confidence in their own judgment and thus be less willing to consider alternative
points of view. Consequently, it may be possible that inexperienced auditor groups may
conduct analytical review more effectively than experienced auditor groups. Finally, I
suggest that inexperienced auditors are more likely to acknowledge their limitations when
conducting analytical review as compared to experienced auditors. Thus, inexperienced
auditors may be more open to working with others while conducting analytical review as
compared to experienced auditors who may view working with another auditor as
unnecessary and a nuisance.
Future research is needed to establish a theoretical basis to explain why the
decision aids used within this study improved auditors’ analytical review effectiveness.
Although this study provides considerable evidence that both the ARD and the PCA
improve the analytical review effectiveness of inexperienced auditors, the mediation
analysis I performed to test my application of Cognitive Load Theory to this setting does
not allow me to draw definitive conclusions regarding why the decision aids improved
auditor effectiveness. Future research using alternative methods, such as a more refined
measure of cognitive load or obtaining a measure of cognitive load before the end of the
study, may provide evidence that the decision aids examined within this study decrease
the cognitive load placed upon auditors during analytical review. However, researchers
should be aware that asking auditors to gauge their cognitive load during the task is likely
to invalidate any subsequent analytical review task results due to the distracter confound
discussed in the Method section.
Additionally, because I find some evidence in my post-hoc analysis to suggest
that the decision aids examined within this study may function as memory aids, future

133

research could further investigate this link in an attempt to better explain the mechanics
behind why the decision aids investigated in this study improved auditors’ analytical
review effectiveness.
Finally, because the two decision aids that I developed and investigated within
this study were found to improve auditors’ analytical review effectiveness, future
research might find it fruitful to expand upon the design of these two aids or to extend
their application to similar, but new, problem-solving contexts.
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BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Bean Co.’s Engagement Background
Bean Co. is a small subsidiary of AMEREX (which is a large, publicly traded
corporation). Although Bean Co.’s financials are not material to AMEREX, the parent
company requires Bean Co. to be audited every year. Your firm has audited Bean Co. for
the past five years and has always given Bean Co. an unqualified opinion.
Because Bean Co. is a small company, the accounting department consists of only a few
individuals. Bean Co. maintains all of its accounting records the old fashioned way - by
pencil and paper. Thus, all the accounting forms and ledgers are in paper format. Even
though Bean Co.’s accounting procedures are not computerized, the engagement partner
has assessed Bean Co’s inherent risk as low because its management is very ethical.
Further, your firm has examined the design of Bean Co.’s internal controls and found no
significant control design deficiencies.
Bean Co.’s Business Model
The operations of Bean Co. are very straightforward: First, the company buys coffee
beans directly from small Jamaican coffee farms. Next, Bean Co. imports the coffee
beans to the United States and stores them in a Tampa warehouse. Finally, Bean Co.
ships Jamaican coffee beans to its customers when it receives orders from them. Bean
Co.’s customers are American coffee houses who prefer to avoid the hassle of importing
beans directly from Jamaica.
How Bean Co. Records Inventory Purchases
Bean Co. purchases inventory (coffee beans) from its network of Jamaican farms many
times per year. The average coffee bean purchase is 5,000 pounds and all coffee bean
purchases are made on credit. Further, all of Bean Co.’s purchases are made FOB
destination. Thus, Bean Co. does not record an inventory purchase until the accounting
department receives a paper “receiving ticket” from the warehouse clerk. The receiving
ticket tells the accounting department how many pounds of coffee beans were received
and from which Jamaican coffee farm they came.
When the accounting department gets a receiving ticket, it matches the receiving ticket to
the original purchase order to make sure the purchase was authorized. Next, the
accounting department debits the “Inventory Purchases” account by the amount of the
purchase and credits “Accounts Payable” by the same amount. Bean Co. has 30 days to
make payment once coffee beans are received.
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How Bean Co. Records Coffee Bean Sales
Bean Co.’s customers are mid-to-large sized coffee houses located throughout the United
States. Because all of Bean Co.’s customers buy on credit, Bean Co. has no cash sales.
Further, all of Bean Co.’s sales are made FOB shipping point. This means that Bean
Co.’s accounting department records a sale into the “Revenue” journal when it receives a
paper “shipping ticket” from the shipping department. The shipping ticket tells the
accounting department how many pounds of coffee beans were shipped and to which
customer they were sent.
When the accounting department gets a shipping ticket, it matches the shipping ticket to
the customer sales order. Next, the accounting department debits the “Accounts
Receivable” journal by the amount of the sale and credits the “Revenue” journal by the
same amount. Finally, Bean Co. sends the customer a bill. Customers have 30 days to
make payment once the bill is mailed.
Bean Co.’s Inventory Method
Bean Co. uses, and has always used, a first-in-first-out (FIFO) periodic inventory system.
At the end of the year, cost of goods sold is calculated by taking last year’s ending
inventory balance, adding the inventory purchases recorded during the year, and then
subtracting the value of the coffee beans remaining in inventory. Bean Co. hires Revis, an
independent third-party, to conduct a physical count of the coffee beans in inventory on
the last day of each year to get the current year’s ending inventory balance. Revis is an
extremely reliable professional service firm who has never made a mistake determining
Bean Co.’s year-end inventory balance.
Although your firm has not yet audited Bean Co.’s ending inventory balance for this year,
Revis has finished counting the year-end inventory and determined there is $895,765 of
inventory in stock (this number is reflected in the financial information you have
received). Consistent with prior years, Revis found no evidence of inventory theft,
shrinkage, or spoilage.
The price of Jamaican coffee beans has been remarkably steady over the past thirty years
due to their limited supply and very stable demand. In fact, the price Bean Co. pays for
each pound of coffee purchased from Jamaican farmers has not changed in the last four
years. Similarly, Bean Co. has not changed the price it charges for each pound of coffee
sold to its customers in the last four years, either.
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YOUR ASSIGNMENT
Congratulations! You have been hired by a Big Four public accounting firm. Your first
assignment is to help with the annual audit of Bean Co., a small coffee bean distributor
located in Tampa, Florida.
While comparing the year-end account balances reported by Bean Co. to the account
balances the audit partner expected to see (which is an analytical review procedure), your
senior has identified an unexpected fluctuation in Bean Co.’s cost of sales ratio. Recall
that the cost of sales ratio is the cost of goods sold divided by total sales. In Bean Co.’s
business, the cost of sales ratio identifies what percentage of every dollar of sales is
consumed by the cost of goods sold.
The engagement partner expected the cost of sales ratio to remain at 64.60%, the same
level as the prior year. However, Bean Co.’s unaudited cost of sales ratio unexpectedly
declined to 62.32%. Although the difference may not seem significant, the engagement
partner finds it surprising because the company’s cost of sales ratio has barely changed
over the past five years.
Your senior has provided you with financial information attached behind these
instructions. Additionally, your senior has provided you with the following guidance:


Because your accounting firm audited Bean Co.’s financials last year, the
information labeled “Last Year (Audited)” can be considered accurate, reliable,
and free of error.



The information labeled as “This Year (Expected)” has been developed by your
audit partner based on his extensive industry and company experience.
Consequently, the partner’s expectations can be considered very reliable.



The information labeled “This Year (Unaudited)” is client-provided financial
information for the current year. The unaudited information is prepared by Bean
Co. and has not yet been audited; therefore, no assurance is provided regarding its
accuracy or reliability.



Looking at the financial information provided, you will see the partner has set the
threshold to 3% of the expectation. Consequently, the columns labeled
“Threshold” present you with information you can use to determine if the upper
or lower bounds of an account or ratio fall outside the threshold boundaries.
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STEPS IN YOUR ASSIGNMENT
Your senior has asked you to conduct analytical review to investigate and explain an unexpected
fluctuation: Why did Bean Co.’s cost of sales ratio unexpectedly decline this year? The Partner
has already determined the account balance expectations and has set the threshold to 3% of the
expectation.
Your senior has asked you to conduct the remaining 3 steps (in order):
Step 1: Examine the background information and financial information to gain an
understanding of Bean Co. and of the unexpected fluctuation (15 minutes)
1. The first step is to identify and record the information cues that you feel are related to the
unexpected fluctuation.
2. A good way to start this step is to consider accounts related to the cost of sales ratio to
see if any of them exhibited unexpected behavior.
3. If any accounts related to the unexpected fluctuation fall outside the threshold, you might
want to identify them because they may help to explain why Bean Co.’s cost of sales
ratio unexpectedly declined.
4. The researcher will make an announcement when 15 minutes have passed. After the
announcement, you may move to the next stage if you are ready. There is no rush, so
spend as much time as you need in this stage.
Step 2: Generate possible explanations for the unexpected fluctuation (15 minutes)
5. After you have identified the information cues you believe are related to the cost of sales
ratio decline, the next step is to generate reasons to explain why the unexpected
fluctuation occurred.
6. Please spend 15 minutes coming up with as many reasons as possible to explain why the
cost of sales ratio may have declined. The researcher will make an announcement when
15 minutes have passed.
7. After the announcement, the researcher will hand out a sheet of paper that tells you how
to move to Step 3. There is no rush, so only move to Step 3 when you are ready.
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Step 3: Evaluate each of your proposed reasons and select the one you believe best explains
why the unexpected fluctuation occurred (No time limit)
8. In other words, review each of your proposed explanations and choose the one you feel
best explains why the cost of sales ratio declined.
Bean Co. Financial Information
This Year vs. Projections vs. Last Year
Audit Workpapers
Reminder: Threshold = 3% deviation from the expectation
Ratios

Threshold
Last Year
(Audited)

Expected
Change

This Year
(Expected)

This Year
(Unaudited)

Low

High

3.79

None

3.79

3.65

3.67

3.90

Cost of Sales Ratio (Cost of Goods Sold / Sales)

64.60%

None

64.60%

62.32%

62.66%

66.54%

Accruals Ratio (Accounts Receivable / Accounts Payable)

84.37%

+ 2.63%

86.99%

103.95%

84.38%

89.60%

Receivables Turnover Ratio (Sales / Ending Recievables)

8.62

- 0.41

8.21

8.21

7.96

8.46

35.40%

37.68%

34.34%

36.46%

Inventory Turnover Ratio (Cost of Goods Sold / Ending Inventory)

Gross Margin (Gross Profit / Sales)

35.40%

None

Threshold
Account Balances
Sales

Last Year
(Audited)
$5,002,861

Expected
Change
+ 5.00%

This Year
(Expected)
$5,253,004

This Year
(Unaudited)
$5,253,004

Low
$5,095,414

High
$5,410,594

Cost of Goods Sold

$3,231,848

+ 5.00%

$3,393,440

$3,273,440

$3,291,637

$3,495,244

Coffee Bean Inventory

$853,110

+ 5.00%

$895,765

$895,765

$868,892

$922,638

Accounts Payable

$722,140

+ 1.84%

$735,421

$615,421

$713,358

$757,483

$3,272,472

+ 5.00%

$3,436,096

$3,316,096

$3,333,013

$3,539,178

General and Administrative Expenses

$620,000

+ 3.00%

$638,600

$497,000

$619,442

$657,758

Net Income

$426,083

+ 8.73%

$463,282

$724,881

$449,384

$477,181

Other Information
Price charged per pound of coffee sold to Bean Co's customers

Last Year
(Audited)
$37.10

Expected
Change
None

This Year
(Expected)
$37.10

This Year
(Unaudited)
$37.10

Low
$35.99

High
$38.21

Cost per pound of coffee (Includes coffee bean purchase price,
freight/shipping costs, direct/indirect labor, overhead, and all other
costs required to make the coffee beans available for resale)

$23.97

None

$23.97

$23.97

$23.25

$24.69

Gross Profit on each pound of coffee sold (the difference between the
price Bean Co's customers are charged for each pound of coffee minus
Bean Co's cost per pound of coffee)

$13.13

None

$13.13

$13.13

$12.74

$13.53

Coffee Bean Purchases

Threshold

FIGURE A1. Case Materials: Financial Information Provided to All Participants.
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APPENDIX C:
TRAINING MATERIALS
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These training materials were presented orally to participants
Now that your minds are warmed up, I would like to give you a little bit of background
on analytical review and analytical review procedures: what the two are, the steps
involved, and how new auditors often conduct them. After I briefly discuss the
distinction between analytical review and analytical review procedures, I will also go
over a short case before the main task begins.
If you have any questions during this little session, please feel free to ask them at any
time.
Definition of Analytical Review and Analytical Review Procedures
Although the terms analytical review procedures and analytical review may seem
identical, there is an important difference between the two.


Analytical review procedures are used by auditors to reveal anomalies and
departures from auditor expectations
o Some examples of analytical review procedures are ratio analysis and
trend analysis.
o Analytical review procedures identify unexpected fluctuations
o Using the example from above, the auditor may have used trend analysis,
an analytical review procedure, to discover that sales increased more than
expected


Analytical review is the diagnostic process of investigating and resolving
unexpected fluctuations.


For example, if sales increased more than the auditor expected, he or she
might decide to conduct analytical review to find out what caused the
increase.

So what purpose does analytical review serve?






Analytical review is one of many fieldwork tests used to determine the validity of
an account’s balance.
Analytical review is a way to test client-provided financial information by
comparing it against expectations developed by the auditor.
In other words, the auditor forms a general idea of what he or she believes client
account balances should be and then compares the expectation to the clientreported balances.
Analytical review is a useful fieldwork test because it can identify areas of the
client’s financial statements that do not match what the auditor expects to see.
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The Analytical Review Process
To conduct analytical review account balance expectations first need to be set:


The auditor develops an expectation of an account’s balance based on his or her
knowledge of the client, general business and economic conditions, and industry
experience.
o The auditor’s expectation will generally be in the form of an interval
estimate.
o The more precise the auditor’s expectation is, the smaller the interval will
be. The smaller the interval, the more useful the analytical review test is
because a smaller interval makes it more likely that material differences
from the expectation will be uncovered.
o When the client reported balance falls outside of the estimated interval,
this represents a material deviation worthy of further investigation.
o If the auditor cannot develop a precise enough estimate or a small enough
interval, the auditor will typically not decide to use analytical review.
o In public accounting firms, the partner usually develops expectations
because the partner has the most client and industry experience.



Since the partner typically sets expectations, when you conduct analytical review
today, you will be given the partner’s expectation.



A simple example of setting an expectation could be something like this:
Suppose the partner on the Tootsie Roll audit expects sales growth of about 4%.
Thus, if sales were $100 last year, the partner would expect to see sales around
$104 this year.



Naturally, the auditor generally does not tell the client his or her balance
expectations.

Next, an overall threshold level needs to be selected:


The threshold level is used to identify what deviations from the auditor’s
expectation should be investigated. Account balances that are above or below the
threshold limits are considered to deviate from the auditor’s expectation.



For simplicity’s sake, assume the auditor sets the threshold at 3% of the
expectation. This means that an account balance that fluctuates less than plus or
minus 3% from the expectation is not considered to deviate from the expectation.
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For example, suppose a firm’s sales were expected to be $200. The threshold
amounts would be set at plus and minus $6. Thus, if sales were reported below
$194 or above $206 the account would be considered to deviate from the
expectation.



Since the partner typically sets the threshold based on a variety of risk factors,
when you conduct analytical review today, you will be given the partner’s
threshold. You will also be given the upper and lower bounds of the threshold.



For the same reasons the auditor does not disclose the expectation to the client,
the auditor generally does not disclose the threshold to the client.

Then, accounts that exceed the threshold limits are identified:


The auditor will investigate differences that exceed the threshold bounds since
they indicate unexpected activity.



Drawing upon the 3% threshold we established earlier, suppose the partner
expects sales to be $200. If client reported sales were $207 sales would deviate
from the expectation, but if they were $204, sales would not be considered to
deviate from the expectation.



During an audit engagement, it usually falls to the audit senior to identify account
balances and accounting ratios that exceed the threshold bounds. When an
account is found to violate the threshold bounds, this is referred to as finding an
“unexpected fluctuation.”



After the audit senior identifies an unexpected fluctuation, the actual investigation
usually falls to a staff auditor. The staff auditor will be tasked with finding out
why the unexpected fluctuation occurred.



Since the senior usually hands the investigation of to a staff auditor, in today’s
study you will assume the role of a newly hired staff auditor asked to find out why
an unexpected fluctuation occurred.
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Once an unexpected fluctuation has been identified, the first step in explaining the
fluctuation is to become knowledgeable about the client and the unexpected fluctuation.
To do this, the staff auditor examines the information available.


The auditor often looks at accounts related to the unexpected fluctuation for cues
that might help explain why the unexpected fluctuation occurred.
o If accounts related to the unexpected fluctuation are also out-of-threshold,
the auditor may identify these accounts as potentially related to the
unexpected fluctuation.

After the auditor becomes familiar with the information available, he or she uses this
understanding to come up with potential causes of the unexpected fluctuation:
o The auditor will often refer to accounts related to the unexpected
fluctuation to try to find a pattern among them that can explain why the
unexpected fluctuation occurred.
o Since many things can potentially cause an unexpected fluctuation, the
auditor generally comes up with more than one potential explanation.
o Although this stage may be a little unclear to you at this point, don’t
worry… it is one of those things that is easier to understand through
example. I will go over a short sample case after we discuss the next step.
After the auditor comes up with as many potential explanations as possible, he or she
evaluates each explanation and then chooses the one he or she believes best explains the
unexpected fluctuation’s cause.
o To do this, the auditor evaluates each of his or her proposed explanations
against the information the auditor felt was related to the unexpected
fluctuation. The auditor usually picks the explanation that best matches
the cues the auditor feels are related to the unexpected fluctuation.
Now that I have given you a brief overview of the analytical review process, I want to go
over a quick example.


The purpose of the example is to give you a feel for conducting analytical review.
Since I am giving the example, the speed with which I’ll go over the case will be
much faster than when you conduct analytical review on your own.
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Do not worry about this - it has nothing to do with your ability and everything to
do with the fact that I have already worked the case and don’t need any time to
identify the patterns and potential explanations.

Analytical Review Case
<<Experimenter Note: Be sure to have the Training Application running here>>
Background: Bolt Co. is a manufacturer of scissor bolts based in Chicago, Illinois. The
company sells only one product: Scissor bolts, which are used to fasten the two blades
required to make a pair of scissors. Bolt Co.’s industry is classified as very mature with
low annual growth of about 3% per year. The scissor bolt industry has experienced very
slow growth over the past 30 years and experts predict the same steady, slow growth for
the foreseeable future.
Your firm has audited Bolt Co. for the past ten years so the engagement partner has a
very good understanding of the firm and the industry in which the company operates.
Consistent with industry trends, the partner expected Bolt Co. to experience about 3%
growth in the current year. Further, the partner set the threshold on the engagement to
3% of the expectation.
By analyzing the percentage change in the number of Bolt Co.’s new customers, which is
an analytical review procedure, the senior on the engagement was very surprised to find
that Bolt Co. gained 13 new customers this year. This represents a 13% increase and is
especially surprising since the scissor industry is so stable and the overall industry
demand for scissor bolts increased only 3% (as expected) this year. The senior has asked
you to find out why the client gained so many new customers this year.
Let’s turn to the financials to conduct analytical review!

<<PUT BOLT CO. FINANCIALS ON OVERHEAD HERE>>
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FIGURE C1. Training Case Materials: Financial Information Presented to All Participants During
Training.

Explanation of Financial Terms
Before we delve too deeply into trying to figure out why Bolt Co. gained so many new
customers compared to expectation, let’s take a moment to familiarize ourselves with
Bolt Co.’s financial information, which is very similar to the format of the information
you will receive in the case you will be asked to work.
Notice that there are three categories of information: (1) ratios, (2) account balances, and
(3) other information.


Each category provides you with a different type of information that you may find
useful in determining what caused the unexpected fluctuation (in Bolt Co.’s case,
the unexpected fluctuation we are trying to explain is why Bolt Co. attracted so
many new customers this year).
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The information provided by each of the information categories may help you
come up with potential explanations for the unexpected fluctuation or may help
you to rule out some of your other explanations.

You’ll notice there are five columns in the spreadsheet. Let’s discuss these five column
headings:
Last Year (Audited): This information is the result of last year’s audit and, therefore, can
be considered completely reliable.
Expected Change: This represents the partner’s expected change this year compared to
last year. Since these expectations are generated by the partner, you can consider them
completely reliable.
This Year (Expected): This is the account balance expectation developed by the
engagement partner. This expectation can be considered completely reliable.
This Year (Unaudited): This is information provided to your accounting firm by the
client. The information has not been audited, so there is no assurance regarding its
accuracy or reliability.
Threshold (High/Low): These amounts represent the boundaries of the threshold. If an
account’s balance lies within the two, the account is not deemed to deviate from the
expectation. If an account’s balance is below the low or above the high, the account is
considered to deviate from the partner’s expectation.
Sample Case
Now that you understand the format and content of the information being provided to
you, I will delve into finding out what caused the unexpected fluctuation.
Keep in mind that other members of the audit team have already set account balance
expectations, set the threshold (at 3%), and identified the unexpected fluctuation that
needs to be identified (the number of new clients increased by 13 this year which was
surprising because the partner did not expect Bolt Co. to gain any new clients this year).
9. Let’s examine the information to gain an understanding of Bolt Co. and the
unexpected fluctuation:
 Remember, we are trying to find cues that might give us some insight as to
what is causing the unexpected fluctuation.
 A good start is to consider accounts related to new customers to see if any
of them exhibited unexpected behavior.

162



If any accounts related to the unexpected fluctuation are out of tolerance,
we probably want to identify them because they could help explain why
Bolt Co. attracted so many new customers

10. Thus, the first thing I am going to do is make a note of those accounts that are
related to the unexpected fluctuation and are out of threshold.
Looking over the information available:
 I know that sales are related to new customers, so I’m going to count the
fact sales increased by 16% as relevant to explaining why Bolt Co. may
have gained new customers.
 Thus, I am going to make a note of this in the application
 USING APPLICATION: record this cue by pressing the correct
button and typing “Sales increased by 16%, much greater than the
3% expected increase”






I know that the percent of customers with outstanding balances over 90
days may be related to new customers (since more customers means some
of those new customers probably will not pay Bolt Co. in a timely
manner). However, if Bolt Co. is attracting the same quality of customers,
I wouldn’t expect this figure to jump as much as it did (200%).
 USING APPLICATION: record this cue by pressing the correct
button and typing “Percentage of customers with balances over 90
days increased by 200%, much greater than the 2% expected
increase”
I would expect accounts receivable to increase with new customers, so I’m
going to consider the fact that accounts receivable increased by 25% as
relevant – especially since I would expect accounts receivable to increase
by 13% if Bolt Co. gained 13% new customers… the fact that it is up 25%
is a bit odd especially since the order size among customers has remained
consistent.
 USING APPLICATION: record this cue by typing “Accounts
receivable increased by 25%, much greater than the 3% expected
increase”
I would expect bad debt expense to increase proportionally with new
customers, so I’m surprised it is up 133%
 USING APPLICATION: record this cue by typing “Bad debt
expense was up 133%, much greater than the 3% expectation”
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11. Now that I have identified the information cues I believe are related to the reason
the number of customers increased, the next step is to generate explanations for
why the number of customers increased so much. Because I know you are getting
tired of hearing me talk I’m only going to propose 3 explanations, although there
are many more possible:
 Explanation #1: USING APPLICATION, type in “Bolt Co. cut the price
of its bolts causing customers to switch to Bolt Co. from other scissor bolt
manufacturers, increasing sales”
 Explanation #2: USING APPLICATION, type in “Bolt Co. spent a lot
more on advertising so it attracted new customers”
 Explanation #3: USING APPLICATION, type in “Bolt Co. loosened its
credit policy, resulting in new, lower-credit quality customers buying from
Bolt Co.”
Now that I have identified some potential reasons Bolt Co. may have gained so many
new customers, I am going to evaluate each proposed explanation and select the one that
I believe best explains why Bolt Co. gained so many new customers:
1. My first proposed explanation was that Bolt Co. cut the price of its bolts, causing
new customers to order from it. However, looking at the information provided, I
see that the average price per bolt sold remained at 5 cents. Therefore, it does not
seem that Bolt Co. cut its price, so I no longer believe this is the reason Bolt Co.
obtained so many new customers.
2. My second proposed explanation was that Bolt Co. spent a lot more money on
advertising, leading to the attraction of new customers. Although I don’t really
have any direct information on advertising expense, I do see that sales, general,
and advertising expense did not increase. This indirectly suggests Bolt Co. did
not spend more money on advertising. Thus, based on indirect evidence, I tend to
believe more advertising is not the reason for the new customers.
3. My third proposed explanation is that Bolt Co. may have loosened its credit
policy. Looking over the information and cues I believe to be relevant, I do see
that bad debt expense jumped 133% and I would expect to see this happen if the
credit policy was eased because a looser credit policy means weaker-credit quality
customers are approved.
I also see that the percentage of customers with balances over 90 days old
increased, which I would expect to see if Bolt Co. was taking on customers with
weaker credit. Further, I see that accounts receivable jumped 25%, something I
would expect to see if companies with weaker credit were approved – those new
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customers are probably more likely to buy products on credit, rather than pay cash
– and since they are less credit worthy, they probably take longer to pay their
bills, as well.
Looking over the rest of the information, it doesn’t look like the credit manager
changed, so that means its not the credit manager, so it could be the policy. There
seems to be a lot of evidence suggesting this is the reason for the increase in the
number of new customers.


Thus, after reviewing all the information available and thinking matters over, I
decide that I believe the reason Bolt Co. gained so many new customers this year
was because it eased its credit policy. Now that I have selected a reason to
explain the cause of the unexpected fluctuation, analytical review is complete.
o USING APPLICATION, select this reason as the “best explanation” then
show users how to exit out of application.

One thing that you will notice about analytical review is that there isn’t necessarily a
“smoking gun” that clearly indicates what caused the unexpected fluctuation. Instead,
conducting analytical review requires you to use your knowledge of accounting and
account relationships to come up with possible explanations.
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APPENDIX D:
ONLINE POST-EXPERIMENT QUESTIONNAIRE
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(ARD Intervention and Combined-Aid Intervention)
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(PCA Intervention and Combined-Aid Intervention)

(PCA Intervention and Combined-Aid Intervention)
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(All Interventions)
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APPENDIX E:
ORAL SCRIPT DELIVERED TO PARTICIPANTS DURING THE MAIN TASK
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Stage 1: Case Familiarization and Pattern Recognition Stage (All treatments)
Oral Instructions (All treatments)
This study examines how new auditors perform analytical review. You will be asked to
read a short case. Then, you will conduct analytical review to find the cause of an
unexpected fluctuation. Please read and evaluate the information to the best of your
ability.
 I don’t want to ruin the surprise, but you all have been hired by a Big Four public
accounting firm.
 In the yellow information package, you will see that you have two pages of
background information, a page of financial information, and a page containing
your assignment from the audit senior.
 The financial information that you have received in the package is also in
electronic format in the Excel application
 Let’s all open the Excel application together. Please click on the Excel file on
your desktop.
 [AFTER LOGIN SCREEN POP UP] The login screen will pop up. Please enter
your user name and password. You’ll see a screen with a few buttons and some
financial information.
Stage 1: Your Assignment
(All treatments, all treatments except the no-aid condition, no-aid condition)
Your senior has asked you to spend 15 minutes looking over the audit workpapers to
become familiar with Bean Co.
As you look over the workpapers, keep in mind the company’s cost of sales ratio was
lower than expected. During this stage, your senior has asked you to record any
information cues you feel were related to the cause of the decline in the cost of sales
ratio by clicking the button labeled “Click here to enter a piece of information
associated with the decrease in the cost of sales ratio.” [SHOW BUTTON AND
DEMONSTRATE HOW TO ENTER PIECE OF INFORMATION].
Please enter each information cue that you believe is related to the unexpected
fluctuation separately. Thus, each information cue should be entered alone by
clicking the “Click here to enter a piece of information associated with the decrease
in the cost of sales ratio” button.
After you enter information cues, you can also edit them by clicking the button
labeled “Click here to review / edit the pieces of information associated with the
decline in the cost of sales ratio.” [SHOW BUTTON AND DEMONSTRATE HOW
TO EDIT / DELETE]’
As you look over the workpapers, keep in mind the company’s cost of sales ratio was
lower than expected. Please identify and record the information cues (account balances,
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ratios, or other information) that you believe are related to the decline of the cost of sales
ratio.
Please take 15 minutes to get familiar with the case information and identify the
information cues you feel are related to explaining why the cost of sales ratio declined.
 Remember, in this stage you are not trying to come up with explanations about
why the unexpected fluctuation occurred, rather you are just trying to get familiar
with Bean Co. and identify information cues you feel are associated with the
cause of the cost of sales ratio decline.
<<At this point the proctor waits 15 minutes. After 15 minutes, Stage 1 ends.>>
Stage 2: Explanation Generation Stage
(All treatments, activity relationship diagram treatment, pattern-consideration aid
treatment)
Please click the button labeled “Stage 2” at the top of your application. The password is:
“accounting.”
Now that you are familiar with Bean Co., your senior has asked you to take at least 15
minutes to come up with as many potential explanations as you can to explain why Bean
Co.’s cost of sales ratio declined. Once you have come up with a potential explanation,
please type it into the application by pressing the button labeled “Please click here to
enter a potential explanation for the decrease in the cost of sales ratio.” [SHOW
BUTTON AND HOW TO DO THIS]
You will notice that when you press this button you are shown the cues you identified as
associated with the cost of sales ratio decline. Because you felt these cues are related to
the unexpected fluctuation, you might find it helpful to refer to these cues when coming
up with potential explanations for the cause of the cost of sales ratio decline.
To help you come up with potential explanations for the cause of the cost of sales ratio
decline, you might find it helpful to refer to the diagram handed to you during this stage.
The diagram might help you come up with potential explanations by making it easier to
see the links between the unexpected fluctuation and the related accounts.
The diagram might also help you identify information related to the unexpected
fluctuation that you did not record in the last stage. Please remember to record
information you believe may be related to the unexpected fluctuation by pressing the
button labeled “Click here to enter a piece of information associated with the
decrease in the cost of sales ratio.” [SHOW BUTTON AND DEMONSTRATE
HOW TO ENTER PIECE OF INFORMATION].
Please note that during this stage you may still add information cues you believe are
associated with the reason the cost of sales ratio declined if you would like to do so.
Your senior also encourages you to save your file a few times during the engagement.
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After 15 minutes has passed, I will give you a handout containing the instructions for
moving to Stage 3. However, this does not mean you must immediately proceed to Stage
3. Please take your time and move to Stage 3 only when you are ready.
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APPENDIX F:
WRITTEN INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN TO PARTICIPANTS IN STAGE THREE
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Stage 3: Explanation Evaluation and Selection Stage
(All treatments, pattern-consideration aid, activity relationship diagram)
Now that you have finished developing a list of potential explanations for the decline in
the cost of sales ratio, your senior has asked you to evaluate your explanations and
choose the one that best describes why the cost of sales ratio declined.
 To do this, please click the button labeled “Click here to select the best
explanation for the decrease in the cost of sales ratio.”
 To help you evaluate each of your potential explanations for the cost of sales ratio
decline, you might find it helpful to refer to the diagram handed to you during the
last stage. Because the diagram displays the relationships between Bean Co.’s
operating activities and accounts, it might make it easier to see how well each of
your proposed explanations addresses the cost of sales ratio decline.
 After clicking the button, you will notice the screen displays your proposed
explanations, a column labeled “Supporting Pieces,” and a column labeled “Best
Explanation” (the last 2 columns will be blank, for now)
 Before you can select the best explanation you need to evaluate each of your
proposed explanations against the information cues you identified as related. To
do this:
o Double click on a proposed explanation
 This will take you to anther screen where you are asked to “check”
the box of each piece of information the proposed explanation you
are evaluating addresses.
 Please check the box next to each piece of information that
supports your proposed explanation.
 After you check the appropriate boxes please hit the green “Save”
button.
 You will see that you are taken back to the explanation evaluation
screen, but now the column labeled “Supporting Pieces” tells you
how many pieces of information support the explanation you just
evaluated.
 Now, please do the same thing for your other proposed
explanations.
 After each of your proposed explanations has a number in the
“Supporting Pieces” column, you can select the explanation you
believe is the actual cause of the cost of sales ratio decline.
o Before choosing an explanation that describes why the cost of sales ratio
declined, feel free to double click any of your proposed explanations to
review the information cues you felt supported it.
o When you are ready to choose an explanation double click on it.
 The check box screen will pop up again.
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Click the button labeled “Select as Best Explanation.” A pop up
box will ask you to confirm your selection.
 You will then be taken back to the main screen
After choosing the explanation you feel best describes why the cost of sales ratio
declined, your senior has asked you to rate each of your explanations in terms of how
likely you feel each explanation is the actual cause of the cost of sales ratio decline.
 To do this, please click the button labeled “Click here to assess the probability
your explanations have identified the reason the cost of sales ratio decreased.”
 You will see all your proposed explanations, including the one you selected.
o You will also see the number of information cues you felt supported each
proposed explanation.
o Type in a probability for each of your proposed explanations. The
probability you enter is how likely you think the proposed explanation is
the actual cause of the cost of sales ratio decline.
o Please note that the probabilities you assign do not have to sum to 100%.
 Thus, you could assign one of your explanations an 80% chance it
was as the actual cause and give another explanation a 75% chance
it was the actual cause of the cost of sales ratio decline.

 When you have finished, please click the “End” button. Excel will close.
 Please raise your hand once the application has closed and I will direct you to the
last part of the experiment.
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